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Summary
Modem studies of Classical Greek battle devote little attention to the role and 
importance of the general in achieving battlefield success. As a result of this the 
general is reduced to a simple leader of men whose only influential decision was 
where and when to fight, and whose major role was to provide inspiration by 
fighting in the front ranks. A modem conception of Hellenic fair play in warfare has 
further limited the importance of the general to Greek armies: apparently advanced 
manoeuvring and tactics were deliberately rejected in favour of a simple and direct 
test of strength and morale. I do not believe this to be the case, and in this study I 
demonstrate the importance of the general to Greek armies by offering a new 
analysis of his role in hoplite battle.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Warfare in the Classical Greek world was chaotic and bloody. Its central 
importance to Greek self-identification is evident from the shared Greek heritage of 
the Iliad and by the choice of the great fifth and fourth century historians to frame 
their work within a military context; warfare and struggle were at the very heart of 
Greek culture.1 In this study I examine the surviving battle descriptions in order to 
present a new analysis of the battlefield role of the general; in this I do not wish to 
present an encomium of ‘good’ generalship or ‘effective commanders’, instead my 
focus is on demonstrating what was possible, and what was believed to be possible, 
for average Classical Greek generals to achieve on the battlefield. Common modem 
views regarding the battlefield role of the general include his being little more than a 
first amongst equals, an individual who led from the front and inspired his men to 
greater efforts, and fought until he fell; a man whose role as commander was greatly 
diminished after the signal to advance was given, this signal representing a switch 
from an organiser of men to an inspirational figurehead. A detailed survey of the 
evidence is required in order to see if these views can be considered to be accurate, 
and an effective framework is needed if this survey is to be relevant and useful. For 
this framework I have chosen the familiar structural progression of a hoplite battle, 
namely: the advance to battle, fighting, othismos, and pursuit.
This breakdown of a hoplite battle is recognisable in most battle descriptions, 
and represents a logical analysis of the action and shifting circumstances of combat.
1 Vemant (1990) 29,47; Hanson (2000a) 22, 219; van Wees (2001) 38-9; Homblower (2007) 22-3,28.
2 Hanson (2000a) 107-8; Schwartz (2009) 180-1.
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By approaching each stage and discussing evidence which indicates the presence, or 
absence, of a role for the general it will be possible to bring together an overall 
image of the breadth of possibilities open to Classical Greek generals. This approach 
requires not just an analysis of the surviving evidence for the battlefield role of 
generals, but also a detailed examination of the scholarship, evidence, and 
progression of each of the four elements identified. Understanding the battlefield 
environment of hoplite engagements is necessary for understanding the potential and 
actual role of the general, and the extent of current misunderstanding of Greek battle 
goes some way to explaining the relative lack of attention that has been paid to the 
battlefield role of generals. If we do not have a clear or realistic understanding of 
how hoplite battles progressed from advance to pursuit then we cannot gain an 
accurate image of what the battlefield role of the general was.
This thesis is necessary as most modem scholarship pays relatively little 
attention to the battlefield role of generals and subordinate commanders, focusing 
instead on the physical conditions of warfare,3 the nature of hoplite equipment,4 the 
connection between competition, culture, and warfare,5 or a combination of all four.6 
While the study of the battlefield role of Classical Greek generals per se has been 
largely passed over by modem scholarship, several highly useful studies of 
individual generals have been published. Cartledge’s exhaustive study of Agesilaus 
offers a detailed chapter on his generalship and command style, as well as offering 
insightful comment on the importance of the Theban general Epaminondas to the
3 A trend begun by Kegan (1974) and taken up in Hanson (1991) and (2000). See also Cartledge 
(1977); Salmon (1977); Cawkwell (1978) (1989); Lazenby (1991); Krentz (1995); Schwartz (2009); 
Matthew (2009.)
4 See, e.g. Snodgrass (1964), (1967); Jarva (1996.)
5 Garlan (1975); (Dawson (1996); Santosuosso (1997); Lendon (2005.)
6 van Wees (2004); Rawlings (2007).
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development of heavy infantry tactics.7 In 1993 Roisman published an innovative 
study of the Athenian general Demosthenes and his use of surprise in battle; 
Roisman briefly expanded on Best’s 1969 analysis of light infantry in Greek battle, 
before coming to the conclusion that Demosthenes was too fond of taking extreme 
risks to be considered one of the ‘great’ commanders of the time.8 Wylie and Hanson 
have offered useful investigations into the careers of Brasidas and Epaminondas 
respectively, while Pritchett, Bianco and Konecny give detailed accounts of 
Iphicrates.9 In 2000 and 2006 Hutchinson published monographs on various aspects 
of command and specific commanders in Classical Greece, including chapters 
examining Brasidas, Demosthenes, and Jason of Pherae; his works are useful but do 
not really break any new ground.10 The focus of other scholars has, for the past 
century, been mostly on the socio-political roles of Athenian generals as agents of 
the state, rather than as individual military commanders, or as commanders per se.n 
None of these works analyse the broader theme of generalship, and an analysis of the 
battlefield role of the general throughout Classical Greece is needed.
The modem study of ancient Greek warfare really began with Anderson’s 
classic Military Theory and Practice in the Age o f Xenophon}2 Anderson devoted a
7 Cartledge (1987) 203-242.
8 Roisman (1993) 72-5; Best (1969.) For Demosthenes see also Woodcock (1928); Wilson (1979); 
Strassler (1990); Wylie (1993).
9 Whiley (1992); Hanson (1988); Bianco (1997); Pritchett (1974) 117-125; Konecny (2001.) See also, 
though with less focus on tactical matters, Kallet (1983) and Harris (1989)
10 Hutchinson (2000); (2006.)
11 Hence the preponderance of material regarding generals in politics, rather than the military: E.g. 
Mayor (1939); Pritchett (1940); Ehrenberg (1945); Jameson (1955); Lewis (1961); Frost (1964a), 
(1964b), (1968); Hammond (1969); Jordan (1970); Baidan (1971); Hansen (1975); Salmond (1992); 
Hamel (1995); Salmond (1996); Bryant (1990); Hamel (1998); Runciman (1998); Berent (2000); 
Bekker-Nielsen & Hannestad (eds) (2001.)
12 Although the contributions of Tam (1930); Lorimer (1947) and Adcock (1957) all played an 
important role in the development of arguments and controversies regarding Greek warfare none is as 
comprehensive or detailed as Anderson.
10
chapter to ‘The General and his Officers’ but his focus was primarily on leadership 
rather than generalship, and while his recognition of the importance of officers, and 
his analyses of various battles are useful, his work is limited to the Fourth century.13 
Pritchett devoted a significant part of his second volume examining The Greek State 
at War to the hoplite general, but his concern was to highlight the connection 
between general and state rather than to investigate the battlefield role of generals; 
two other chapters examine the mercenary captains of the fourth century, again with 
socio-political, rather than military, goals in mind.14
In The Western Way o f War Hanson attempted to create an image of the 
hoplite general as a figure of morale and inspiration than of tactics and strategy; this 
general was a solid individual whose role was to fight, be seen to fight, and die on 
the battlefield if he could not return victorious.15 His chapter is tellingly entitled ‘A 
Soldier’s General’, and it plays an important role in his overall conception of hoplite 
warfare being a deliberately ‘simple’ system. Hanson selects several excellent 
sources which all speak to the need for practical, hardy individuals able to share in 
the suffering of their men, and exceed them in drive, determination, and example. 
Thus Archilochus spoke of his desire for a stolid commander, uninterested in good 
looks or fashionable trinkets, while we are reminded that there appears to have been 
a fine tradition of generals falling on the battlefield; the Athenian general Lysicles 
had the gall to survive the battle of Chaeronea, being executed for his troubles.16 
This tradition is central to Hanson’s conception of generalship, according to him
13 Anderson (1970) 67-83.
14 Pritchett (1974) 4-125.
15 Hanson (2000a) 107-116.
16 Hanson (2000a) 110-1. Archilochus 114; Diodorus 16.88.2. See chapter 2 for more detail.
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“...all believed that their supreme commander could best further his army’s cause by
1 7leadership through example...” This may have been true; leadership by example 
was, and remains, an important aspect when leading any group of people, especially 
soldiers. However Hanson is at risk of over-simplifying here; just because various 
sources complement the hardy, inspirational leader does not mean that generalship 
was limited to fighting, and being seen to fight. Indeed numerous examples of 
generals influencing the course of battles during actual combat exist, from picking 
the right moment to attack, to initiating flanking cavalry attacks mid-battle, to 
restraining an entire army once the battle had been won; it is the central aim of this 
study to bring these incidents to the forefront, in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
role of the general was not as limited as Hanson and others suggest.
The most recent treatment of hoplite battle, that of Schwartz, offers four 
pages on the role and position of the general within the phalanx, and gives a list of
1 o
those generals who were killed in battle between 512 and 323. He points out that 
there was an expectation that the general would join in the fighting, and even lead 
the phalanx in the front ranks, but does not offer any analysis to extend or 
complement Hanson’s brief chapter in his Western Way o f War.
An alternative view to Hanson’s was presented by Wheeler, who contributed 
a chapter dealing with the ‘General as Hoplite’ to Hoplites: The Classical Greek 
Battle Experience in 1991. Wheeler summarised the then communis opinio thus:
17 Hanson (2000a) 107.
18 Schwartz (2009) 179-183.
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“The Homeric warrior converted to phalanx commander retained his 
role of physical leader in battle and stationed himself in the front ranks of the 
phalanx. Indeed, given the limited tactical manoeuverability of the phalanx 
once battle was decided upon and the army was deployed as desired, the 
commander could do little to influence the battle and thus took his place in 
the ranks to aid the physical effort of combat. In this view the high fatality 
rates of generals and the types of wounds received confirm the commander’s 
station in the front ranks.”19
Wheeler expressed dissatisfaction with this model, and offered criticism 
regarding the supposed simplicity of the role of the general, pointing out that the 
death of a general did not always result in defeat for his army, that the evidence does 
not prove that all generals inevitably fought in the front ranks, and that any search 
for a ‘typical’ hoplite battle is fraught with difficulty.20 Wheeler centred his 
discussion on the changing role of the general that he described as transitioning from 
‘Homeric warrior-chief to ‘battlefield-manager’; from an individual who always
91entered combat to one who sometimes did so. His point is well made, although it 
does not amount to a ‘demolition’ of Hanson’s conception of the hoplite general, as
99Wheeler claimed in the introduction to a recently published collection of articles. 
Wheeler’s discussion was brief, and although he pointed out that “A number of 
anecdotes relate commanders making tactical decisions at the beginning or in the 
middle of battles” he cited few examples and did not offer any detailed discussion of
j ' lthem. Wheeler expanded his ideas regarding the hoplite general in his contribution 
to the Cambridge History o f Greek and Roman Warfare, in a sub-section entitled,
19 Wheeler (1991) 124.
20 Wheeler (1991) 125-6
21 Wheeler (1991) 124; Keegan (1987) 315-38. Pritchett offered a brief response to Wheeler’s 
argument in his Essays in Greek History published in 1994 in which he essentially reaffirmed the 
position of the general as a hoplite fighting in the front ranks. Pritchett (1994) 111-44.
22 Wheeler (2007b) xxi.
23 Wheeler (1991) 148-9.
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perhaps ironically, ‘The Emergence of Generalship’.24 He stressed the teaching of 
hoplomachia, fighting with hoplite equipment, in the fourth century as an indication 
of increased awareness of the need for tactical flexibility and competent troops, 
although the main thrust of his argument was that the real, and piecemeal, 
development in Greek warfare during the Fifth and Fourth centuries was in strategy, 
not battlefield command.
The scholarship discussed above represents the extent of discussion regarding 
the battlefield role of the hoplite general; a clear position is yet to emerge, and a 
detailed study of the extent to which generals could influence the course of battles, 
whether from the front ranks or within the phalanx itself, is required. I do not deny 
the importance of the social, political, and cultural aspects of generalship in Classical 
Greece, especially for Athenian commanders, but a great deal of excellent 
scholarship has examined these elements during the past forty years and I do not 
wish to follow like with like; while a new study examining the political and social 
power of generals would be useful, it is not needed nearly as much as an attempt to 
demonstrate the limits and possibilities of the general’s influence of battle.26 Modem 
scholarship has also long focused on ‘face of battle’ or socio-anthropological studies, 
and while both of these approaches have yielded fascinating results, they have 
resulted in a distinct lack of attention being paid to the role of the general on the 
battlefield itself.27
24 Wheeler (2007a) 213-223.
25 Wheeler (2007a) 222.
26 See Fomara (1971); Pritchett (1974); Lenaguer (1979); Hamel (1995), (1998.)
27 See Wheeler (2007b) xx-xxv for criticism of the ‘face of battle’ approach, and the danger of 
pushing modem theories of battle onto ancient armies. See Hanson (2007) 16-18 for the importance of 
‘face of battle’ studies and his opinion that no particular school currently dominates the field, and 19-
14
The notion of an ‘emergence’ or ‘development’ of generalship during the 
fifth century, and especially after the Peloponnesian war, is something which would 
benefit from re-examination. Is this a result of the nature of our surviving sources, or 
a reflection of reality? The chronological progression from Herodotus to Thucydides 
to Xenophon is accompanied by a progression from the militarily interested amateur 
to the intellectual ex-general with some experience of warfare within Greece to the 
professional general with experience of warfare from mainland Greece to the middle 
of Mesopotamia; it is only natural that each of these sources will present a different 
version of battle and warfare as a whole, as such we must be very careful in 
ascribing to reality something that may be nothing more than a reflection of these 
authors’ principal areas of interest and expertise.
The modem study of Greek warfare has focused largely on the fundamental 
elements of battle, the hoplite and the phalanx, with good reason: it was heavily 
armed hoplites fighting in phalanx formation who resisted the Persian invasions at 
Marathon, Thermopylae and Plataea, and hoplites, not peltasts, cavalry, or light 
infantry, who took centre stage in the many small clashes and occasional great land 
battles of the Peloponnesian and Theban wars. Modem scholarship has followed 
this ancient concentration on the hoplite and has created an image of warfare in 
which the hoplite reigned supreme, and where the ‘hoplite ethos’ pervaded both 
warfare and society as a whole; some scholars have even praised the way the Greeks 
made war upon each other, seeing in it a form of honour and glory sorely missing
20 for the overspecialisation and narrow focus of military history as a whole.
28 Cavalry has also received detailed treatment during the past twenty years: Bugh (1988) Spence 
(1993); Worley (1994); Gaebel (1994.) The battlefield role of light infantry has received little to no 
detailed examination since Best (1969), although modem attitudes to how the Greeks viewed missile 
weapons appear to be slowly changing: Krentz (2002); Homblower (2007) 40-2; Wheeler (2007a.)
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from the sometimes faceless and detached warfare of the industrial age. Thus 
Hanson commented on the “...wonderful, absurd conspiracy...” of hoplite battle, a 
system of warfare which he viewed as operating not to end lives, but, paradoxically,
90to save them. The concentration on frontal defence by individual hoplites- a 
concentration magnified greatly by the phalanx formation as a whole -  the limited 
use of advanced tactics, command structure, and effectively integrated mixed forces, 
resulted in a system that was appreciated and understood by all ‘true’ Greeks, with 
the opprobrium attached to departures from the norm being enough to ensure the 
system survived and endured. This is an attractive notion, for many different reasons. 
What better justification for the continued study of the ancient world, and Greek 
warfare in particular, than if we can claim that it was imbued with something that we 
have lost, an ethereal quality or different worldview that is worthy of rediscovery 
and detailed contemplation? Something that would make this world, edging 
inexorably towards catastrophe and conflict, a ‘better place’ if we could truly 
understand it? Worthy reasons indeed to attempt to ‘decode’ the Greek attitude 
towards, and methods of undertaking, warfare.
A contrasting approach has appeared over the last decade which seeks to 
analyse Greek warfare and hoplite battle in particular as a form of warfare that was 
grounded in practicality and only limited by the inventiveness of those who fought 
within it. Thus in 2000 van Wees contributed a chapter to his own edited volume 
War & Violence in Ancient Greece in which he questioned many of the most 
influential theories at that time; this argument was greatly expanded in his Greek
29 Hanson (1991) 6.
16
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Warfare: Myths and Realities, published four years later. Meanwhile in 2002 Peter 
Krentz suggested that Josiah Ober’s ‘Rules of war’ could not stand as a pseudo-legal, 
or even pseudo-moral, framework with which to analyze and understand Classical
o  i
Greek warfare. Krentz pointed out that most of the twelve rules suggested by Ober 
were frequently broken, and concluded that they were a matter of military tactics, 
rather than set protocol.
The debate has continued to rage; 2007 saw the publication of the Cambridge 
History o f Greek and Roman Warfare, with contributions from many of the leading 
authorities on Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman warfare. The two edited volumes are 
excellent pieces of scholarship; they summarise many of the on-going arguments and 
offer some new approaches and insight into the way the ancients waged war, 
however they are, by nature, limited, and some topics that need serious consideration 
are largely passed over. Excellent though it is the Cambridge History has not 
settled the matter of how to approach or understand Greek warfare, with monographs 
published since from Rawlings and Schwartz, and articles from Matthew and Krentz, 
raising new points and offering new interpretations of the surviving ancient 
evidence. There are contrary opinions on the nature of every element of Greek 
warfare, from the development of hoplite equipment through to whether or not 
hoplites would, or indeed could, pursue a defeated army. By approaching Greek 
warfare from the head of a general down, rather than from the feet of a hoplite up, I
30 van Wees (2000) 125-66, (2004.)
31 Ober (1996) 53-72; Krentz (2002.)
32 Most notably that of othismos.
33 Rawlings (2007); Schwartz (2009); Matthew (2009); Krentz (2010.)
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will shed new light on these issues, and add another piece to the puzzle of warfare in 
the Classical Greek world.
This is primarily a literary study, one that is based on the main historical 
sources surviving for the Fifth and Fourth centuries BC. Thus there is extensive 
reference to Herodotus’ Histories, Thucydides’ History o f the Peloponnesian War, 
and Xenophon’s Hellenica, collected minor works and Anabasis?* Other 
contemporary sources such as the dramatists, as well as the Attic orators and the 
Hellenica Oxyrynchia, are cited when and where they are appropriate, but they do 
not, collectively or individually, contain much information regarding the battlefield 
role of the general. Equally epigraphic and archaeological sources are of relatively 
little use when determining the role, and possible role, of the Greek general. Where 
these other forms of literary evidence offer descriptions, discussions, or dramatic 
incidents that relate directly to the topic then I offer analysis. Thus Euripides is of 
great use in attempting to understand the amount of space available to individuals in 
the phalanx; his description of a fight between two brothers equipped as hoplites is 
illuminating, especially his, and the scholiast’s, reference to the ‘Thessalian trick’.35 
The plays of Aristophanes frequently complement information from the historical 
sources relating to military matters or procedure, while his occasional ad hominem 
jokes and barbs are of great use when attempting to understand the popular view of 
battle and indeed war itself. His unrelenting mockery of Cleonymus for throwing
34 Although the title History o f the Peloponnesian War does not appear in Thucydides’ work, it is a 
much more agreeable title than ‘the war of the Athenians and Peloponnesians’ or ‘the Atheno- 
Peloponnesian War,’ and is commonly used by all modem translators. Homblower (1987) 7-8,13; 
(1991)5.
35 Euripides Phoenicians 1404-13. See Chapter 4 a.
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- jz :  ' i n
away his shield, his shots at Lamachus in the Acharnians, and his attack on an 
unnamed officer in the Peace are all indications of common feeling towards certain
O Q
behaviours in battle, although they must be treated with a great deal of caution. 
Indeed Lamachus was perhaps undeserving of such harsh treatment, and is certainly 
not deserving of the judgment that Hanson gives him as a ridiculous figure of 
ostentation, detached from the troops and so concerned with self-image that his 
commitment to enter battle can be doubted.40 Lamachus, it is to be remembered, met 
his death on the island of Sicily when he went to the aid of an Athenian force being 
routed by Syracusan infantry and cavalry; as a result of this became cut off from 
most of his men, being killed along with five or six others.41 He was certainly willing 
to enter combat, and was praised by Plato as being wise and courageous.42
This study is primarily based on the evidence found in contemporary 
Classical texts, and the evidence of Homer, Tyrtaeus, Plutarch, Diodorus and 
Polybius is generally only used in support of points or evidence that can be found in 
the more reliable or contemporary sources, while the evidence of the tacticians 
Polyaenus, Arrian, Asclepiodotus and Aelian is used sparingly. My justification for 
this methodology is simple: we have a wealth of surviving contemporary evidence 
from individuals who had, if not direct experience of hoplite battle, then at least 
grown up and lived in a society whose military focus was that of the hoplite. While 
the Iliad contains many vivid, even disturbing, battle descriptions, and there are
36 Aristophanes Birds 1473-81.
37 Aristophanes Acharnians 1069-1226.
38 Aristophanes Peace 1171, 1295-1304.
39 Discussed further in chapter 3.
40 Hanson (2000a) 110.
41 Thucydides 6.101-103.
42 Plato Laches 197C.
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occasional glimpses of a concern for organised formation, it is difficult to detect a 
concern for the organised phalanx of the fifth and fourth centuries. In this I do not 
mean to trivialise the importance of Homer to the cultural, social, and military 
history of Greece, rather I do this to ensure a sharp focus can be maintained.
My reliance on the three main historical authors of the Classical period is, in 
part, forced, as many battle descriptions, discussions of warfare, and portraits of 
generals survive only in the works of these three, however this reliance is also 
embraced thanks to the varying levels of personal knowledge and experience of 
warfare that each one possessed. Problems still remain though: none of these ‘big 
three’ actually directly describes or discusses the basic building blocks of Greek 
warfare: they generally assume knowledge on the part of the reader as to the methods 
and techniques of warfare, while only offering comment on incidents that their 
audience may not have understood. Hence Thucydides remarks that the Spartans 
advance to the sound of the flute in order to keep in step rather than for religious 
reasons, but makes no mention of how hoplites actually fought, and offers very little 
information or comment regarding what generals could do while on the battlefield.43 
Equally Herodotus reports the presence of a ‘special unit’ of hoplites and archers that 
were used to good effect at the battle of Plataea, although he does not describe how 
the unit operated or how it was formed.44 To a certain degree this is not surprising: 
none of the ancient authors wrote in order to preserve the Hellenic martial arts. 
Indeed their goals were generally loftier, being concerned with warfare as a 
historical, political, and social construct with which to analyse other, more
43 Thucydides 5.70.
44 Herodotus 1.82. Whitby (2007) 64-5.
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fundamental, topics. As such we must look to the battle descriptions that they offer, 
and attempt to build an image of generalship, and warfare, from a collage of 
vignettes, anecdotes, and remarkable incidents.
This collage is made up of information that, in the majority of cases, would 
have been passed on to the author verbally, and in some cases after a considerable 
amount of time had elapsed. This is a concern considering the difficulties of 
extracting reliable information from those who witnessed, or participated in, 
traumatic events; such difficulties formed the opening arguments of Whatley’s 
classic paper examining the difficulties of reconstructing ancient battles.45 Anybody 
who has witnessed or been part of a stressful and traumatic event will be aware of 
the difficulties associated with accurate memory recall: events move forwards and 
backwards in time, ‘tunnel vision’ results in misidentification of individuals and the 
unconscious ignoring of the most basic information, simple and vital actions are 
attributed to incorrect or even absent individuals, and particularly traumatic events 
can even result in physical or mental damage.46 Whatley provides an example in 
which he explains what happened when a Fellow of his college decided to 
investigate the value of the testimony of first-hand participants in battle; it is to be 
remembered that although Whatley’s paper was published in 1964, it was first 
delivered in 1920, two years after the end of the First World War. Whatley wrote 
that this Fellow:
45 Lazenby (1985) 3-5; Whatley (1964) 119-121. Shrimpton (1997) 245 for the view that Herodotus 
does not cite his sources when he is satisfied of their authenticity. Homblower (2000) 373-386
46 Herodotus 6.117. Krentz (2010) 157 for the suggestion that this was a case of conversion disorder 
or hysterical blindness.
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. .asked each man how many bombs he had thrown. The total of the 
answers came to 21: the correct total was 7. The N.C.O. was positive that the 
officer had recharged his revolver and that he and the officer between them 
had fired at least 12 shots. Really only 3 had been fired and the officer’s 
revolver had not been recharged.”47
Thus the confusion of battle would have been such that individuals would 
have had little conception of anything beyond their immediate surroundings; the 
information available to an individual hoplite in battle was also limited to his 
immediate surroundings, thus if an ancient author wished to fully reconstruct a single 
large engagement his information would come in the shape of accounts from men of 
differing mental ability, who were stationed at different parts of the line, and whose
AO
overall image of the battle may have differed greatly. The ancient source material 
is also complicated by the passage of time, which would have further distorted the 
memory of even these events.49 Little wonder that even Thucydides found describing 
large battles difficult. Authors also had their own, personal, reasons for supplying the 
information they did: Thucydides could surely have given more detail regarding the 
battle of Amphipolis,50 while the fine details that he provides regarding the Pylos 
campaign may have been included in order to present a damning image of the 
Athenian general Cleon, rather than out of concern for true accuracy.51
This lack of detailed information is unfortunate, but it can be overcome by 
the intelligent use of sources as a whole, rather than trying to over-analyse individual
47 Whatley (1964) 121.
48 Keegan (1976) 103; Tritle (2006) 219.
49 Whitby (2007) 54-5.
50 Thucydides 5.10: Thucydides was in command of a small squadron of triremes near Amphipolis at 
the time.
51 Thucydides 4.27-38, esp 28.
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battles in an attempt to make sense of, or recover, specific information pertaining to 
that particular battle. The information contained in the battle descriptions of the three 
main historical authors allows for an overall image of generalship in the Classical 
Greek world to be generated, even if it does not allow for the reconstruction of 
specific generals’ careers or actions in battle.
Herodotus’ accounts of the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae, and Plataea 
are referred to in the following chapters; each of these battle descriptions contains 
valuable information regarding the Greek experience of warfare and the battlefield 
role of the commander. While it is almost certain that Herodotus had some 
familiarity with the use of weapons, and may have had direct experience of conflict 
in the overthrow of Lygdamis, the tyrant of Halicarnassus, we have little 
information regarding his military experience. He does not inform us of any 
command position he may have held, and does not relate personal experiences of
S3warfare in the way that Thucydides and Xenophon did in their texts. However 
while Herodotus may not have been an experienced military authority, his 
descriptions of the two Persian invasions were almost certainly based on information 
learnt from actual participants, direct descendants, or friends of such.54 This 
information, some of it discovered “...in the taverns, on the quay side...”55 of the 
scattered Greek states would have exposed him second-hand to the gruesome reality 
of the battles of the Persian Wars.56
52 Suda s.v. Herodotus. Tritle (2006) 209-10.
53 Possibly because he did not himself have the experience of generalship, or access to the ready 
thoughts of those generals who fought in the Persian Wars: Bum (1984) 5; Tritle (2006) 210.
54 E.g. Herodotus 2.123,4.195, 7.152. Tritle (2006) 210; Krentz (2010) 12.
55 Myres (1953) 212.
56 Bum (1984) 5; Schepens (2007) 44-5.
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In this regard Herodotus’ evidence is difficult; he was not old enough to take 
a direct role in the Persian Wars, while many of those who fought in them, and 
certainly most of those who held a command position, would have been very old 
indeed when Herodotus came to make his enquiries of them: memories would have 
faded, glory intensified in the retelling. This much is suggested by Aristophanes’ 
amusing portrayal of the ‘Marathon-men’ in the Wasps: irritated by the softness of 
the current generation, the veterans emphasise how they overcame the Persians at 
Marathon, despite the size of their army, and eventually chased them off, skewering 
them like tuna -  an image of grumpy old men passing on tales made larger with each 
telling is difficult to escape!57 An image made all the more powerful by its reliance 
on the memory of such men in contemporary citizens’ minds, as it is unlikely that 
many survivors of Marathon were still alive. However, despite our difficulties in 
using Herodotus, we ignore or denigrate him at our peril; the scale of his work and 
the place of warfare within it are such that if we reject his evidence “...we are
C Q
cutting off the branch on which we sit...” His battle accounts, and the many asides 
and anecdotes contained in them, are of fundamental importance when attempting to 
construct a battlefield environment for the hoplite general and the hoplite, and while 
he may not have been as rigorous as Thucydides in his selection of evidence, it is 
this very quality which occasionally makes him of much greater value.59
Thucydides held the office of strategos at least once in his life, and his 
descriptions of the battles of Corinth, Aetolia, Sphacteria, Delium, Mantinea and
57 Aristophanes Wasps 1081-85. Discussed below.
58 Lazenby (1993) 15
59 Schepens (2007) 47.
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Syracuse, as well as various small skirmishes, are of great use.60 His claim to have 
started his work at the very beginning of the Peloponnesian War lends his work even 
greater authority; he lived through, spoke to direct participants in, and possibly even 
witnessed some of the greatest battles fought during the Classical period.61 It is true 
that he was not a notably successful general, indeed the only time he mentions his 
command is when he informs us that he could not save Amphipolis from Brasidas, 
being exiled from Athens as a result. However being outmanoeuvred by Brasidas is 
less of a judgment on Thucydides’ ability as a general than it is a demonstration of 
Brasidas’ superiority as a general. Indeed in many ways we are lucky that 
Thucydides lost Amphipolis to Brasidas; his interest in, and contrast of, Brasidas and 
Demosthenes, perhaps even his ability to write his account, may have been generated 
by the nature of his defeat and his subsequent exile from Athens.
Thucydides’ authority as a reliable and informed source is undoubted, but his 
work is not a military history or handbook, indeed at times it is frustratingly light on 
the practical details of both hoplite battle and the role of generals. Thucydides 
himself explained that this was deliberate, that his work was not a story designed to 
excite his contemporary audience but rather a creation for all time.64 In Thucydides’ 
case this has resulted in a preponderance of material regarding the planning, political 
motivations, and social implications of strategy, rather than specific details of
60 Thucydides 4.104-5. Croix (1972) 7-11; Homblower (1987) 157, 184; (1996) 331-334.
61 Thucydides 1.1. Homblower (1987) 39-40 for the suggestion that many aspects of Thucydides’ 
style could be due to his reading, and indeed writing, of military reports.
62 Thucydides 4.104-5. Homblower (1987) 3; (1996) 331-4.
63 Thucydides tells us he was in command of a squadron of seven ships and arrived too late to save the 
city: 4.104.
64 Thucydides 1.22. Flory (1990) 85; Homblower (1991) 59-62. Homblower (2000) 375-6 for the 
conjecture that this may be a criticism of Herodotus.
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individual engagements.65 However, his battle descriptions remain of great interest 
and occasionally contain easily overlooked, but vitally important, pieces of 
information. Thus in his description of the battle of Sphacteria in 425, we learn, 
almost en passant, that Spartan hoplites were used to shouting and hearing 
commands during battle, while in his description of the build-up to the battle of 
Mantinea we learn that Peloponnesian phalanxes could withdraw, in good order, 
while within javelin range of an enemy occupying a strong and elevated position.66 
In these examples, and many more, we begin to see Thucydides’ concern for 
technical detail, and it is these details that I will focus on as well as large 
controversial issues, such as the famous ‘drift to the right’.67
A potentially significant problem when dealing with Thucydides is the nature 
of his most famous literary device: the speeches. Thucydides himself offers some 
explanation as to how his audience should interpret these accounts:
Kai o a a  pev  Aoyco eittov ekckttoi p M£AAovte<; TToAepnaeiv p ev auTU) p 5 p  dv reg , 
xaAETTOv Tpv dKpi'pEiav a ir rp v  tw v Aex0£vtwv S ia p v p p o v E fla a i pv  £po i te w v  auTd<; 
pK O uaa Kai toT^  oiAAo0 ev tto0 ev £poi aTTaYY£AAouaiv: tix; 6 ’ a v  eS okouv  sp o i EK aoroi 
TTEpi Tihv aiei TTapovTajv to  S eovto paA icrr’ eItteTv , E xopsv ip  oti EYYUTaTa 
^upT T aaris Yv d )p p ^  T(h v  aA r|0u)^  Aex0£ vtu)v , outujs Ei'ppTai.
“Of the various speeches made either when war was imminent or in the 
course of the war itself, it has been hard to reproduce the exact words used 
either when I heard them myself or when they were reported to me by other 
sources. My method in this book has been to make each speaker say broadly
65 Hanson (2000a) 44-5.
66 Thucydides 5.65. Discussed in more detail below.
67 Thucydides 5.71. Discussed in more detail below.
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what I supposed would have been needed on any occasion, while keeping as
/TO
closely as I could to the overall intent of what was actually said.”
In this study I make use of three speeches by Thucydides: Brasidas’ speeches 
to his troops in 423 and 422, and the Syracusan general Hermocrates’ speech to the 
Syracusan assembly in 415. While the speeches may not be exactly what these 
generals said on the occasion, they are still of great value as they still reflect the 
opinions of a Greek general: Thucydides.69 Thus the speeches highlight the 
advantages that Thucydides considered could be gained from strategic thought, and 
what generals could achieve on the battlefield, while the speeches he has Brasidas 
deliver indicate an awareness of the strength of light infantry and the need for a
70general to adapt to changing tactical circumstances. The speeches primarily deal 
with military matters, and the information they contain can be verified, indeed 
enhanced by other authors -  especially Aeneas Tacticus.71 They do not form a 
central part of any of my arguments, and are only used to back up points which can 
be found in narrative sections of Thucydides and other authors. As such I take some 
of the information they contain at face value: Thucydides makes Brasidas stress the 
noise and power of light infantry because light infantry could be very noisy, and very
79powerful, as the Spartans had discovered to their cost two years previously. 
Equally Hermocrates was able to advise sailing from Syracuse to meet the Athenians 
in the Gulf of Taras because Thucydides considered such an aggressive defence to
68 Thucydides 1.22 (trans Hammond.)
69 The bibliography for speeches in Thucydides is massive. In 1972 Ste Croix remarked that 
“Thucydides 1.22.1, dealing with the speeches, has evoked an enormous amount of discussion, which 
is still going on, with little sign of agreement.” For interesting and relevant discussions see Clark 
(1995) 375-6; Morrison (2006) 251-277; and, most recently, Harding (2011).
70 Especially the speech at 4.126. Barley (forthcoming) on the power of Classical Greek light infantry 
and new thoughts regarding its rejection in favour of hoplites.
71 On whom see Chapter 4 and Pretzler (ed) (forthcoming).
72 Thucydides 4.126,4.34.
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have been both logical, and possible, given the amount of information available to 
the Syracusans at the time.73
Thucydides did not live to complete his work, leaving us with a History o f 
the Peloponnesian War that breaks off abruptly in 411, although it is most likely that 
he lived to see the end of the Peloponnesian War.74 Fortunately the Athenian writer, 
philosopher, and soldier Xenophon began his narrative where Thucydides’ ends; his 
Hellenica represents an attempt to continue the work of Thucydides, although in
n c
style and form it is now generally considered to be inferior. However he remains 
the best literary source for the end of the Peloponnesian War, and the machinations 
behind, and the military encounters of, the Corinthian War and other conflicts of the 
fourth century; he is perhaps best known to military historians for his accounts of the 
battles of Leuctra in 371 and Mantinea in 362, while his description of the second 
clash at the battle of Coronea in 394 has become something of a favourite for
7 f\scholars of Classical Greek battle to quote. Wheeler credits Xenophon with 
founding the genre of military history, a worthy epithet given the scope of his 
interest and experience. However, none of his surviving works deals exclusively 
with the battlefield role of the hoplite general, and as such my use of his material is 
episodic. Indeed, this is a necessary methodology for every source I use; as Wheeler 
stated: “an argument must be pieced together from episodic anecdotes of what a 
general did or did not do in a particular situation.”77
73 Thucydides 6.33-4.
74 In the ‘Second Preface’ Thucydides describes how he continued his work up until the Long Wall 
and the fortifications of Piraeus were destroyed: 5.26.
75 Grey (1989) 1-2, 27; Dillery (1995) 9-11.
76 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.19; Agesilaus 2.12.
77 Wheeler (1991) 148.
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Xenophon’s interests and experience led him to write on many different 
topics, from the best way to train dogs to a detailed and personal description of the 
Anabasis of the Ten Thousand. Shared themes that run through his works are those 
of leadership, the virtues of leaders, and the way leaders interact with those around
n o
them. Thus the Agesilaus and the Cyropaedia present Xenophon’s conception of an 
ideal commander, while the Anabasis is littered with conspicuous examples of
70inspiring leadership or innovative tactical decisions. However my study is not one 
aimed at analysing the ‘perfect’ commander or soldier, nor is it concerned with 
leadership in the broad sense of encouragement and example; that Xenophon 
apparently began to chop firewood while both naked and in the middle of a 
snowstorm may have been inspiring, but it has little bearing on the battlefield role of
O A
generals. Of more use are the occasions where Xenophon describes skirmishes, 
pitched battles, and complicated engagements such as those around Athens and 
Piraeus in 404/3; his accounts allow a great deal of information regarding the 
potential role of the general to be extracted, information the provenance of which is 
strengthened by the extent of Xenophon’s own military experience.
Xenophon was probably the most qualified of all the surviving Classical 
Greek writers to comment on and analyze military matters; his time with the Ten 
Thousand and his direct experience with Agesilaus, amongst others, demand that his 
works form a significant part of any investigation into warfare in Classical Greece. 
This military experience followed an education in which Socrates was one of his
78 Wood (1964) 33-66; Anderson (1974) 120-133; Due (1989) 147-206; Hutchinson (2000) 18; 51-63; 
130-137; Grey (2007) 1-14; (2010) 6-12.
79 On which see Anderson (1974) 120-133; Hutchinson (2000.)
80 Xenophon Anabasis 4.4.11-12.
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teachers, and Plato a fellow student, an environment which gave him the tools to
O I
write on, and offer analysis of, the major political and cultural events of his time. 
However, Xenophon’s works are not without their difficulties; some have detected 
an overt bias against the Thebans, and he gives the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, 
and the Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas, suspiciously little attention. 
This is unfortunate for our knowledge of the politics and personalities of these two 
energetic men, and Xenophon gives just enough information to allow a basic idea of 
how the generals present influenced the course of the Leuctra and Mantinea 
engagements. More useful information regarding generals and generalship can be 
found in many other, smaller, accounts of battles in Xenophon’s works, and by 
paying close attention to these I believe a more realistic image of generalship can be 
constructed from his testimony.
There is one ancient source which appears in this work a great deal more than 
it does in most other military studies of Classical Greece: Aeneas Tacticus, the fourth 
century Peloponnesian author of the Poliorcetica. His tactical manual on how to 
survive while under siege offers a systematic and practical response to the impending 
or continuing invasion of a state and, unfortunately, has been largely neglected by 
modem scholarship on battle. Aeneas Tacticus’ work has much broader application 
than siege warfare, being a systematic account of how best to go about organising 
military forces as a whole.83 Aeneas Tacticus’ conception of warfare is complex, 
involving the effective use of communications, scouting, and mixed forces, as well 
as placing a heavy reliance on ruse, ambush, and tactical advantage. His advice also
81 Xenophon Memorabilia 1.3.9-13; Anderson (1974) 20-33; Gray (2010) 8-10.
82 Marincola (1997) 175-216; Cawkwell (2004); Stylianou (2004).
83 Barley (2012.)
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calls for an unprecedented role for the general; one of strategist and controller rather 
than tactician and fighter. Aeneas Tacticus’ general does not enter the fighting unless 
absolutely essential, instead he should act as a focal point for information and co­
ordination; his ideas are not presented as new or ground-breaking, and there is scope 
to compare, and apply, his theories and philosophies to the rest of the Classical 
period. Indeed the central tenant of Aeneas Tacticus’ advice is that the link between 
general and subordinate commanders, and between subordinate commanders and 
soldiers, is vital, and if exploited correctly allows a flexible, tailored, and devastating 
response to an enemy force in the field to be mounted. The extent of Aeneas 
Tacticus’ military knowledge and practical experience lends his work great 
authority; he appears to know his Thucydides and may even have had personal 
contact with Xenophon,84 while his observations on the nature of large groups of 
men under pressure, as well as his concentration on organisation and calmness, fits 
ill with the orthodox image of generalship in the Classical Greek world.
The Poliorketika is the only work of Aeneas Tacticus that survives; it is 
complete in that the subject of how to survive under siege, or, more properly, how to 
survive when the state is threatened, appears to be fully addressed, with the text 
breaking off at the beginning of a discussion of how to equip naval fleets. However 
a number of points are addressed only by way of reference to other works which 
Aeneas Tacticus had previously published. Thus the reader of the Poliorketika who 
wishes to discover the best way to send fire signals is directed to the Paraskeuastike 
biblos, or Preparations, where Aeneas Tacticus had previously set down advice to
84 See chapter 4.
85 Although this is unlikely to indicate that a work on ‘The Organisation of a Fleet’ was written as a 
separate piece, and has been lost. Whitehead (2002) 14-5, 207.
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his reader in this area. Other works which Aeneas Tacticus refers to include his
o n
Poristike (Procurement) and his Stratopedeutike (Encampment). Aelian records 
that Aeneas Tacticus wrote ‘a considerable number of military books’, one of which 
may have been a work on the science of military manoeuvers, while other internal 
references in the Poliorketika itself indicate that Aeneas Tacticus may have written a
o o
work on Akousmata, or Addresses. The loss of these works is regrettable; indeed 
Aeneas Tacticus’ surviving work is such an invaluable collection of advice, 
anecdote, and practical theory, all presented as ‘standard’ responses to invasion or 
threat, that his evidence has the power to dramatically change the way we view 
Classical Greek warfare. Regarding the man himself it is possible, indeed probable, 
that he was the Aeneas of Stymphalos, a general of the Arcadian League in 366
O Q
mentioned by Xenophon. His writing certainly indicates a man with experience of 
dealing with people in times of crisis, and of the organising and leading of large 
groups of people. His concern for the maintenance of morale and the prevention of 
treachery, as well as the establishment of a chain of command and rapid signaling 
procedures, indicates a man aware of the importance of reconnaissance, information, 
and flexibility to a force in the field; three factors which are emphasised in the 
following chapters.
86 Aeneas Tacticus 7.4. He remarks that he will not repeat his material concerning fire-signals. 
Fortunately Polybius may have read the Preperations and recorded some of it at 10.44. Whitehead 
(2002) 13-4, 111-2.
8714.2,21.2. Whitehead (2002) 13-4.
88 Aelian Tactics 1.2; Aeneas Tacticus 38.5. Whitehead (2002) 13-4.
89 Xenophon Hellenica 7.3.1. Whitehead views the identification as probable, as does Lesky (1996) 
629; Ste. Croix (1981) 298; Wheeler (1983) 8-9. Other scholars have viewed the identification as only 
possible: Tam (1927) 227 and (1970) 14; Delebecque (1957) 430; Ober (1985) 7 .1 favour a strong 
probable view: his practical and detailed knowledge indicates an individual with direct experience of 
command, and I find the temporal and geographical connection to this Aeneas most convincing. 
Xenophon’s mention may also have been based on personal contact: Aeneas Tacticus knew his 
Thucydides, and it is not too far-fetched to suggest that two like-minded individuals such as Aeneas 
and Xenophon would have had some degree of contact.
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This is significant; here we have an ancient author, probably an experienced 
general, offering his own thoughts regarding military matters. True, the Poliorketika 
is a work of the mid-fourth century, but Aeneas does not present any of his advice as 
being innovative or part of some technical or intellectual ‘revolution’ of warfare or 
generalship, the existence of which is frequently advanced by modem scholarship.90 
Aeneas’ definition of ‘siege’ is very broad, and his advice should be read as a 
commentary on the art of warfare in general. The roles of the general, and 
subordinate commanders, is of great importance to Aeneas, as is the systematic and 
effective use of reconnaissance, manoeuvre, and communication. Aeneas Tacticus 
advises that all these things be done, as well as constantly emphasising the 
importance of both ‘supreme’ command, and subordinate officers. Indeed his advice 
is down-to-earth and practical, indicating those pointers a professional, or at least 
highly experienced, soldier considered most vital to give to his audience; his is not a 
historical work, but a guide, as such we must pay close attention to his specific 
advice regarding generalship, and the overall conception of warfare that his text 
generates.
This thesis begins with an analysis, in chapter 2, of the ancient evidence for 
the ability of generals to communicate mid battle, the place of the general in the 
phalanx, and the deaths of generals in battle. The chapter is important as it seeks to 
dispel the notion that generals were more important for the morale of their army than 
for its tactical flexibility and effectiveness. The connection between army and 
general is analysed, as are those occasions when generals were killed in battle, in an 
attempt to demonstrate the true importance of generals to Greek armies, to
90 As summarised by Wheeler: (2007) 213-223.
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emphasise the ability of generals to influence battle, and to highlight the strategic 
and tactical sophistication of Greek warfare. I conclude by suggesting that generals 
were able to communicate on a local and ‘phalanx-wide’ scale, that generals did not 
always fight in the front ranks, and that casualty rates for Classical Greek generals 
were not ‘astonishingly’ high.91 Further conclusions are that battles where generals 
of the losing side were killed are not indicative of a desire or necessity on the part of 
generals to die on the battlefield, and that the Greeks recognised the importance of 
generals and command positions by deliberately targeting them.
Chapter 3 is a systematic review and analysis of the evidence for subordinate 
commanders in Classical Greek warfare. These men have been largely ignored by 
modem scholars, yet they are directly attested in all of the major contemporary 
sources, and their presence and influence in battle can also be inferred from various 
battle descriptions. In these descriptions subordinate commanders are found leading 
small, occasionally ‘elite’ units, ‘stepping up’ to take command when their general 
was killed, and also ensuring that ‘pockets’ of command, beyond the general’s 
personal influence, existed throughout the phalanx. Official systems of subordinate 
command existed in Athens and Sparta in Herodotus’ time, with the Spartan system 
becoming more complicated and integrated as time went on: by Thucydides’ time it 
was possible to describe the whole Spartan army as a chain of command, and I 
suggest it was this, more than superiority in physique, fitness, or weapons training, 
that was responsible for Spartan success on the field of battle. Subordinate 
commanders were a vital element of Greek battle, and the role and importance the
91 See, e.g. Hanson (2000a) 112.
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ancient sources attach to them suggests that any investigation into generalship, or 
indeed any aspect of warfare, in Classical Greece must take them into account.
In Chapter 4 I examine Aeneas Tacticus’ advice to generals regarding how 
best to withstand a siege, and argue that his definition of ‘siege’ is so broad that his 
work should be read as a commentary on the art of warfare in Classical Greece as a 
whole. The role of the general, and his ability to communicate with subordinate 
commanders in order to attack the enemy with multiple small units, is of great 
importance to Aeneas. His conception of warfare as a whole is one of victory by any 
and all means, with the general and his subordinates being vital elements. I conclude 
by arguing that this conception can also be found in the surviving works of the 
Classical historians, and that Aeneas Tacticus’ surviving work is a vital and rich 
resource for the study of Greek warfare.
Chapter 5 is a review and alaysis of the four recognised ‘phases’ of hoplite 
combat: the advance, fighting, and retreat/pursuit. In the first section of this chapter I 
examine the ancient evidence for the ability of generals to influence the advance into 
combat, the nature of this advance and how it affected command, and also discuss 
the most influential modem reconstructions and interpretations regarding this 
advance. I conclude that hoplite generals could exercise influence over their troops 
during this phase, and demonstrate that a running charge directly into combat was 
unlikely.
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I follow this with an examination of the fighting that took place once two 
phalanxes had come into contact with each other, in order to determine if it was 
conducive to the continued exercise of command and control, or whether the 
situation descended into such chaos that generals were unable to influence battle. My 
focus here is on the following factors: the distance between individuals in the 
phalanx, the ability of hoplites to fight in single combat, and the various passages 
which indicate the ability of individuals to work in small teams during the fighting. I 
do not attempt to demonstrate the presence of definite techniques, or to state that 
there was a ‘standard’ way of fighting; such a discussion would be highly conjectural 
and is, I believe, the wrong approach to understanding hoplite battle. Instead I use 
the ancient evidence to place limitations on what appears to have been possible for 
hoplites to do while fighting, which allows the construction of a realistic 
environment to place the general in: if there was little space between individuals and 
hoplites were unable to operate effectively outside a static phalanx then there can 
have been little scope for generals to influence battles. This involves making logical 
inferences from various incidents that took place during the battles of the fifth and 
fourth centuries in order to construct an overall image of what the ancient historians 
and their audiences considered possible. I suggest that hoplites, and indeed the 
phalanx formation itself, were a great deal more flexible than new orthodox thought 
accepts, and conclude that the general could influence this phase of combat, both on 
a local scale and, occasionally, on a phalanx-wide scale.
After this I examine the controversial othismos, or push, discussion of which 
has played a significant part in the modem reconstruction of hoplite battle, a 
reconstruction which severely limits the extent to which generals could influence
36
battle and which is challenged and rejected here. I begin with a brief outline of the 
two current competing interpretations and then give a modem literature review that 
traces the argument over othismos from the start of the 20th century to the latest 
discussion in Peter Krentz’s book on the battle of Marathon, published in 2010. I 
then move onto a detailed analysis of othismos, otheo, and exotheo in Herodotus, 
Thucydides, and Xenophon. I examine the instances where these words are used in a 
battlefield context and conclude that, in most cases, the word is used in either a 
technical or a psychological sense. I do not refer to this as a ‘phase of battle’ because 
the evidence suggests that when a ‘push’ occurred in battle it was not a separate 
event, distinct from the fighting, but was a consequence of that fighting, thus one 
phalanx was slowly pushed back while fighting. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate that the notion of othismos as a mass push is false and, as a result of 
this, something other than numbers and the ability to ‘push’ with one’s shield was 
the deciding factor in battle: I suggest instead that generalship was the deciding 
factor. I also argue that it should not be considered a phase of battle, but have 
included it in this chapter both because it sheds light on the battlefield environment 
generals found themselves in, and in order to give a complete analysis of both 
ancient and modem scholarship.
The final part of chapter 5 examines the pursuit that sometimes took place 
once a battle had been won or lost. Here I analyse the source material which 
describes how battles ended, how far defeated armies were pursued, and what 
reasons were given for armies either not pursuing, or doing so for a limited amount 
of time. Several incidents in which generals demonstrated their influence, or lack 
thereof, over their troops are analysed, and I conclude by suggesting that generals
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could exert significant influence during this final phase of battle, and also emphasise 
the continued importance of local command, control, and leadership.
The true importance of generalship and subordinate command to Classical 
Greek armies of all size and ability has not been fully appreciated by modem 
scholarship, and by examining these topics in the context of a hoplite battle, and as 
stand-alone topics, a realistic and complete image of command can be created. This 
image has significant consequences for our understanding of the practice of Greek 
warfare, as well as forcing a fundamental re-examination of the purpose and nature 
of the Classical Greek way of war, which itself impacts on our understanding of 
Greek society as a whole. The battles and wars of the Classical Greeks were not 
simple, phalanxes of hoplites were not rudderless unguided masses of men, and 
generals were capable of influencing battle from beginning to end. The Greeks also 
recognised the importance of command and subordinate command, resulting in a 
system of warfare with a focus on flexibility, organisation, and teamwork. The 
importance of these three factors has not been fully appreciated by modem 
scholarship, and the following chapters present a new image of both the Classical 
Greek general, and the system of warfare within which he operated.
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Chapter 2A: The ability of generals to communicate
The issue of if, and if so how, generals were able to communicate orders to 
parts of the phalanx is vital to this study and is a difficult one to address; the ancient 
authors do not explicitly discuss the workings, or even the presence, of a ‘standard’ 
or common system of communication, and many of the smaller battle accounts are 
not sufficiently detailed to posit a reconstruction of the orders that may have been 
issued and the means by which they were transmitted. Fortunately there are a number 
of accounts of larger battles which contain relatively detailed and important 
information regarding the ability of generals to issue orders and to have these orders 
communicated to the whole, or specific parts, of the phalanx. These examples span 
the range of this study’s timeframe and indicate that it was possible for generals to 
send messages and orders mid-battle, as well as, occasionally, receive replies. 
Connected to the issue of communication is one of physical positioning -  where did 
generals usually stand in the phalanx, and how did this affect issues such as casualty 
rates of generals and what happened when generals were killed? Consideration of 
these issues will allow me to give an overview of some of the essentials of 
generalship, setting up the discussion, in later chapters, of the ability of generals to 
influence the course of battles both on a local and a wider scale.
The most important work regarding the transmission of orders in Classical 
Greek warfare is Peter Krentz’s chapter in Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle 
Experience, where he analyses the surviving information regarding the use of the 
salpinx, an ancient brass instrument similar to a trumpet, in ancient military
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contexts.92 The instrument appears to have been fairly limited in its range, perhaps 
being able to produce only one or two distinct notes, although numerous references 
from several sources indicate that it was a fairly ubiquitous presence in the Classical 
Greek military mindset. Thus Homer was able to compare Achilles’ shouting to the 
sound of the salpinx, a reference that also makes clear its distinctive sound and 
emphasises the fact that audiences would be familiar with this. Similar sentiments 
can be found in Aristophanes’ Peace, where a ‘Maker of War Trumpets’ is told that 
his instruments are essentially useless in times of peace, and that he must find 
alternative uses for his wares, such as converting them into scales to weigh figs.94 
The sound of this particular instrument was so closely associated with military 
matters and the passing of orders that when news reached Athens that Philip II had 
captured Elateia the prytaneis summoned the generals and the salpinktes, while 
Aeneas Tacticus recommended that, in an ideal response to siege, the general would 
be stationed in a safe place along with trumpet players and runners.95 These 
examples relate to the battlefield use of the salpinx only indirectly, and there are few 
direct examples of it being used to relay orders once battle had begun, with these 
generally being signals to begin the charge or the retreat. The most famous examples 
of its use in these situations are found in the Anabasis of Xenophon, with one in 
particular demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of the instrument’s use. 
Xenophon, aware that the enemy would hear the trumpet signal and recognise its 
importance, reversed the meanings of the calls for ‘charge’ and ‘retreat’ to effect a 
safe river crossing.96 During battle or skirmish this was probably the extent of the 
‘messages’ that the salpinx could send; sending complicated messages involving
92 Krentz (1991) 110-120.
93 Homer Iliad 18.219; c.f. 21.388.
94 Aristophanes Peace 1240-50.
95 Demosthenes On the Crown 169; Aeneas Tacticus 22.2-3.
96 Xenophon Anabasis 6.5.27; also 1.2.17 where it is used as the signal to begin the advance.
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multiple notes or patterns would have been dangerous given the noise of battle and 
the changing circumstances of different parts of the line, thus the more complicated 
the message the greater the chance of it being misinterpreted. Krentz’s discussion 
was centred on the scattered and occasionally obscure references to the salpinx, but 
he also offered a brief analysis of other forms of communication which we know the 
ancients to have used, noting that Arrian considered verbal orders to be the clearest
07possible system. Verbal orders seem to have comprised an important part of the 
ability of Greek generals to communicate their orders to parts of their commands, 
and their use can be found in many different battle accounts, from the Persian Wars 
to the Corinthian War, with both direct references and reasonable inferences being 
found. One of the strongest examples can be found in Herodotus’ account of the 
battle of Plataea in 479. During the opening engagement of the campaign the Persian 
cavalry was engaged in constant harassing operations against various sections of the 
Greek line, with the attack falling hardest on the Megarians, who were stationed on 
the most vulnerable part of the Greek line. According to Herodotus the Megarians 
sent a messenger to the Greek commanders stating:
MsYapEEg Aey o u q i: r)|JEig, a v S p s g  a u p p a x o i ,  o u  S uvcxtoi EipEv n iv  riE paE iov  rmTOv 
6£K£cr0ai poG voi, ExovTEg otoctiv TauTriv Eg Tr)v £OTr|pev a p x h v : aAAa Kai Eg t6 5 e 
Arnapin te Kai apETn ovtexoijev  koi'ttep ttie^oijev o i. v Ov te Ei pri Tivag aAAoug ttepijjete 
S ia S o x o u g  Tr|g Ta^iog, iote EKAEiipovTag Tr)v to^ iv.
“I bear a message from the Megarians to their allies: “We do not have the 
resources to resist the Persian cavalry unassisted here in the position we took 
up at the start of the battle. So far, despite the pressure, we have held out, 
although it has taken perseverance and courage. But now, unless you send
Q O
further troops to relieve us at our post, we will abandon it.”
97 Arrian Tactica 27.
98 Herodotus 9.21 (trans Waterfield.)
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The message was sent in enough time, and in enough detail, for reinforcements to be 
organised and sent from the Athenian contingent." While the Megarians were not 
engaged in a pitched battle with another hoplite force, they were clearly under direct 
attack and were able to communicate with elements of the allied army that were 
stationed some distance away; it is reasonable to posit that the Megarian general 
would also have been able to use a messenger to communicate with parts of his own 
phalanx, should he have had the need. A similar situation occurred at the battle of 
Sphacteria in 425: the Athenian general Demosthenes was able to receive 
information and issue orders, although he was not actively engaged in the fighting at 
that time.100
A useful and important example of a hoplite general communicating directly 
with his army during actual combat can be found in Thucydides’ account of the 
battle of Delium in 424.101 According to Thucydides the Theban general Pagondas, 
worried that his left wing was being defeated by the Athenians, sent two squadrons 
of cavalry to its aid. The effect of the new deployment was to cause panic in the 
Athenian right wing, which imagined the cavalry to indicate the presence of another 
enemy army, and further pressure the beleaguered Athenian left. The Athenian left 
was unable to resist the concentration of numbers to the front, cavalry to the flank,
109and fleeing troops to the side, and broke. We are not told how the orders were 
conveyed or, indeed, what Pagondas was doing when the information arrived; 
Thucydides’ account is brief and lacking the necessary details. However we do know
99 Herodotus 9.21-2.
100 Discussed in more detail below.
101 Thucydides 4.96.
102 Thucydides 4.96.
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that the decision to send this aid was made mid-battle, suggesting that Pagondas was 
somehow informed, or could himself see, the plight of the left wing, and that he was 
able to issue orders to send aid, orders which were communicated quickly enough to 
have the desired effect. It is reasonable to posit the existence of a system of runners 
here: indeed, given the specific nature of Pagondas’ orders, and the fact that total 
surprise was achieved, it is difficult to see how any other form of communication 
could have been used.
While Delium is an important example of direct communication from a 
general resulting in a change of tactical circumstances, two powerful and striking 
examples of the use of messangers can be found in Thucydides’ account of the battle 
of Mantinea, six years after Delium.103 Thucydides’ full account of the battle covers 
two days, and includes the manoeuvring of the opposing armies in the day before the 
engagement actually took place. During this day the Argive force occupied an easily 
fortifiable and elevated position, which the Spartan King, Agis, nonetheless resolved 
to assault. When the Peloponnesian phalanx was within javelin range, one of the 
Spartan veterans shouted to Agis that he was leading the army on an unadvisable 
course of action. Thucydides records that either Agis was convinced by this advice or 
had independently realised the danger at the same time; regardless of the reason the 
end result was the same, with the attack being called off immediately.104 The incident 
has an important bearing on two aspects of communication in Greek warfare, 
demonstrating the ability of generals to issue commands to an entire army and expect 
them to be followed, as well as the ability of individuals to make themselves heard
103 Thucydides 5.65-74.
104 Thucydides 5.65. Lazenby (2004) 120; Homblower (2008) 171-2.
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and influence events before combat began. The importance of effective 
communication is highlighted here; whether a veteran shouted the advice, Agis 
realised the danger himself, or this was all pre-planned, the Peloponnesians were 
able to hear the commands that were issued.105 The pilos helmet, being lighter and 
open-eared, allowed for greater communication between individuals and may well 
have introduced as a result of changing tactical necessity and the Spartan concern for 
effective battlefield command and communication, with the ability to hear and react 
to commands being deemed more important than massive defence.106 This much is 
surely suggested from Thucydides’ account of the battle of Sphacteria, where he 
describes the difficulty the Spartans had in responding to skirmishing attack due to
1 (17the amount of noise the enemy were making.
A second vital example of the ability of generals to issue orders occurred
during the actual battle of Mantinea that took place the following day. According to
Thucydides the advance of the Peloponnesian phalanx was slow and steady, however
it was not without incident, with Agis ordering a significant tactical shift during the
advance, discussed below. During the advance into combat the Peloponnesian line
overlapped the enemy line on the right flank, thus the Tegeans and part of the
Spartan phalanx were on course to outflank the enemy left; however, this situation
was mirrored by the enemy line, whose right flank, made up of Mantinean and
108Argive troops, threatened to flank the Peloponnesian left wing. In an attempt to 
counter this, while advancing, Agis ordered the regiments on his extreme left, those 
of the Sciritae and Brasideioi, to match the Mantinean and Argive line, with further
105 Homblower (2008) 171.
106 Anderson (1970) 30-1; Hanson (2000a) 57-5; van Wees (2004) 48; Schwartz (2009) 57-9.
107 Thucydides 4.34.
108 Thucydides 5.71.
44
orders being sent to two Spartan polemarchoi to spread their line in order to cover 
the resulting gap in the formation.109 The end result would have been to extend the 
Peloponnesian line to match the allied army’s outflanking attempt, while allowing 
the Peloponnesian right to continue its own flanking manoeuvre. This shows a 
considerable degree of both tactical awareness and communication skills while on 
the move.
Thucydides states that the reason for Agis’ orders is the now famous ‘drift to 
the right’; the passage is important and bears quoting in full:
to cnpaTOTTeSa ttoieT jjev Kai cmavTa toOto: eth to 5 e^i6 KEpaia auTwv ev toic; 
£uv65oi£ paAAov e^cuBeTtqi, Kai TTEpiiaxouai koto to twv Evavn’wv Euwvupov 
apcpoTEpoi Tip Ss^iip, 6 ia  to cpo(3ou|j£vous TTpoacrrEAAEiv to yupva ekootov cbg 
paAicrra tq toO ev Se^iqi TrapaTETaYpevou dain'Si Kai vopi^Eiv Tiiv TtuKVOTriTa Trfe 
^uykAhoeux;  EuaKETTaoroTaTov Eivai
“As they engage, all armies tend to the right, pushing out their right wing 
with the result that both sides then outflank their opponent’s left wing with 
their right. This is because each individual hoplite is anxious to bring his own 
undefended side as close as possible to the shield of his colleague on the 
right, and reckons that tight locking is the best protection.”110
The hoplite on the far right of the formation was the initiator of such a drift; 
he was the most vulnerable individual in the formation, and it would have been in his 
own interest to ensure he did not make initial contact with the enemy due to his 
vulnerability to being flanked.111 If the extent of the Peloponnesian or Argive drift 
was greater than expected then the potential for the Peloponnesian left wing to be 
flanked would increase; while this would also allow the Peloponnesian right wing to
109 Thucydides 5.72.
1,0 Thucydides 5.71 (trans Hammond.)
111 “In this case, the hoplite’s fear of personal injury overcame his interest in the success of the army, 
and left the men on the extreme left of the army exposed.” Goldsworthy (1997) 11.
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flank the Argive left, Agis deemed the risk too great and issued his orders in an 
attempt to balance his line. While the orders were obeyed by the Brasideoi and the
119Sciritae, the polemarchs refused to move to cover the gap; Thucydides states this 
was because the order was given too late in the advance, an important point when it 
is remembered that in order to accomplish the manoeuvre the polemarchs would 
have to have marched their formations to their left, thus exposing their ‘naked’ right
113sides to the enemy. The issuing of the original order indicates the ability of the 
general to communicate with his wings while on the move. Indeed, according to 
Thucydides Agis not only issued the original orders, but was informed that they had 
been disobeyed by the centre in enough time to issue new orders to the left wing to 
close up, in an attempt to reduce the gap in the formation.114
The battle of Cyzicus in 410 was a lengthy and complicated engagement, 
however once the Peloponnesian commander Mindarus was killed, his army fled in 
panic and the Athenians pursued the fleeing Peloponnesians, but this pursuit was 
abandoned when the threat of Persian cavalry to both the army and the attendant fleet 
was realised.115 Two options present themselves: firstly, the threat of the Persian
112 Anderson (1970) 72 suggests that the orders were disobeyed because they arrived by runner and 
were “.. .without the authority of the king’s person to back them...” While sending such orders by 
runner seems to be the most likely method (see, e.g. Aeneas Tacticus 22.2-3) it is more likely that the 
orders were disobeyed because they would have placed the Peloponnesian centre and mid-left wing in 
great danger. Lazenby (2004) 120 for the observation that Agis “... was a man given to sudden 
changes of mood.”
113 Thucydides 5.72 -  they were later exiled, although for cowardice, not insubordination. Lazenby 
(2004) 123; Homblower (2008) 189;Tritle (2010) 124. Wheeler (2007a) 215 for the Spartan 
“...perfection of the phalanx.” Was this a case of professional pride or military indoctrination (“Never 
show the blind side to the enemy!”) overriding the orders of Agis? See Thucydides 5.10 for the impact 
that marching while presenting the right flank to an enemy could have.
114 Thucydides 5.72. Anderson (1970)
115 Xenophon Hellenica 1.1.14-18; Diodoms 13.51.5-8. Diodorus’ detailed account, probably based 
on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, is difficult to reconcile with Xenophon’s compressed attempt at 
describing the mn up to, and course of, the battle. Littman (1968) 265-272 prefers Diodoms’ account, 
although see Grey (1987) 72-89 for a contrasting view. Sense can be made of Diodoms here though, 
especially in light of those battle descriptions of Xenophon where Thrasybulus appears as a general:
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cavalry was known before the engagement began, the Athenian troops were warned 
of this but began a pursuit of the defeated Spartan infantry anyway, with the 
Athenian commanders being unable to immediately restrain their troops after a 
lengthy and hard fought battle. Secondly, the threat of the Persian cavalry was not 
known until after the Spartan infantry had been defeated, at which point this 
information was relayed to the Athenian force and the pursuit was abandoned. The 
second option is supported by Diodorus’ account, and also appears more likely given 
the lengthy and complicated nature of the battle; however we have no evidence as to 
how this information was relayed. An aural signal would be possible, but such 
signals are limited due to their relatively short range and the fact that their meanings 
must be agreed upon beforehand; equally a visual signal would be unlikely given the 
need to maintain either a chain of static messenger posts or a direct line of sight to 
the fleet.116 A runner or cavalry messenger would be the most likely means of 
relaying messages and orders while in neutral or unfriendly territory and also allows 
for the scouting of the Persian cavalry. The restraint of pursuit at Cyzicus, then, most 
likely came about as a deliberate decision based on information communicated to the
117army via messenger. This incident hints at the level of tactical and strategic 
sophistication which was at play; the Athenian commanders were able to maintain 
control over their army despite winning a hard and significant victory, and were 
aware of remaining threats still in the field.
his use of retreat/pursuit in the battles of Munychia and Piraeus indicate that the pursuit described by 
Diodorus could well be accurate.
116 Krentz (1991) 110-8 for discussion of the use of the salpinx in warfare -  it is possible that a pre­
arranged signal existed which could recall the army to the fleet, but this does not account for the 
spotting of the danger posed by the cavalry.
lt7 See Aeneas Tacticus 4.1-12; 6.4-7; 7.1-4; 15.5-7; 16.16-7; 22.21-4; 26.12-14; 27.1-4 for the 
importance of communications between various contingents of an army, and how these 
communications can be optimised.
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The previous examples have involved the attempted, and sometimes 
successful, use of battlefield communication via messenger. This communication 
could originate from elements of a very large army experiencing difficulties 
(Megarians communicating with the supreme commander of the Greek force) or 
from a smaller army’s general who spotted a problem with his phalanx’s deployment 
(Agis at the battle of Mantinea). These examples demonstrate the desire and ability 
of fifth century Greek generals to maintain control over their forces and to react to 
changing circumstances, two factors which can also be seen in the way individual 
hoplites, and phalanxes as a whole, operated in the field. A third category can be 
seen in Thucydides’ reporting of the aftermath of the first large battle of the Sicilian 
Expedition. This engagement was a decisive victory for the Athenian force, ending 
with the Syracusan army being forced to retreat behind the walls of the city. 
Thucydides offers a number of interesting reasons for the defeat of the Syracusan 
force, such as the experience of the Athenian force and the sudden onset of a violent 
thunderstorm, however the most important reason he gives, for my purposes here, is 
that of the multiplicity of commanders in the Syracusan army. Thucydides writes:
p sy a  5e pAaipai Kai to  TTAqGos tu jv  CTTpaTqYwv Kai n iv  TToAuapxiav ( r ja a v  Y^P tte v te  
Kai 6eko  oi OTpaTnyoi outoT^ ) tc jv  te  ttoAAwv Tqv a^uvTaKTov a v a p x ia v . qv 5e oAi'yoi 
te  OTpaTHYoi yevw vto i EjjTTEipoi Kai ev tco xeipwvi TOUTip TTapaaK Euaaw ai to  
ottAitikov, o?£ te  ottAo pri eo tiv  e k tto p ^ o v te ^ , o ttw s  ihq ttAeTcttoi E aovrai, Kai Tq aAAq 
|jeA£T[) TTpoaavaYKd^ovTEg, scpq k o to  to  EiKog KpaTqaEiv acpag tw v  Evavn'wv, 
avdpEi'ag psv  acpiaiv U Trapxouan^, EUTa^iag 6 ’ iq t o  Epya TTpoaYevopEvq?
“The major problems were the number of generals (there were fifteen of 
them) and the multiplicity of command, together with the lack of systematic 
response to command among the troops. If they confined authority to just a 
few generals of experience, and spent the winter organising the hoplite forces 
-  maximizing numbers by providing arms for those without their own, and 
introducing compulsory training as well -  they would have a good chance, he
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said, of overcoming their opponents. They already had the courage, and 
discipline would follow.”118
The inference is that Syracusan generals could be expected to exercise battlefield 
control, but a clear chain of command was lacking, resulting in many different orders 
coming from up to fifteen different men.119 The confusion that would result from 
fully fifteen different sources of ‘primary’ authority can easily be imagined, 
especially when combined with the relative inexperience of the Syracusan force 
compared to the Athenians, and the fact that the Athenian force had, at that time, 
only two commanders. That the Syracusans recognised the danger of having too 
many generals is reinforced by the further reduction of their command system to a 
single individual, the Spartan Gylippus, when reinforcements from the Peloponnese 
arrived, a change which turned the Syracusan defence into a focused and effective 
effort. Thus Thucydides considered the initial defeat of the Syracusan army to have 
been because it lacked a clear system of command and control, and was made up of 
inferior fighters. Here we see Thucydides, an experienced general, emphasizing the 
need for generalship and fighting ability by having another experienced general, 
Hermocrates, advise his city to concentrate upon these qualities in order to match the 
Athenian army in the field. This is because generalship, communication, and fighting 
were the fundamental elements of hoplite battle, and weakness in all three resulted in 
the defeat of the Syracusans: the death toll of about 260 Syracusan dead to the
I  A A
Athenian 50 indicates the extent of the Athenian superiority.
118 Thucydides 6.72 (trans Hammond.)
119 Kagan (1991) 243.
120 Thucydides 6.71.
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Examples and incidents which emphasise the ability of generals to 
communicate with their phalanx, and for hoplites to communicate with each other, 
are less prevalent in the battle accounts of the fourth century. Iphicrates’ victory over 
a Spartan mora in the battle of Lechaeum was a similar situation to Demosthenes’ 
victory at Sphacteria: Iphicrates’ attack relied upon constant attacks from his peltasts 
combined with the threat of an intact phalanx which remained close to, but
191uncommitted to, the attack. A degree of communication between the two elements 
would have been essential if the plan was to be effective, although Xenophon is 
silent on the matter.122 Equally Xenophon records details of a number of 
engagements where phalanxes did not advance despite holding a significant 
advantage or being very eager for combat. Such examples suggest that the troops 
present were restrained or ‘talked down’ by, presumably, their generals, again 
suggesting that communication with the entire phalanx was possible in highly 
charged and stressful situations, although admittedly before battle was actually 
joined. These examples are analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.
An interesting historical example is that of the second battle of Mantinea in 
362, a useful engagement for directly demonstrating the ability of information to be 
distributed throughout a phalanx, and for, potentially, demonstrating the importance, 
and hence the presence, of a general’s commands mid-battle. The attack of 
Epaminondas’ deep column resulted in the flight of the opposing army, but his death 
in the fighting appears to have robbed his whole force of initiative, direction, and
121 Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.13-18.
122 Xenophon tells us some of the peltasts had been caught, and presumably killed, by pursuing 
Spartans in a previous engagement -  maintaining a safe distance from the Spartans was just as 
important for the hoplites. Xenophon Hellenica 4.4.16-17.
50
drive. Various elements of the Beoetian force slipped away and failed, or refused,
to capitalise on their advantage by pursuing the broken enemy.124 This situation, 
though exceptional, still provides important information regarding communication in 
battle and the role of the general in combat. The breakdown of the Theban force and 
its failure to finish off the Peloponnesian army could indicate two things: firstly that 
the commanders of the various Theban and allied units present were awaiting orders 
from Epaminondas that never arrived because he was killed; secondly, that news of 
Epaminondas’ death spread very quickly and was such a shock to morale that the 
Theban army was no longer capable of undertaking a pursuit, orders or not. Either 
possibility assumes information, either specific or general, could be communicated 
rapidly during battles.
A passage from the 2nd century AD author Polyaenus can also be deployed to 
shed light on the ability of generals to communicate mid-battle, although given his 
distance from the events he describes we must approach his evidence with caution. 
The contents of the passage actually appears three times in Polyaenus’ work, being 
attributed to Iphicrates, Epaminondas, and Alexander the Great, three of the greatest 
tacticians and generals of Greek history. In each passage the general is reported as 
stating:
ev pf|pa xapi'aaa0£ poi, Kai Tr)v vikriv £^o|j£v
123 Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.24-5.
124 Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.25.
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1“Favour me with one step and the victory is ours.”
The passage suggests it was the uttering of these words that inspired the army to 
victory, a scenario which relies upon the ability of that general to have his words and 
wishes heard and understood, indeed heard and understood quickly, given the intense 
situation the passage suggests.
125 Polyaenus Strategems 2.3.2; 3.9.27; 4.3.8.
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Chapter 2B: The place of the general in the phalanx and the death of generals
in battle.
An important issue regarding the ability of generals to issue orders and 
communicate mid-battle is where generals were usually located in the phalanx, and, 
indeed, if such a position can be consistently found in the source material, an issue 
closely connected with the idea of generals as figureheads for their phalanxes. The 
connection between general and morale has fascinated modem scholars, several of 
whom have framed the Greek art of generalship as the creation, strengthening, and 
maintenance of bonds between individuals and groups and the moulding of an 
army’s morale, all factors closely associated with the need for all generals to fight, 
and be seen to fight, in the front ranks of the phalanx. Thus the prevailing image 
of a Classical Greek general is one of a man who decides the depth of his phalanx, 
attempts to aim it in the right direction, gives an inspiring speech, then lends his 
spear and shield to the effort, the technical part of his job as general virtually
197complete and the physical, inspiring part just beginning. Hanson wrote that “Our 
sources indicate that there was a general desire on the part of the general to fight and
1 9Rrisk death alongside his men.” He presents this as a ‘novel’ ideal of the Greeks, 
one which remained at the core of Western warfare until the beginning of the First
126 Most strongly by Hanson (2000a) 108-116. Wheeler (1991), reacting to the first edition (1989) of 
The Western Way o f War attempted to demonstrate that generals did not always stand in the front 
ranks, but nonetheless based his theory on leadership by example and the emotional link between 
general and army. Anderson (1970) 70-1. Schwartz (2009) 180-183 follows Hanson closely, stating 
that “The best way a general could exert himself was.. .by being among his men and setting a good 
example in order to boost morale and fighting spirit.” See also Paul (1987) 307-8.
127 Wheeler (1991) 121-3 where he also first discusses the concept of a ‘transition’ from warrior to 
general; Hanson (2000a) 108-110; Schwartz (2009) 180-1. Krentz (1985), (2002), (2010) and van 
Wees (2004) do not directly discuss the battlefield role of the general as a subject, but their overall 
image of warfare allows for such individuals to contribute with significantly more than just their 
weapons, strength, and inspiring qualities.
128 Hanson (2000a) 108.
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World War, and attempts to explain this desire as a function of generalship itself, i.e. 
generalship and leadership were synonymous, and generals lead from the front
1 A Q
because, once battle began, their ability to do anything other than fight was ended. 
Hanson’s chapter is full of romantic and idealised images of generalship such as this, 
images that seem influenced more by his knowledge of, and constant comparison 
with, the American Civil War and the two World Wars than by any connection with
1 ^ A
the relevant ancient material. Indeed the notion that generals must have fought and 
inspired their men with their physical deeds in battle is apparently based on what he 
views as an otherwise unexplainably high casualty rate for generals throughout the
111
Classical period. Hanson seems to view this as an honourable thing, and points out
that “...there seems not to have been a single instance in some six hundred years of
warfare of any Spartan king’s surviving the defeat of his men on the field of battle -
that is, until the king Kleomenes III in the twilight of the Spartan state deserted his
110overwhelmed troops at Sellasia in 222.” This puts the proverbial horse before the 
cart: you simply cannot state that generals from all states rarely survived the defeat 
of their armies and then make a special case out of Spartan kings also not surviving 
defeat.133
Wheeler disagrees with some of Hanson’s conclusions regarding generalship, 
but agrees that morale played an important part, remarking that by the fourth 
century: “...an army was inoperative without its general -  its metaphoric, spiritual,
129 Hanson (2000a) 110; Van Wees (2004) 108-113.
130 E.g. Hanson (2000a) 108-9,115-6. Comparisons and analogies with other, later, ‘forms’ of war 
play a large part in Hanson’s methodology.
131 Hanson (2000a) 113-4.
132 Hanson (2000a) 113-4.
133 See also Schwartz (2009) 149 for the view that “A lapse of over a century between royal deaths in 
battle... would also suggest the absence of Spartan kings from the phalanx’s front line.” It seems to me 
that this suggests nothing more than the fact that for over a century no Spartan king died in battle.
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and physical head.”134 It is interesting to note that Wheeler does not describe the 
general as the tactical head of the army, surely the point Iphicrates was making when 
he introduced his simile comparing an army to the human body: it was quite possible 
for a person’s body to be strong and prepared for war, but if that person could not 
make rapid and correct decisions regarding where and how to apply this strength,
I
then they were ineffective in battle. The discussion of communication during 
battle, found above, demonstrates that generals could issue commands and expect 
them to be followed, however where the general was during battle has an important 
bearing on our overall image of generalship during the Classical period. If the 
sources show he was always in the front ranks and always fighting then the case for 
an almost purely leadership role is strengthened, however if the evidence shows that 
sometimes generals were absent from the front ranks, perhaps throughout the 
fighting, then a more sophisticated role for the general can be found, one involving 
information, communication, and decision making, rather than just inspirational 
action. A third option also presents itself: generals usually fought in the front ranks 
but could withdraw to the rear when exhausted, injured, or wanting to get a sense of 
how the battle was going in order to issue appropriate commands.
The accounts of various battles can be found to back the position that 
generals fought in the front ranks of the phalanx, thus at the battles of Marathon, 
Potidaea, Olpai, Pireaus, Nemea, Coronea, and Leuctra the ancient authors inform us 
that generals were stationed in the front ranks, indeed Epaminondas’ tactics at 
Leuctra relied upon being able to crush the Spartan ‘command position’ at the very
134 Wheeler (1991) 145.
135 Polyaenus 3.9.22.
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beginning of the engagement, something that would have been very difficult had it
1been located in the rear ranks of the phalanx. These battles, while large and 
important ones, represent only a small fraction of those fought, and scholars have 
generally sought corroborating evidence from other sources which discuss attitudes 
or ideals regarding generals and the theory that an inspirational presence was the
1 37most important aspect for Greek generals to possess. Thus we have numerous 
exhortations from various sources for generals to be hard, practical men who were 
quick and capable with their weapons rather than their minds and tongues, and this 
points to a number of shared characteristics that seem to have made up an ‘ideal’ 
general. Archilochus observed that:
“I don’t like the towering captain with the spraddly length of leg, one who 
swaggers in his lovelocks and clean shaves beneath his chin. Give me a man 
short and squarely set upon his legs, a man full of heart, not to be shaken 
from the place he plants his feet.”138
Thus overbearing confidence or the impetuosity of youth were not qualities 
desirable in a general, indeed the very opposite is suggested: a general should be 
experienced, solid, and capable. This point may be supported by Aristophanes’ 
caricature of Lamachus and his insults, directed at an unnamed captain, about 
colourful and over-the-top crested helmets; an absurd image of an individual overly 
concerned about his image rather than his ability to command men springs to 
mind.139 It is worth pointing out, however, that the ability to identify a general, or 
subordinate officer, quickly could have been vital to hoplite battle, and a crested
136 Herodotus 6.111; Thucydides 4.62, 3.107; Xenpohon Hellenica 2.4.30,4.2.9-19,4.3.16, 6.4.13; 
Plutarch Pelopidas 23. Wheeler (1991) 145.
137 See, e.g. Wheeler (1991); Hanson (2000a); Schwartz (2009.)
138 Archilochus 114.
139 Aristophanes Achamians 1071-1234, Peace 1171. Hanson (2000a) 110 comments that the point of 
Aristophanes’ barbs is that these individuals “...might not be eager to charge with their soldiers into 
the faces of the enemy.” Lamachus seems to have been a solid and effective commander, and, indeed, 
died while marching with his soldiers into the faces of the enemy, so I feel the charge is unwarranted.
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helmet would certainly achieve this: Aristophanes’ exaggeration makes for an 
amusing scene, however it must have some basis in reality for it to have been 
relevant to a contemporary audience.140
Archilochus and Aristophanes’ points highlight the qualities, desired in a 
general, emphasised in various other works such as hardiness141, the ability to keep 
discipline142, and the ability to simply project competence.143 While there are 
examples of generals suffering personal hardship these refer to the maintenance of an 
army’s morale and discipline off the battlefield: tales such as Iphicrates walking 
barefoot and wearing summer clothes in the winter, and Agesilaus’ ability to 
withstand extreme temperature and go without sleep, have no bearing on where they 
could be found once the fighting started, or how they conducted themselves in 
battle.144 Despite this Hanson felt able to state that “...all believed that their supreme 
commander could best further his army’s cause by leadership through example, by 
fighting in the ranks on the right wing of the phalanx where his hoplites might be 
buoyed by his personal display of courage...”145 It is difficult to view the remark as 
accurate, indeed Xenophon does not record any instances of Iphicrates actually 
fighting with his men, although there are many examples of his ability to inspire men 
to great efforts when training, or to impose strict discipline and unusual methods of 
ensuring the loyalty and effectiveness of mercenary forces.146
140 Hanson (2000a) 73-4 is sceptical regarding the presence of crests on Corinthian helmets.
141 Xenophon Agesilaus 5-6.
142 Xenophon Anabasis 2.6.9-14,20. Cartledge (1987) 207.
143 Plutarch Moralia 231F4.
144 Polyaenus 3.9.34.
145 Hanson (2000a) 107.
146 Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.32; Polyaenus 3.9.35.
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The majority of the surviving battle descriptions do not indicate which rank 
the generals of either phalanx were stationed in, however some do offer hints. The 
Spartan King Agis at the battle of Mantinea was, according to Thucydides, present in 
the centre of the Peloponnesian line and surrounded by a bodyguard of 300 hippeis, 
however we are not told whether Agis was actually in the front rank.147 An incident 
the day before the battle when a veteran called out to Agis that his tactics were 
dangerous may suggest that Agis had an obscured view of the situation and that he
14Rwas therefore not in the front rank.
In Thucydides’ account of the battle of Amphipolis we are told that Brasidas 
led a small force in a rapid strike against the Athenian centre while Cleon, the 
Athenian general, fled at the first opportunity and was killed by a peltast.149 A 
reasonable inference may be that Brasidas was literally leading the advance of his 
hoplites from the front rank while Cleon, whose flight does not seem to have 
disrupted the Athenian phalanx, was not in the front ranks, however the evidence is 
clouded by Thucydides’ apparent dislike of Cleon and the lack of detail, thus we 
cannot make too much of it.
A vital example is that of the battle of Delium, the details of which have been 
discussed above, and which serves as evidence for generals either not being present 
in the front ranks throughout a battle, or for their ability to communicate with their
147 Thucydides 5.72.
148 Thucydides 5.65.
149 Thucydides 5.10.
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army despite being actively engaged in the fighting.150 It is to be admitted that 
Thucydides does not give details about where Pagondas was at any point in the 
engagement, however his description of Pagondas’ speech as being very short, 
perhaps in an attempt to catch the Athenians off guard, suggests that Pagondas may 
have at least started the battle in the front ranks, as, presumably, did Hippocrates, 
who was forced to cut his speech short and quickly join the ranks.151 It is possible 
that Pagondas issued his order for a cavalry attack while still fighting in the front
1 M
ranks, however this seems unlikely: the stress and potential confusion involved
with undertaking these actions simultaneously suggests that Pagondas withdrew 
from the fighting, either into the very rear ranks or even out of the phalanx 
altogether, to allow him to receive information regarding the plight of his left wing 
and to issue appropriate orders to address it. Note that I do not suggest that Pagondas 
represents a transition from ‘general’ to ‘battle-manager’, rather that his role as 
general did not bind him to the front ranks for the entire battle. Frontinus and 
Polyaenus record an incident that supports this interpretation, although it is not found 
in Thucydides’ account of the battle: at the battle of Tanagra in 457 an Athenian 
commander was apparently able to launch an attack with his left flank before
I  C1!
running to his right flank and declaring that the attack had met with success: it is
unlikely he was in the front rank throughout this stratagem.
Two of the most tactically interesting and well documented battles of the 
Classical period contain important information regarding the absence of the general
150 See above.
151 Thucydides 4.95-6.
152 Thucydides 4.96.
153 Frontinus Stratagems 2.4.11; Polyaenus 1.35.1. Wheeler (1991) 149-50.
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from the front ranks, those of Sphacteria and Lechaeum. It is to be admitted that in 
neither of these battles are the hoplite forces present actually engaged, however they 
are useful for making a general point regarding the ability of generals to ‘direct’ 
battles. At Sphacteria we are told that Demosthenes, having organised his light 
infantry into multiple units of around 200 and sent them to attack the Spartan 
hoplites, was approached by the captain of one of these groups who had important 
information regarding a weakness in the Spartan position.154 It appears that 
Demosthenes, along with the Athenian hoplites, was stationed some distance from 
the fighting, possibly in an elevated position, and was deliberately avoiding 
combat.155 Xenophon’s account of Laecheum is less detailed but suggests a similar 
situation: Callias, the commander of the hoplites, did not engage with his hoplites, 
instead allowing Iphicrates’ peltasts to engage the Spartan force; we do not know 
exactly what Iphicrates was doing during the fighting but given the need for a 
flowing system of constant attacks it is likely he was fulfilling a similar role to 
Demosthenes at Sphacteria.156 Both engagements show that there was no overriding 
inspirational or tactical need, or doctrinal imperative, which required generals to be 
present for the fighting. Indeed, one of the most impressive Spartan generals of the 
fourth century, Agesilaus, does not seem to have been stationed in the front ranks at 
the battle of Coronea: Xenophon tells us that it was Herippidas that led the initial 
advance, while Plutarch’s account states that Agesilaus was wounded during the
1 ^ 7second clash despite the presence of a royal bodyguard 50 men strong. There is no 
justification to state that “Along with regimental spirit, an even better incentive for 
hoplites to stand firm was the sight of their own commanding officer...fighting
154 Thucydides 4.36.
155 Athenian hoplites were present: Thucydides 4.31.
156 Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.13-18.
157 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.17; Plutarch Agesilaus 18.
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1alongside them in the very front ranks of the army” when on some occasions the 
general was not even taking part in the fighting, and on those occasions when he 
was, only those physically close were able to see him in the first place!159
The ancient evidence does not permit a definite conclusion to be reached 
regarding the position of the general in a phalanx; the relevant information is missing 
from many battle accounts, and the information that does survive does not point to a 
single, ‘standard’ position that all generals adopted. This is to be expected for two 
reasons: 1) not all generals shared identical character traits, thus some may well have 
preferred to lead from the front ranks while still others would have preferred a less 
direct role, 2) not all battles and phalanxes demanded a general leading from the 
front ranks, hence Demosthenes’ decision not to engage in the fighting at all during 
the battle of Sphacteria. Taking all the evidence together, as well as the conclusions 
of later chapters of this thesis which deal with the possibility of command during 
battle, I conclude by affirming the third option given at the beginning of this section, 
namely that generals usually fought in the front ranks but could withdraw to the rear 
when exhausted, injured, or wanting to get a sense of how the battle was going in 
order to issue appropriate commands. However a final aspect of generalship which 
sheds light on the ability of generals to communicate and their position in the line 
remains to be investigated, this being the deaths of generals in battle.
In his contribution to Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience 
Wheeler examined various aspects of generalship in Classical Greece, paying
158 Hanson (2000a) 107.
159 Due to the confusion and intense fighting in the front ranks. Schwartz (2009) 181.
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particular attention to a factor of Greek battle which Hanson emphasised in The 
Western Way o f War. the supposed ‘shockingly high’ casualty rates for generals. 
Wheeler pointed out that the battles of Tegyra, Leuctra, Mantinea, and Olynthus 
were all lost because the death of the Spartan general, or generals, in command 
resulted in such moral panic that their army was unable to continue fighting.160 Far 
too much has been made of this. Indeed no contemporary source explicitly states that 
the death of a commander was the cause of such panic that the phalanx collapsed, 
while there are several examples of commanders being killed and their phalanx 
continuing to fight.161 Why should we assume that all phalanxes were led by 
individuals who commanded such respect and admiration that the mere possibility of 
their death was enough to spread panic? A different explanation presents itself: if the 
death of a general resulted in defeat then it may have been because the phalanx was 
now literally ‘out of control.’ This explanation does not deny the possibility that a 
general ‘going down’ in combat could have a severe impact on a phalanx’s morale, 
indeed I believe it simply completes the picture, allowing a balanced view of a 
general’s importance to his army to be presented.
One aspect of generalship that has not yet been discussed is the impact of its 
absence to hoplite forces, i.e. how often were generals killed, why were they killed, 
and what were the consequences of the loss of a general during battle? Hanson came 
to the conclusion that defeated Greek generals were almost inevitably killed during 
battle, that victorious generals were also often killed, and that this resulted in
160 Wheeler (1991) 145.
161 E.g. Herodotus 7.224-5; Thucydides 5.10; Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13-14, 7.5.23-5.
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“...astonishing, high mortality rates among battlefield commanders.” This notion 
is closely attached to Hanson’s overall conception of hoplite battle as a simple affair, 
devoid of tactics or trickery, a conception that also includes a form of combat so 
restrictive that it would actually prevent generals from exercising influence during 
battle, as a result of which they were reduced to providing an inspiring example to 
their men. Hanson takes this idea one step further in the concluding paragraph of 
his analysis of generalship, where he offers a comparison to the generals of the 
American Civil war, professing that “...the general in the field, like his hoplite 
predecessor, was obliged not only to fight, but more importantly, to die beside his 
men.164 Thus the conspicuous display of ‘shared risk’ by generals was deemed by 
Hanson to be more important than any ability they may have had to influence the 
course of battle. However the following chapters demonstrate that the opposite is the 
case: hoplite battles were not simple fights, but involved the use of tactics, which 
were able to be used as a result of the flexibility of the phalanx formation and, hence, 
the ability of the general to influence battle. The issue of casualty rates for generals 
has not been addressed though, and remains of importance to the image of 
generalship that this study is presenting: if rates were ‘astonishingly’ high then this 
may well lend credence to the image of generals fighting harder, closer to the enemy, 
and with conspicuous bravery in order to inspire their men; to get them to follow and 
fight by way of example and the shame of being ‘outdone’. We would naturally 
expect many more to be killed in battle than if they were relatively inconspicuous, 
or, indeed, were directing the action from some nearby hill.165 However, high
162 Hanson (2000a) 112.
163 Indeed, how could a general do anything else if he was pushing his comrades from behind, being 
pushed from behind, or standing in line attempting to cover his neighbor’s shield-less side with his 
shield?
164 Hanson (2000a) 115.
165 See Wheeler (1991) and (2007) for the view that generals did not always enter combat, and that
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casualty rates could also point to a second option: generals were viewed as targets of 
high importance, either as a result of their ability to inspire their men, or because of 
their ability to influence battle.
The sentence from Hanson quoted above highlights the approach that modem 
scholars have taken to Greek generalship: one fascinated by the frequency with 
which generals were killed and the need to lead by example, rather than the impact 
those generals could have on battle itself. The two points are closely related, indeed 
concentration on the deaths of generals and the importance of leadership by example 
is a position that is almost inevitable given the restrictive battlefield environment 
those same scholars advocate and which is analysed and rejected in the following 
chapters.
Schwartz provides the most complete list of deaths of generals, a list which 
spans from the death of Anchimolius at Phaleron in 512166 to Leosthenes at Lamia in 
323167 and takes up some one and a half pages of his book.168 The list is visually 
impressive, however Schwartz does not offer a conclusion regarding its contents, and 
simply states that: “The high mortality rate among generals in Archaic and Classical 
times speaks volumes.”169 Does it? If the point being made is that serving as a 
general in Classical Greece was a dangerous activity then this is surely correct, as is
while a close connection existed between army and general, this was not so powerful as to break the 
army if the general was killed. Thucydides 4.96: the ability o f the Theban general Pagondas to launch 
a cavalry attack mid-battle suggests he was not directly involved in the fighting at that moment, but 
does not indicate he was privy to a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the engagement:.
166 Herodotus 5.63.
167 Diodorus Siculus 18.13.3-5
168 Schwartz (2009) 181-2.
169 Schwartz (2009) 182.
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the assertion that serving as a hoplite was a dangerous activity, and the assertion that 
serving in the front rank was more dangerous than bringing up the rear. However 
referring to ‘high mortality’ rates is difficult to justify: we simply do not have 
sufficient information to make a comparative claim such as this, especially as the 
claim also treats all battles as of equal importance regardless of size and does not 
make allowances for the nature of hoplite battle itself or to the difference in 
command between states. For example, Schwartz points out that the Athenian 
generals Callimachus and Stesileus were killed at the battle of Marathon, and that 
Laches and Nicostratus were killed at the battle of Mantinea.170 However pointing to 
just these facts and not examining them in context leads us to false conclusions, 
especially when there is no mention of those generals who were not killed. Thus at 
Marathon eight of the ten Athenian generals survived, as presumably did the 
Plataean general or generals, giving us a total of two out of (at least) eleven, or an 
18% fatality rate.171 Herodotus records that both of these generals were killed during 
the extended pursuit of the Persians after the Athenians had broken their 
formation,172 i.e. after there would have been a pressing need for the sort of inspiring 
leadership that Hanson, Lazenby, Schwartz et al insist was vital for generals to 
display. Thus they fell, somehow, in the melee that occurred after the battle proper 
had been decided, and it is worthwhile to note that although Herodotus’ account of 
Marathon contains evidence of Athenian generals exercising tactical and strategic
173 1 HAthought , as well as influencing battle directly , there is no evidence to suggest
170 Herodotus 6.112; Thucydides 5.74. Schwartz (2009) 181 -  his emphasis.
171 Herodotus 6.114. The Plataean general(s) did not take part in the ‘commander’s conference’ at 
6.109, but given around 1,000 Plataeans fought it is reasonable to assume they were led into battle by 
their own leaders.
172 Herodotus 6.114.
173 Herodotus 6.109. Krentz (2010) 137-143.
174 Herodotus 6.114. Krentz (2010) 157-9.
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that they took greater risks, or displayed conspicuously greater valour, than any of 
the hoplites under their command.
Marathon is the first battle involving hoplites for which we have detailed 
information, and to see whether it is representative we can compare it to another, 
though larger, engagement, that of the battle of Plataea, where Herodotus does not 
record the death of a single Greek general although he does describe a ‘commander’s 
conference’, indicative of the number of contingents and, hence, generals that were 
present.175 That two battles of such size could take place only ten years apart and 
have such different consequences for those generals who fought indicates the 
difficulty of examining bare statistics and arriving at valid conclusions, as is also 
demonstrated by the battle of Mantinea. While Thucydides records the death of both 
Athenian generals at Mantinea, he gives no information regarding the fate of the 
generals in command of the contingents from Mantinea, Argos, Cleonae, Omeae, 
Tegea or Maenalia, although it is clear that Agis, the Spartan general, survived. 
Whether Thucydides did not know if the other generals survived, or did not consider 
it worthwhile reporting, cannot be determined, however the death of the Athenian 
generals, along with 200 other Athenian hoplites, is directly reported, and is not 
surprising given the circumstances. The Athenians held the left wing of their allied 
phalanx and were not only opposed by the main body of Spartan troops, but, once 
Agis had extended his line, were also outflanked by the Spartans and Tegeans who
175 Herodotus 9.50-1.
176 Thucydides 5.67 for the list of states present. 5.72 for Agis’ potential involvement in the fighting 
itself -  had he been killed then Thucydides would surely have mentioned it. Wheeler (1991) 148-9 for 
the observation that the 300 hippeis fight as a bodyguard to the Spartan King, and that several battle 
descriptions have the king placed behind other troops.
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made up the right wing of the Spartan phalanx. As such the Athenians were 
outnumbered, outmanoeuvred, and outclassed, and were only able to escape without 
further casualties due to the presence of their cavalry, which prevented a concerted 
pursuit by the enemy, and by Agis’ decision to march to the aid of his beleaguered 
left wing.178 The deaths of both Athenian generals at Mantinea was a result of the 
immediate tactical circumstances of their section of the line, and does not aid the 
case for a ‘high fatality rate’ amongst Greek generals. The next entry in Schwartz’s 
list is the first battle of the Sicilian expedition, where the Syracusan general 
Diomilos died: at least eighteen generals fought in this battle, and Thucydides 
records no other deaths, thus we get an overall fatality rate of 5.5%, again, not a
1 70figure that appears to be astonishing. The list goes on, but all it demonstrates is 
that in some battles some, occasionally all, of the generals of some contingents 
present, were killed, with the losing side usually suffering more casualties than the 
winners.180
There is an important distinction that needs to be made between those 
generals who apparently deliberately chose to die on the battlefield rather than 
escape and live, and those about whom all we know is the fact that they died at some 
point during battle. If the majority of generals willingly died rather than escape, or if 
the source material indicates that such was the expected behaviour of generals, then a 
number of options present themselves: 1) generals genuinely led from the front, and
177 Thucydides 5.72-3. Lazenby (2004) 124-5.
178 Thucydides 5.72. Also 6.69-70 for cavalry preventing pursuit, and Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.22-3 
for the Spartan restraint of pursuit at the Nemea.
179 Thucydides 6.69-73. The Athenians were led by three generals while the Syracusans had fifteen! 
Schwartz (2009) 181.
180 Mirrored by casualties amongst the hoplites as well: see appendix 1. Hamel (1998) 204-9 and Paul 
(1987) 307 also give lists of generals killed. Again the lists are visually impressive but, because of the 
fragmentary nature of the evidence, they do not allow solid conclusions to be drawn.
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believed that their presence could bolster their troops to greater efforts, thus they 
deliberately placed themselves in the place of greatest danger, or stood their ground 
or advanced when their phalanx was in danger of being defeated, 2) the stigma and 
embarrassment of defeat was such that generals preferred to die fighting rather than 
live under the shadow of failure, which suggests that this was the best, or only, way 
for generals to influence battle 3) generals were so afraid of the potential 
repercussions should they return home in defeat that they would fight to the death 
rather than be directly punished for their failure.
The first category is small, but appears to have had a disproportionately large 
impact upon the study of Classical Greek generalship, given the insistence on the
101
importance of generals fighting, and dying, in battle. Indeed only two explicit
1 89examples survive, both of them Spartan. The death of Leonidas is discussed 
elsewhere in this study, suffice to say that he chose a course of action which placed 
him in great danger, and during which he certainly led from the front, not out of a 
need to inspire his men but because he was relying on flexible tactics and 
manoeuvre.183 Hanson uses Leonidas to illustrate what he views as a “...genuine 
desire on the part of the general to fight and risk death alongside his men.”184 
Attributing motives or emotions to all generals, hailing from disparate parts of the 
Greek world, is even more dangerous than doing so to individuals: we do not know 
if generals desired to fight alongside their men, we do not even know if their men 
desired to fight, but what we do know is that Thermopylae was no ordinary battle,
181 Hanson (2000a) 115-6.
182 Although the men of Thespiae fought to the death three times in the Classical period, the surviving 
source material does not allow a comment regarding the desire, or otherwise, of their generals to do 
this to be made. See Chapter 2.
183 Herodotus 7.112.
184 Hanson (2000a) 108.
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and Spartans were no ordinary Greeks. Indeed given that the entire Spartan 
contingent present was wiped out at Thermopylae because they were surrounded and 
could not escape, and that the battle came to be viewed as the epitome of Spartan
bravery, it cannot be used to identify a particular trend amongst Greek generals as a
1whole. Spartan generals in particular do not seem to have conformed to the 
‘inspiring example’ type: Thucydides’ description of the battle of Mantinea has the 
Spartans sitting quietly and talking amongst themselves while generals from other 
states were inspiring their men with speeches; Spartans, it seems, did not need 
generals to inspire them to greater efforts.
A century separates Leonidas from the only other surviving example of a 
general apparently deliberately placing himself in more danger than his troops and 
being killed, that of the Spartan Anaxibius, whose army was ambushed by the 
Athenian mercenary general Iphicrates in 379. According to Xenophon Anaxibius, 
whose army was caught marching in column and halfway down a mountain, 
recognised the hopelessness of the situation and sacrificed himself to allow the rest
1 87of his army to escape. The incident may be evocative and appealing, it certainly
conforms to the Spartan stereotype, but there is no need to reduce it to an emotional
1 88decision by Anaxibius to prefer honourable death over dishonourable flight. 
Indeed Xenophon remarks that the majority of the Spartans were ordered to flee 
from the ambush, but were pursued and killed until they reached the safety of
185 See, e.g. Thucydides 4.36.
186 Thucydides 5.69.
187 Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.38.
188 So Hanson (2000a) 108, 178,193.
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Antandrus; if Anaxibius’ intent was to make a ‘last stand’ in order to draw attention 
to himself then he failed. Scholars are fond of quoting his reported last words:
av6p£<;, Efjoi pev £v0a5e KaAov aTTO0av£iv: up£i<; 5 e n p iv  aupp£T^ai Toiq uoA£pioig 
ott£u5£T£ £ig Tr)v aw iripi’av .
“Men, it is honourable for me to die here, rush to safety before coming to
1RQclose engagement with the enemy.”
Thus Xenophon’s reporting of this engagement is used to demonstrate the heroic 
qualities of Spartan generals, rather than the ability of Iphicrates to outclass 
Anaxibius with a combination of misdirection and ambush; a situation possibly 
brought about by Xenophon’s pro-Spartan bias, and reinforced by modem 
misconceptions regarding the inability of generals to influence battle, and the role of 
the general on the battlefield itself. Indeed, although Xenophon’s description of 
Anaxibius’ ‘last words’ suggests he deliberately chose to sacrifice himself to allow 
his men to live, Xenophon also writes that:
o 6£ A va^ipioq a p u  K afrpaivE a u v  Toiq AokujvikoT^ , ev Tounp o  ’IcpiKpaTqs £^avicrrnai 
n iv  £V£5pav Kai Spoptp  £(p£p£TO n p o g  auTov.
“...and Anaxibius with his Lacedaemonians was just beginning the descent, 
at this moment Iphicrates started his men up from their ambush and rushed 
upon him on the run.”190
Anaxibius’ position was deliberately targeted by Iphicrates, presumably because 
Iphicrates was aware of the importance of the general to the effective deployment 
and tactical management of an army.191 Anaxibius did not necessarily choose the
189 Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.38 (trans Brownson, modified.)
190 Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.37 (trans Brownson.)
191 C.f. his remarks regarding the general as the head of the army: Plutarch Moralia 187b; Polyaenus
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nature of his death, and statements such as Wheeler’s that “No wonder that the 
Spartan Anaxibius, the victim of his own carelessness and an ambush of Iphicrates,
1 Q 9
opportunely chose ... death in battle” focus too much on the supposedly heroic 
nature of his decision to stand and fight, rather than his recognition that it was an 
impossible situation for him, personally, to escape from: the implication in 
Xenophon’s description is that Anaxibius was unable to retreat as a result of the
i cncompleteness of Iphicrates’ ambush. His ‘final order’ to his men to retreat 
highlights the point made at the beginning of this chapter that Greek generals were 
capable of communicating with their commands, and that Anaxibius could do it at 
short notice to an allied hoplite force in an ambush situation strengthens the case for 
communication as an essential part of Greek battle. It is perhaps too much to deny 
Anaxibius any aspect of heroism or self-sacrifice here; had he survived the initial 
ambush he may have lived through the entire engagement, however I believe he 
recognised his own situation was impossible as Iphicrates had targeted him directly. 
His order to retreat, though given in an attempt to save as many of his men as 
possible, was not followed by a suicidal and deliberate ‘last stand’ to give his men 
time to get away, but by his rapid death at the hands of Iphicrates’ mercenaries who 
proceeded to catch and slaughter his men.
3.9.22.1.
192 Wheeler (1991) 151. Schwartz (2009) believes that Anaxibius “...demanded to be left alone with a 
few troops, trying to make good an escape for his men” and uses this as an exemplar of the general 
setting a good example by his actions. This does not account for the context of the ambush or the 
deliberate targeting of Anaxibius’ position by Iphicrates, and elevates the engagement to something it 
was not: an example of the superiority of Spartan character.
193 It is also telling that Wheeler brings up Iphicrates’ ambush after calling Anaxibius careless, it reads 
like an apology on behalf of the Spartans, or an attempt to place the blame on a Spartan’s failure 
rather than an Athenian’s success.
71
The two Spartan examples discussed above are the only surviving historical 
examples of generals ‘choosing’ heroic death over survival, they are not typical 
battles and, indeed, they do not represent individual generals doing nothing other 
thain providing leadership through personal example.194 Other, less detailed accounts 
of generals leading ‘from the front’ survive, however these do not demonstrate an 
overriding need for generals to provide inspiring examples, indeed they show 
something quite different: a need for generals to be in such a position, and with such 
troops, that the best advantage of changing situations could be gained. Thus Brasidas 
personally commanded the rearguard at the battle of Lyncus and an ambushing force 
at Amphipolis, where he was killed: both occasions when the actions of a small 
group of chosen men were key to his overall plan, and so were commanded by him 
personally.195 Lamachus was killed in Sicily leading reinforcements from the 
Athenian left wing to resist a Syracusan attack on the right wing and was killed, not 
as a result of a need for him to personally inspire his men, or because he fell while 
allowing others to escape, but because he, and several others, became cut off from 
the main body of troops, possibly because of inadequate Athenian battlefield 
intelligence and scouting.196
Pelopidas commanded the Sacred Band at Tegyra and Leuctra, and was killed 
at Cynoscephalae during a tactical struggle over elevated positions, all occasions 
when the forces he led were operating alone or in direct support of the main phalanx,
194 While there are other examples of generals, Spartan and non-Spartan, getting themselves into 
unsurvivable or seriously dangerous situations, these do not indicate that they were ‘prepared’, 
‘willing’, or ‘eager’ to die fighting, just that they had no other option but to try and fight their way out 
of the mess they got themselves into. E.g. Mnasippos: Xenophon Hellenica 6.2.16-23.
195 Thucydides 4.124-9, 5.7-10.
196 Thucydides 6.101. Homblower (2008) 531. Wheeler (1991) 146 states that Lamacus was “...too 
boldly trying to exploit a Syracusan rout...” however Thucydides states that Lamachus was moving to 
support the Athenian right wing, a tactical decision, not chasing after fleeing enemies.
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and thus needed to be able to respond to changing circumstances. Indeed, his input 
was expected and needed in order for the formation to be effective; he was not
1 07simply acting as a conduit for morale. The behaviour that led up to his death is the 
very antithesis of that which the source material suggests was desirable in a general: 
Pelopidas let his emotions get the better of him, broke ranks, and whether he was 
dreaming of performing heroic deeds or simply enraged, his actions endangered his
1 Q O
entire army rather than providing an inspiring example. Generals were not limited 
to providing an inspiring example for their men to see, nor was their role limited 
once battle had actually began, indeed those occasions when a general fought 
“...with such contempt for death that he was actually killed...”199 were occasions 
when he was not faced with a choice: Leonidas and Anaxibius could not get away, 
thus they died, along with the majority of their commands.
There is some evidence to suggest that generals were ashamed of returning 
home in defeat or afraid of the consequences that could follow if they did so, 
however this evidence does not amount to a solid conclusion that generals would 
fight to the death rather than accept a single defeat. Wheeler believes that “...failure 
demanded the ultimate sacrifice to avoid ignominy for the commander and to 
appease his city. Although defeated, the general could still claim a hero’s status.”200 
In support of this assertion he offers Epaminondas’ opinion that death in war was 
kalliston, that Leonidas thought a glorious death in battle a gift to aristoi, and that
197 Plutarch Pelopidas 17, 32; Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.11-14.
198 Plutarch Pelopidas 32. C.f. Herodotus 9.71: fighting out in front of the phalanx, or charging on 
ahead against superior numbers, was not recognized as good, or brave, behaviour for hoplites and, 
presumably, generals.
199 Schwartz (2009) 180.
200 Wheeler (1991) 151.
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901Agesilaus thought a quiet death for himself to have been unworthy. These 
thoughts were all recorded by Plutarch and are thus both not contemporary and 
tainted by his desire to offer moral exemplars, indeed the three individuals are 
among the most extraordinary men of their time, and we must be careful with 
applying the principles and thoughts which Plutarch has them expound to Greek 
generals as a whole. More reliable and pertinent are the worries of the Athenian 
generals Demosthenes and Nicias, who, according to Thucydides, were both afraid
9 0 9of returning to Athens in defeat. That both had been defeated and survived to fear
the reaction of the Athenians contradicts Hanson’s assertion that the Athenians ‘to 
their credit’ were so taken with the notion of generals dying before surviving defeat 
that all Athenian generals did so until Andocides had the gall to survive
9A 0
Chaeroneia. We have no direct contemporary evidence to the effect that generals 
preferred death to survival in defeat: Demosthenes, Nicias, and Andocidies clearly 
did not, while the mere fact that generals of some contingents of defeated armies 
often died does not prove that they deliberately chose to ‘go down fighting’ rather 
than face the possibility of prosecution or execution on returning home. Indeed to 
state such is to overlook a simpler explanation that accords with the findings of the 
following chapters regarding the ability of generals to influence the course of battles, 
and emphasises the importance of generals throughout the Classical Greek period: 
generals of defeated armies died in battle because they had been targeted.
In suggesting this I do not mean to propose that all generals who ever died in 
battle did so because they were identified and systematically targeted by the enemy
201 Plutarch Moralia 192, 225D; Agesilaus 36.
202 Thucydides 3.98, 7.14-15.
203Hanson (2000a) 114. Diodorus Siculus 16.88.2.
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general, or that no generals ever died while attempting to hold off an enemy push or 
because they pursued a defeated enemy force too far. Instead I propose that the 
Greeks recognised the importance of generals to the continued effective operation of 
a phalanx and thus took pains to “chop off the head of the snake” whenever they 
could. This principle can also be seen in various engagements of the Peloponnesian 
War: at the battle of Olpae Demosthenes placed an ambush to counter the 
outflanking manoeuvre of the enemy right wing, which resulted in the death of the 
general Eurylochus, the destruction of the best troops in the Peloponnesian force, and 
the defeat of the rest of the army.204 By engaging the expected position of the enemy 
general directly Demosthenes protected most of his left wing and centre, allowing 
his right wing, which he led in person, to defeat the enemy left and occupy the 
battlefield. Thus the enemy general and his best troops were tied up in combat and 
unable to come to the aid of their left wing, with Demosthenes’ recognition of the 
importance of command mid-battle being at the very core of his tactics.205 This 
recognition was shared by Epaminondas and put into practice in his victories at 
Leuctra and Mantinea.
A desire or demand for generals to willingly expose themselves to greater 
danger than their troops cannot be consistently found in the source material, indeed 
the placement of the general on the right wing with the best troops indicates quite the 
opposite: generals usually occupied that part of the army which was least likely to be 
outflanked, most likely required direction in order to control the drift to the right, and 
most likely to outflank the enemy, therefore being least exposed to danger, and most
204 Thucydides 3.107-9.
205 See also the battles of Sphacteria, Munychia, and Coronea for possible examples of generals being 
deliberately targeted.
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9 0 6in need of a controlling presence. However notable exceptions exist: at the battle 
of Delium the Athenian general Hippocrates was placed in the centre, while at the
9 0 7battle of Mantinea Agis held the centre of the allied army. Neither of these 
represents a general deliberately accepting a greater degree of risk in order to inspire 
his men: Hippocrates was caught out of position by the early advance of the enemy, 
Thucydides explains he was walking the line offering encouragement while his 
opposite number only gave a short speech, and Agis was accompanied by the 300 
hippeis, elite troops whose presence caused many of the enemy to flee before contact
908was even made. Generals placed on the right wing were also in such a position as 
to direct the best troops in the phalanx in person, or, in the case of an allied army 
where the men from the polis under threat occupied the right wing, were stationed 
with troops who needed little further encouragement to fight as hard as they could. 
Generals were not hoplites whose only role was to act as a conduit and catalyst for 
their army’s morale, they were not expected to perform glorious or exceptionally 
brave acts to inspire their men, and they were certainly not unable to influence battle 
once it had begun. The notion of the hoplite general as primus inter pares and 
symbolic figurehead on the battlefield must be rejected -  it is a simplistic view based 
on fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of Classical Greek battle, reinforced 
by misguided attempts to draw parallels with completely different forms of warfare. 
Instead the evidence suggests that while generals did fight alongside their men in the 
majority of cases they did so in order to ensure advantages could be rapidly exploited
206 Contra Hanson (2000a) 110 who writes that the general would be the first to make contact with the 
enemy. I cannot see how he can be correct.
207 Thucydides 4.96, 5.67. At the battle of Syracuse the Athenians held the centre of the phalanx while 
the Argives and Mantineans held the right. Thucydides does not state where the Athenian generals 
were stationed. 6.67.
208 Thucydides 4.96.
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by being well placed to issue orders, not so that they could inspire their men to 
greater efforts.
The surviving primary material suggests that the role of a Classical Greek 
general was more complicated than current orthodox thought suggests. His was a 
role which was not limited to providing an inspiring and physical example to his 
men, but was one which encompassed the receiving and sending of messages, the 
issuing of orders, and the exercise of discretion in deciding where and when to fight 
in the front ranks of the phalanx. I do not suggest that there was a desire on the part 
of generals to avoid combat altogether, rather that there was no need for them to be 
constantly present in the front ranks fighting for their lives; the source material 
directly, and indirectly, suggests that generals were capable of much more.
Chapter 3: Small units and subordinate commanders
An important ‘offshoot’ of this investigation has been the discovery of the 
importance of other levels of command, formal and informal, in hoplite armies. 
These secondary levels of command are rarely discussed directly by the surviving 
sources; however their presence, and their importance, can be inferred from a 
number of incidents which can only be explained by the ability of individuals to 
react rapidly, and in an organized fashion, to changing events. These events, from a 
rapid dash out of the phalanx to strike down a Persian general,209 to the disabusing of 
a Spartan King’s battle plan, and the ability of phalanxes to continue operating 
after the death of their general,211 all indicate that individuals other than the general 
were able to, and indeed expected to, exercise leadership and command functions 
during battle. This is a vital point that has not been fully recognized by modem 
scholarship, but it is a point that changes our understanding of the battlefield 
environment of hoplite engagements, the nature of the phalanx, and the very purpose 
of Classical Greek battle by further shifting the emphasis from the ‘wonderful absurd 
conspiracy’212 of a system of battle that deliberately limited the possibility of 
generalship, and hence casualties, to one which concentrated on the engineering of 
advantage through any means possible. Indeed, the presence of subordinate 
commanders within phalanxes highlights the importance the Greeks attached to 
organization and leadership in battle, and reinforces the image of the phalanx as a
209 Herodotus 9.22.
210 Thucydides 5.65.
211 E.g. Herodotus 7.224-5; Thucydides 5.10; XenophonHellenica 6.4.13-15.
212 Hanson (1991) 6. Hamel (1998) 59-75 has an interesting chapter on Athenian subordinate 
commanders and the extent to which they could influence generals regarding discipline, awarding of 
prizes, and strategic decision-making, however she does not consider their battlefield role.
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flexible formation, as developed in previous chapters, and changes the focus of 
hoplite combat from solidarity to teamwork.
The importance of subordinate commanders to Classical Greek armies is 
evident in the structure of Spartan and Athenian armies, both of which had various 
formal levels of command below the general. The Spartan system was rather more 
complicated than the Athenian, and allowed Spartan phalanxes to exercise an 
impressive degree of battlefield adaptability and survivability in the face of 
concerted attack, or in the event of their general being targeted and killed. This 
system evolved during the fifth and fourth centuries, and we are fortunate that a 
number of excellent sources contain information regarding the levels of command 
and organisation within the Spartan army at that time. The oath of the Greeks 
apparently sworn before the battle of Plataea, and preserved in a mid-fourth century 
inscription from Achamae, contains a sentence which is vital to our understanding of 
both Spartan and Athenian approaches to command at all levels:
“I shall not desert my taxiarchos or my enomotarches, whether he is alive or 
dead, and I shall not leave unless the hegemones lead us away, and I shall do 
whatever the strategoi command.. .”214
91c
The oath may refer to a mixture of Spartan and Athenian military officers:
91 f\the position of enomotarches was solely Spartan; the Athenians elected their
213 See, most recently, van Wees (2006.)
214 Tod 11.204, 21-29. The oath is partially reproduced in various literary sources: Lycurgus Against 
Leocrates 81; Diodorus Siculus 11.29.31; FGrHist 115 F 153. van Wees (2006) 125 for a summary of 
the arguments regarding the inscription’s authenticity; he regards it as an “.. .exact copy of the real 
thing” 153.
215 Suggested by van Wees (2004) 244. Lazenby (1993) 220 n.15 is sceptical.
216 Herodotus 1.65. van Wees (2006) 127.
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strategoi each year but the word is not used to describe Spartan officers; the Spartans
9 1 7referred to their Kings as hegemones; both states had a subordinate officer known
918as a taxiarchos. Or it may refer to a purely Spartan system of command, in which
91Qthe hegemones refers to their position as leaders of the alliance against Persia, and 
the strategoi refers to a ‘council of the allies’ generals’, presumably dominated by
9 9 0Spartans, and not the Athenian office. Thus the oath possibly reflects a joint effort 
by Spartan and Athenian individuals to create an oath suitable for all the states 
present at the battle, or is an indication that Spartan command and control of the 
allied army was stronger than previously thought, with the allies swearing not to 
abandon the battlefield before the Spartans, or to disobey any orders which the 
‘council of generals’ issued. The latter suggestion has the benefit of avoiding the 
need to imagine Spartans and Athenians swearing loyalty to each others’ officers and
ileaders, while highlighting the importance of the basic tactical unit used by the 
Spartans, the enomotia. The ‘Oath of Plataea’ can be compared with the ‘Oath of the 
Ephebes’, found on the same inscription, to highlight the primary difference between 
Spartan and Athenian forces. The Ephebic oath stresses loyalty to one’s neighbour in 
line and the obligation to defend and strengthen the state: obedience to officers does
9 9 9not feature, although obedience and loyalty to all loyal soldiers does. The generic 
tone of the oath, and its function in the ‘coming of age’ of Athenian youths, reduces 
its impact as a reflection of Athenian military practice, and it does not indicate that a
217 Herodotus 9.53
218 Herodotus 9.53; Aristotle Athenian Constitution 61.1-3; Aristophanes Achamians 575. van Wees 
(2006) 127-8, n.10, 11.
219 As at, e.g. Herodotus 7.149,159, 204,208, 8.2-3.
220 As at, e.g. Herodotus 8.49, 56-9, 78, 9.21. Siewert (1972) 60-61, 95-6, now followed by van Wees 
(2006) 131.
221 van Wees (2006) 131. 127 for the point that an Athenian taxiarchos commanded large units, while 
an enomotarches commanded the smallest unit possible in the Spartan system: the two are not 
comparable, and the most plausible explanation is that the oath refers to two Spartan positions, rather 
than an Athenian and a Spartan.
222 Lines 5-20.
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chain of command, or subordinate officers, were not important to Athenian military 
thought and practice.
Despite uncertainty regarding its specific details the oath remains useful as it 
still sheds light on, at least, the levels of Spartan command present at the battle of 
Plataea, and also because it suggests that the 36 states present at the battle would 
have understand and appreciated the position of taxiarchos -  if it was shared by the 
Spartan and Athenian military systems then it is fair to assume that others also used 
it, or were at least familiar with the concept. Also the oath makes it clear that the 
Spartan command system was more integrated than other states, with another level 
of command existing between the general’s immediate subordinate and the rest of
99^the men. This level, the enomotarches, was the commander of the ‘sworn band’ to
which he belonged, a unit which, by Xenophon’s time, also had six file leaders, 
adding a further level to the Spartan system.224
Within each enomotia of about 40 men there were thus seven officers, a level 
of organisation increased by the ability of Spartan generals to direct ‘year-classes’ to
99Sundertake specific actions. The flexibility of this final element of the Spartan 
system was demonstrated by its use at times when Spartan phalanxes found 
themselves under attack by light infantry; these were dangerous situations which 
required an immediate response from the general, and having the ability to direct 
specific groups of men, all of whom had gone through the agoge together, was a
223 Van Wees (2004) 100.
224 Herodotus 1.65; Xenophon Spartan Constitution 11.4-8. van Wees (2006) 125.
225 Thucydides 5.68; Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.12,17. Van Wees (2004) 98,277.
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significant advantage. These additional levels of command created an environment 
in which each individual Spartan was aware of his, and his immediate neighbours’, 
position in the chain of command, and was thus able to take, or give, orders as and 
when required. It is important to note that this not only gave Spartan forces the 
ability to respond to changing tactical circumstances quickly, but may also have been 
the foundation for their effectiveness as fighters as well: having such a system of 
command would allow those involved in the actual fighting to direct their efforts 
more effectively as part of a group. Thus the strength of the Spartan ‘cutting edge’ 
was in its organisation and its capacity for teamwork, not just any physical 
superiority the Spartans enjoyed, a point emphasised by Plutarch:
kcm'toi ttovtwv aKpoi texvTtoi Kai aocpicrrai tw v uoAepiKwv ovte<; oi iTTapTicrrai npo^  
ouSev outux; ETraibEuov auTouq Kai ouvei'Bi^ov, ujq to  pr) wAavaaOai pr|6£ 
TapaTT£a0ai to^eux; [p. 396] 5iaAu0Ei'an ,^ aAAa xpwpevoi Traai tt6vte£ £m<rrdTai<; Kai 
^EuyiTaig, ottoi ttote ko’i auviainaiv o Kivbuvog, KaiaAappavEiv Kai auvapporrEiv Kai 
paxea0ai TTapaiTAnaiux;
“And yet the Spartans, who were of all men past masters in the art of war, 
trained and accustomed themselves to nothing so much as not to struggle or 
get into confusion upon a change of formation, but to take anyone without 
exception as neighbour in rank or in file, and wheresoever danger actually 
threatened, to seize that point and form in close array and fight as well as 
ever.”227
The importance of teamwork and the ‘onion layer’ system of subordinate 
command to the continued effectiveness of Spartan forces is further demonstrated by 
Thucydides’ description of the Spartan response to the appearance of an Argive-led 
army on the day of the battle of Mantinea:
226 E.g. Thucydides 4.125-7; Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.14-16.
227 Plutarch Pelopidas 23 (trans Perrin.) Lazenby (1985) 160; Wheeler (2007a) 215.
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paaiAeux; yap ayovTog u tt’ ekei'vou u o v ia  apxeiai, Kai Toig pev TToAepapxoig auTog 
cppa^ei to  6eov, oi 6£ toT^ AoxayoT*;, ekeTvoi 6e toT<; TTEVTnKovTnpaiv, auGig 6 ’ outoi 
toT^ EvwpoTapxoiq Kai outoi t r  EvwpoTig. Kai ai TrapaYY^cre'S. Hv T| pouAwvrai, koto 
to  auTa xwpoOai Kai Taxeiai ettepxovtoi: axeSov \ a p  ti ttciv TTAriv oAiyou to  
crrpaTOTTESov twv AaKESaipoviwv apxovTEg apxovTwv siai, Kai to  ettipeAe^ toO 
SpwpEvou ttoAAoi^ TTpoariKEi.
“When the king is in the field he is in complete command. He personally 
determines the requisite orders and gives them to the polemarchs; they pass 
them on to the divisional commanders, and then in sequence the orders are 
transmitted from divisional commander (lochagos) to company commander 
(penteconter) to unit commander (<enomotarches) to unit. Any subsequent 
instructions needed follow the same route and arrive quickly. Virtually the 
whole of the Spartan army is a system of command within command, and 
responsibility for action is widely shared.”
Thucydides most likely gave this description of the Spartan officer system as 
an introduction to, or pre-emptive explanation of, the refusal of Agis’ orders by two 
subordinate commanders which occurred later in the battle, and it reinforces the 
point made above about the complexity of the Spartan command structure.229 
Thucydides does not explain the purpose behind this structure, or directly compare it 
to that of any other state, but the implication is relatively clear: other states used their 
own systems of subordinate command, but the Spartan system was quicker, more
90 Aeffective, and more professional. Indeed such was the importance of the 
subordinate command structure to Spartan armies that each of the seven divisional 
commanders present at the battle of Mantinea decided upon the depth of his own
9 < J 1
formation.
Thus each division of the Spartan army was able to arrange its ranks 
according to the nature and size of the enemy force directly opposing it while also
228 Thucydides 5.66 (trans Hammond.) Anderson (1970) 71-2; Cawkwell (1989) 382.
229 Homblower (2008) 174.
230 Lazenby (2004) 121.
231 Thucydides 5.68.
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adhering to the overall formation structure and battle plan, decided upon by Agis. 
However at Manintea this battle plan was changed by Agis at the last minute when 
he attempted to shift two divisions to the left in order to match the enemy line; Agis’ 
orders were refused by the polemarchs of the divisions, and a hole was left in the 
Spartan phalanx as a result.232 The polemarchs were later exiled for cowardice, but 
their decision, indeed their ability, to refuse a direct battlefield order indicates the 
importance of subordinate commanders to the Spartan army, the close connection 
between the polemarch and his division, and the difference in experience and ability 
between the polemarchs present and Agis, in overall command. Indeed, Agis does 
not seem to have been a particularly gifted commander: his order would have 
resulted in the two divisions presenting their unshielded side to an advancing enemy 
in close proximity, a potentially disastrous situation that the two polemarchs flatly 
refused to be drawn into.233 This tactical mistake can be added to the one he nearly 
made the day before the battle which was only avoided by the shouted advice of a 
‘veteran’234, and his earlier decision to agree to a peace treaty with Argos when he 
could have crushed their army in the field, a decision he took without consultation 
and for which he was heavily criticised.235 On each occasion Thucydides directly or 
indirectly implies that Agis’ authority was challenged or defied by subordinates -  
men who were narrowly able to prevent the King leading them into dangerous 
situations thanks to their official authority within the Spartan system and, 
presumably, their influence over, and loyalty with, the men in their division.
232 Thucydides 5.71.
233 Thucydides 5.71-2. 5.10 for the danger of marching with the unshielded side to the enemy. Tritle 
(2010) 124, who also comments that this has factor has, hitherto, been unrecognized by modem 
scholars. Lazenby (2010) 123-5.
234 Thucydides 5.65.
235 Thucydides 5.61-3. Homblower (2008) 167-8: Agis was fined and could no longer withdraw an 
army from enemy land unless he had the support of ten appointed Spartiates, however his ability to 
otherwise command the army was not reduced.
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The nature of their equipment ensured that hoplites were difficult to kill or 
injure from the front, while the nature of phalanx combat ensured that relatively few 
casualties were taken during the actual fighting, with most taking place during the 
retreat. Because of this, the ability to call and direct specific and highly localised 
efforts to penetrate the enemy formation would be important: Xenophon mentioned 
the fall and recovery of Cleonymus three times in one battle because it demonstrated 
his bravery and was also unusual -  perhaps such a fall was usually fatal if the enemy 
was alert to its occurring, and was able to force their way into the brief gap thus 
created. Incidents like this, and the nature of the fighting in the front ranks of two 
engaged phalanxes, further highlight the importance of subordinate commanders and 
veterans; these were men who could control and command on a local scale, pushing 
their hoplites into aggressive action where possible, organising defensive measures 
where required, as well as functioning as ‘nodes’ of communication in some 
situations.236
This does not deny a role for the general during this phase of fighting, indeed 
he could engage in exactly the same kind of local scale command, as well as 
controlling the overall tactical situation if necessary. The presence of official and 
organised systems of subordinate command in the armies of Classical Greece 
emphasises the importance of command and control to hoplite forces; just because 
generals could not micro-manage their entire phalanx throughout an engagement 
does not deny them an important role!
The fighting in the front ranks of an engagement between two phalanxes was
236 Discussed in chapter 2.
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a matter of local advantage and disadvantage, of tentative advance into the face of a 
resisting enemy, or a rapid surge over the body of a fallen hoplite. Once two 
phalanxes met, the battle did not descend into a blurred frenzy of frantic stabbing 
and hacking between two phalanxes, neither of which was operating under direction. 
Rather the shouted commands and messages of the general, some of which were 
relayed down the line, the steady heads of experienced front rankers, and the shouted 
warnings of watchful second rankers, would result in a flowing and responsive 
combat, with both side searching for the slightest advantage to exploit. This does not 
require prodigal martial skills or the ability to communicate complicated orders 
rapidly. All that is required is the knowledge of how fast you can cover ground, the 
striking distance of your weapons, and the disposition of the immediate enemies, as 
well as the support of surrounding friendly hoplites should you attempt to push 
forwards, of fall back. This style of combat allows for, indeed demands, local-scale 
leadership, and accounts for those incidents discussed below which indicate a ‘loose’ 
formation, the flexibility of hoplite equipment, and the military superiority of 
Spartan and mercenary forces. These forces held the advantage in organisation and 
command structure backed up by physical strength and endurance, not vice versa.
The sole surviving work of the fourth century Peloponnesian author Aeneas 
Tacticus contains a great deal of information regarding the importance of 
generalship, subordinate commanders, and effective organisation if a state was to 
resist an attack effectively, and is included here because I view his work as a 
commentary on Greek warfare as a whole, not just on siege situations in particular. 
For Aeneas Tacticus, the advantages offered by familiar terrain, coupled with the risk
237 See Chapter 5c.
238 See chapter 4.
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of betrayal or panic if an enemy army managed to march up to the city walls, meant 
that an organised resistance should initially be offered as far away from the city as 
possible.239 As a result of this his work is not just a guide on how to survive while 
the town itself is under siege, but also a significant source of information and advice 
on how to engage enemies in the field, with the most important theme, for my 
purposes here, being that of the link between general and subordinate commanders in 
charge of small units. This link lies at the very core of Aeneas Tacticus’ conception 
of warfare, and he directly explains its importance several times, while we can also 
impute the link at various other points in his narrative.
Throughout his work Aeneas Tacticus constantly emphasises the need of the 
state’s general to remain in overall command of the defence of the city and to engage 
in a proactive defence of the state. However he does not expect the general to act 
alone, and offers a significant piece of advice to his audience which would 
effectively increase their ability to command the defence, and control their forces: 
the creation of street level commanders.
The discussion of these commanders comes in the second half of an analysis 
of how best to post guards; Aeneas first advises that in the event of a panic or an 
unexpected attack the tribes of the city should be assigned by lot a section of wall to 
guard.240 The need for an immediate response and for the population to be occupied 
in the event of a siege is something emphasised several times in the work; the 
authorities must take control, energise, and disperse the people if disorder was to be
239 Aeneas Tacticus 8.1; 16.16. By doing so it would also be possible to use naturally occurring 
boundaries, such as rivers and mountain passes, as defensive features: e.g. Xenophon Anabasis 
2.3.10-14.
240 Aeneas Tacticus 3.1.
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avoided.241 Although this would seem an adequate initial response to an unexpected 
attack, Aeneas points out that a well prepared general would have gone one step 
further and, in peacetime, would already have appointed the most competent and 
judicious men of each street to act as local commanders.242 Thus, in the event of 
enemy forces being spotted entering the outer territory, the men of each street would 
be able to rally around a central and well-known figure before making their way to a 
previously determined location; those from the streets close to the agora would 
congregate there, those close to the theatre would congregate there and so on. This 
system would be effective in the initial, potentially panicked, response to an invasion
'J A ' las citizens would rapidly find themselves under authoritative local command. It is 
unlikely that this initial organisation would be by street, unless the citizens of the 
street in question were actually working together during the time the threat was 
detected, however the existence of these street commanders would allow a 
recognised system of command to exert itself until the initial ad-hoc units could be 
re-organised into the units within which the citizens were used to fighting. Aeneas 
Tacticus advises that this system be adopted as it provides an immediate and 
effective response should anything occur during the night, a time when street-level 
command is an obvious choice, however it is clear that it would be effective at other 
times, and also carries with it several other distinct advantages which fit well with 
Aeneas Tacticus’ view of how to resist enemy aggression.
By taking command down to the street level the general could organise 
armed forces, undertake military action, maximise the advantage to be gained from
241 E.g. Aeneas Tacticus 3.1; 8.1; 9.1; 10.13; 15.2; 16.2-9 (where Aeneas qualifies his advice by 
reminding the reader that although speed is of the essence, organisation and preparedness remain 
more important); 26.1
242 Aeneas Tacticus 3.4-6.
243 C.f. Xenophon Hellenica 1.1.23.
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local geographical knowledge, and could gain a simpler and more accurate count of 
his military forces. Street-commanders also highlight the level of preparedness, 
caution, and attention to details which Aeneas Tacticus recommends; the general 
should do his utmost to keep the enemy away from the walls of the city, but should 
also be realistic and have procedures in place in case the walls are breached, a 
situation where the ability to effectively organise and command a ‘rolling’ system of 
street fighting would be vital.244 The response of the Plataeans to the Theban 
incursion into their city in 431 is a fine example of how effective this could be, and 
while it is not an example of a ‘pitched battle’, it provides useful evidence for the 
possible existence of a pre-existing system of subordinate command, further 
highlighting the importance of command and control to Greek forces. Thucydides 
wrote:
65okei ouv ETnxeipnTea eivai, Kai ^uveAeyovto SiopuoaovTsg Toug Koivoug TOi’xoug 
Trap’ dAAqAoug, bnwg pri 5ia twv 65 wv (pavEpoi w aiv iovTEg, dpa^ag te avsu twv 
utto^uyi'wv Eg Tag 65oug KaGicrraaav, iva dvTi TEi'xoug fj, Kai TaAAa ^qpTuov fj 
EKacrrov 6<paiv£T0 updg to uapovTa ^upcpopov EaEaGai.
“They gathered together by digging through the party walls between their 
houses, to avoid being seen on the move in the streets; they dragged carts 
without their draught-animals into the streets to act as a barricade; and they 
made all other arrangements which seemed suitable in the circumstances.”245
This was a complicated, but effective, response to the Theban attack; 
Thucydides gives no clue as to how it was organised, but the principles behind it are 
the same as those that Aeneas Tacticus advocates: local knowledge of terrain and 
geography was combined with a surprise attack, resulting in the Thebans being 
surrounded and unable to escape.246 The level of coordination that must have been
244 Aeneas Tacticus 1.4-9.
245 Thucydides 2.3 (trans Hammond.)
246 Aeneas Tacticus clearly knew of Thucydides’ account of the siege of Plataea, and comments on the
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required is impressive; perhaps the Plataeans already had a system of street- 
commanders in place, or the Plataean military authorities deferred to the knowledge 
of those citizens whose houses and streets were on the ‘front-line’; regardless, the 
presence of effective command and control, tied to the exploitation of local terrain, 
can be found in this attack, as, indeed, it can be found in the entire Plataean
1 • 247resistance to the siege.
Although the break out was successful it caused a minimum of damage to the 
Peloponnesian force, so perhaps something similar to Brasidas’ ambush of Cleon at 
Amphipolis is a more appropriate example. The battle is analysed in detail in the 
previous chapters, suffice to say here that constant observation of the enemy, 
combined with Brasidas’ desire to engage an army that was light on morale and 
effective leadership, resulted in a comprehensive Peloponnesian victory.249 Before 
the engagement Thucydides has Brasidas deliver a speech, of which Aeneas Tacticus 
would undoubtedly approve, in which he praises the use of unorthodox methods and 
distances himself from any set ‘form’ of engagement, stating that:
Kai to KAEjjpaia TaOia KaAAicrrriv S o^av  eyei a  tov ttoAejjiov |jaA iaT  a v  ti^ airaif|CTa^ 
tou$ cpiAoug pEYicrf a v  wcpeAiiaEiev.
“These are the tricks of war, and win great acclaim when the enemy is
7 SOcompletely fooled to the maximum benefit of one’s own side.”
effectiveness of the Plataean response in 2.2-6, however his detail regarding the Plataean authorities 
delaying and distracting the Theban incursion force is not found in Thucydides. Homblower (l 991) 
240-3; Whitehead (2002) 102-3
247 Thucydides 2.3-5, 75-8; 3.21-4.
248 Thucydides 5.8-11.
249 See Anderson (l 965) l -4 and Best (l 969) 29-35. Aeneas would probably prefer the general to 
survive such actions however.
250 Thucydides (trans Hammond) 5.9. However see 4.126 where Brasidas suggests the skirmishers his 
army faces are cowardly and undisciplined; his speech appears more motivational than rhetorical as 
he closes with the warning that the enemy still pose a significant threat if they are underestimated.
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Later in the speech Brasidas points out that reinforcements are more 
formidable to the enemy than those soldiers already fighting, a point reproduced, in
251very similar language, by Aeneas Tacticus. Homblower recognises the importance 
of this however he does not comment on the military significance; clearly Aeneas 
Tacticus knew his Thucydides, but Thucydides, like Aeneas Tacticus, also recognised 
the importance of communication, ruse, subordinate commanders, and mixed forces 
to effective generalship.253 Indeed, the sentiments expressed by Brasidas, and the 
attack that followed, are so close to Aeneas Tacticus’ overall conception of warfare 
that we must credit Thucydides as being, if not a significant influence, then at least a 
significant source of information for him.254
A vital element of Aeneas Tacticus’ advice is the use of small units, and an 
important point regarding the effectiveness and importance of subordinate 
commanders, and the flexibility of hoplites themselves, can be made by examining 
the evidence for small phalanxes and elite units in the contemporary historians of 
Classical Greece.255 These units can be found in the pages of all the major 
contemporary historians, where they operate independently and in conjunction with 
other phalanxes, and also appear to have been highly flexible. They are examples of 
hoplites undertaking specific ‘missions’ in, usually, highly dangerous situations
251 Aeneas Tacticus 38.2.
252 Homblower (1995) 53; (1996) 444. Whitehead (2002) 201.
253 Thucydides also has Lamachus make a variation on this point at 6.49, where he advises that the 
Athenians must attack Syracuse sooner rather than later, as the longer an army remains on enemy soil 
without attacking, the less fearful it is to the enemy.
254 Homblower (1996) 444 describes the similarity of Aeneas Tacticus 38.3 and Thucydides 5.9 thus: 
“This shows that one not very famous or obvious bit of Th. was known to one not specially 
intellectual reader, and this has implications for our view of the reception of Th.” However it also has 
great implications for our understanding of the development of warfare, and surely indicates that 
Aeneas Tacticus cannot be fairly described as ‘not specially intellectual’!
255 Van Wees (2004) 57-60. See also Pritchett (1974) 221-5; Lazenby (1985) 54-6; Trittle (1989) 55-6; 
Hutchinson (2000) 100-1 ;Hunt (2007) 144-5; Wheeler (2007a) 220-1.
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which required the ability to react to changing circumstances; as such they are vital 
to any discussion of generalship or hoplite fighting in Classical Greece.
Of great interest is the fact that many of these units were 300 strong, a 
number which does not allow for a phalanx of the ‘standard’ eight ranks to be 
formed, and which is found so often in the pages of Herodotus, Thucydides, and 
Xenophon that it must have some significance. There are three possible 
explanations for this: a unit size of 300 this was either 1) the minimum effective unit 
size for a phalanx, however this seems unlikely given the numbers of small poleis 
which sent correspondingly small numbers hoplites to the battle of Plataea, and 
would have been generally concerned with (relatively) small scale warfare.257 2) 3 00 
hoplites was the maximum effective unit size which could be easily manoeuvred on 
the battlefield. This is more likely than the previous option, however larger units are 
commanded by individuals in the surviving battle descriptions, and expecting any 
‘specially formed’ unit to have its focus on maximum numbers, rather than 
maximizing its other qualities such as speed and flexibility, seems to miss the point. 
3) A unit size of 300 balanced striking power with ease of command and the ability 
to manoeuvre effectively. This seems the most likely option, indeed many of these 
units were created to fulfill specific roles which required them to respond, sometimes 
independently of external orders, to changing tactical circumstances. As such they 
were not usually commanded by a general, but by an experienced subordinate who 
the general trusted, such as Pelopidas’ leading of the Theban Sacred Band, although
256 The 1,000 strong Argive ‘special’ unit seems to have been unusually large: Thucydides 5.67, 5.81; 
Diodorus 12.3.75-7, 12.79.4-6; 12.80.2-3.
257 It is, of course, important to distinguish between permanent units and those formed on the spot for 
specific purposes, however it is the number in the unit and the unit’s ability to function on the 
battlefield, rather than the socio-political purpose of the unit, that I wish to emphasise here. Van Wees 
(2004) 58-60.
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they were occasionally commanded in person by generals, with the main force under 
the command of a subordinate.258 The Spartan elite unit of 300 hippeis maintained 
the Spartan concern for organisation and the chain of command, having three 
hippagretai, one of whom was senior, a factor which also allowed the hippeis to be
259deployed as three units 100 strong.
The most famous example of a unit of 300 is, of course, that of the 300 
Spartans who fought to the death at Thermopylae.260 While Leonidas’ death marked 
the ‘beginning of the end’ for the Spartans, their phalanx appears to have remained 
under control during this time. 261 This leadership may have been provided by a 
designated second-in-command, by a veteran or other notable individual, or it could 
have been a natural and organic response by the entire phalanx, with each individual 
knowing what to do in the event of the King going down. Regardless of where this 
leadership came from, the ability of the Spartans to withdraw in good order once 
Leonidas’ body had been secured suggests that it was effective.
The flexibility and power of small units were also used by both Thebes and 
Athens during the battle of Plataea and although little information regarding the 
Thebans survives, beyond their fighting to the death, we are better informed about 
the Athenian unit.263 According to Herodotus, the Megarian contingent of the allied
258 Plutarch Pelopidas 17-18.
259 Xenophon Constitution o f the Spartans 4. Figueira (2006) 58-9.
260 These were not the hippeis though: Herodotus describes them as older men, all of whom had 
children. Herodotus 7.205. Figueira (2000) 61-2.
261 Herodotus 7.112; Thucydides 5.72.
262 C.f. Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13-14. Also his Spartan Constitution 11.6.
263 Herodotus 9.67: the 300 Thebans are described as ttpujtoi Kai dpicrroi and, given the existence of
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Greek army was under heavy cavalry attack, and sent a message threatening to 
abandon their position if help was not forthcoming; a contingent of ‘picked’ 
Athenian hoplites and archers, under the command of the previously unmentioned 
Olympiodorus, volunteered to help.264 The description of the men as ‘picked’ 
(AoyaSeg) raises the question ‘picked by whom?’ No elite body of Athenian hoplites
existed at this time, and Diodorus’ assertion that they were the bodyguard of 
Aristides is difficult to accept as no other source supports a tradition that Athenian
265generals were assigned a bodyguard as a matter of course. Indeed, the assignation 
of such a bodyguard seems very unlikely for Athenians in this period given the 
tradition concerning Peisistratos’ bodyguard and the imposition of tyranny. The 
unit of 300 in question may have been picked on the spot by Olympiodorus himself, 
or may have been pre-selected as a ‘rapid-reaction force.’ The latter seems more 
likely given the need for a quick and effective response, which may not have been 
possible had an ad hoc unit been assembled. Regardless of why and how the unit 
was formed, the principle remains the same: the Athenian response to an urgent 
request for help was to send a unit of 300, led by a subordinate commander, not to 
march with a large force under the command of a general.
Herodotus reports that the new Athenian deployment was effective, the
Theban units of 300 in Thucydides and Xenophon, it is reasonable to assume they were a distinct 
group. Van Wees (2004) 59. Herodotus also reports that 300 Spartans, commanded by one 
Arimnestus, fought to the death when they took on the entire Messenian army at the battle of 
Stenyclerus: 9.64.
264 Herodotus 9.21-3. How & Wells (1912) 295; Lazenby (1993) 222-3; van Wees (2004) 181.
265 Diodorus 11.30.3. Diodorus may have confused the Spartan institution of hippeis with the force 
that Herodotus describes. Lazenby (1993) 222; Hunt (2007) 144.
266 Herodotus 1.59; Aristotle Constitution o f the Athenians 14.1.
267 E.g. while the mercenaries of the 10,000 formed a unit of slingers to counter the range of Persian 
archers, they did so after they had escaped the ambush -  if professionals could not form such a unit 
on the spot it seems unlikely that amateur Athenians could. Xenophon Anabasis 3.3.6-20.
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Persian cavalry commander Masistius’ horse was hit by an arrow, and Masistius 
himself was immediately set upon and killed.268 The account of this incident 
suggests the Athenian force was flexible and under effective command; in order to 
take out Masistius individual hoplites would have had to leave the formation and 
engage him in combat, while the order to do so must have come quickly if Masistius 
was dead by the time the Persian cavalry came around for another pass. The 
conspicuous glory of the Athenian force could suggest a potential difficulty with the 
account, however the Athenians seem to have been the only contingent to have 
brought an organised force of archers to the battle, and therefore their deployment
270against cavalry would have made a great deal of sense.
Subordinate commanders leading small units were vital to the ability of the 
Greeks to effectively resist the Persian invasions; that they were used during 
moments of crisis by both Athens and Sparta suggests they were not a new or 
innovative response, while their ability to move rapidly, to resist both infantry and 
cavalry attack, and to operate with archer support indicates they were flexible and 
under effective command. These qualities remained central to Greek military thought 
throughout the fifth century, and a number of 300-strong units played important, 
illuminating, and generally underappreciated roles, for several different states, in the 
Peloponnesian War.
268 Herodotus 9.22; Plutarch Aristides 14.5. How & Wells (1912) 295.
269 Herodotus 9.20-4. Bum (1984b) 517-8; Lazenby (1993) 222.
270 Bum (1984a) 424 for the suggestion that this force was a “... ‘task force’ specially adapted for 
advanced guard action...” The suggestion is sensible, especially given the later Spartan request for 
their deployment to a different section of the line: Herodotus 9.60. Green (1996) 246 refers to them as 
“...a special Athenian commando force... which had been posted well ahead of the main line, perhaps 
as shock troops” which seems a bit much. See also Lazenby (1993) 222.
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The first notable battle descriptions of the Peloponnesian War were not 
hoplite engagements, but rather city-fighting, siege breaking, and clashes between 
hoplite forces and light infantry. The initial response of the Plataeans to the Theban 
incursion into their city is discussed above, but the break out of the city by Plataean 
forces after nearly two years of siege has not yet been analysed. This break out was 
innovative and effective and was designed to limit the impact that that a unit of 300 
Peloponnesians could have on the escape; clearly the Plataeans regarded the speed
on iand flexibility of this small unit as a significant threat. Thucydides gives little 
information regarding this unit, but it seems likely that it was created as a ‘rapid 
reaction force’ for just such a scenario, and would have been led by a subordinate 
commander detailed to respond to emergencies.
Thucydides does not record any details regarding who was in command of 
the breakout, however the response of the Plataean state indicates that a significant 
degree of command and control was in place.272 The force made use of scouting and 
intelligence by observing that the Peloponnesian guards withdrew to the towers of 
the circumvallation wall during inclement weather and the Plataeans exploited this 
by making their breakout during a stormy and moonless night. Stealth and surprise 
were vital if the force was to be successful, so each man was only lightly equipped, 
while the force as a whole was spread out in order to prevent weapons from clashing 
and alerting the guards.273 The advantages that scouting, stealth, and surprise offered 
the Plataeans were increased by the effective use of ruse: as the breakout force
271 Thucydides 3.23 See also 7.43 where the Syracusans form a unit of 600 hoplites to guard Epipolae.
272 Although he does mention that it was originally suggested by Theaenetus, a seer, and Eupompides, 
a general: Thucydides 3.20.
273 Thucydides 3.21-2. Lazenby (2004) 52.
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approached the Peloponnesian wall, the remainder of the Plataeans launched an overt 
attack on the section of wall directly opposite and lit a number of beacon fires in 
response to a Peloponnesian fire signal to Thebes indicating enemy action.274
cppuKTOi te fipovTO £<a TbS ©nf3ag ttoAejjioi: napavTaxov 6e Kai oi ek Trig TToAEiog 
riAaiaifig and toG TEi'xoug cppUKTOug uoAAoug TTpoTEpov TTapEOKEuaapEvoug 6g auTO 
toGto, OTTwg aaacpq to  anpeTa Trig cppuKTwpiag Toig TroAEpioig fj Kai piq por|0oT£v, 
aAAo ti vopiaavTEg to  yiyv0M£V0v e v^ai H Tb bv, upiv atpurv oi avSpsg oi E i^ovTEg 
SiaqjuyoiEv Kai toO aacpaAoGg avTiAapoivTO.
“Beacons were lit to send the signal of enemy action to Thebes, but the 
Plataeans in the city countered by lighting several beacons on their own walls 
(they had prepared them in advance for this very purpose) to confuse the 
beacon-signals received by the enemy, in the hope that they would 
misinterpret that was happening and not arrive in support until their own
syneescapees had got clear and reached safety.”
So the Plataean breakout was supported by intelligence regarding the 
probable Theban response, and a method to counter this was devised. Finally the 
breakout force carried a mixture of weapons, with archers and javelin throwers 
proving their worth by engaging the enemy at a distance.276 The initial Plataean 
resistance, discussed above, and this breakout, could not have been achieved without 
several subordinate commanders being in place to offer advice or take control of 
confusing and dangerous situations that occurred in darkness, while the 
Peloponnesian unit of 300 represents a concern on their part for the ability to respond 
to any aggression from the city rapidly and effectively, and the unit was most likely 
under the command of a subordinate officer.
274 Thucydides 3.22.
275 Thucydides 3.22 (trans Hammond.)
276 Thucydides 3.23-4.
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Thucydides’ account of Sphacteria contains a great deal of useful information 
regarding the power and flexibility of small units, the role of subordinate 
commanders, and the role of the general himself. He compares the battle to that of 
Thermopylae, and it is clear that at Sphacteria the Spartan forces were initially 
mobile and flexible.277 This response to ranged attack required the same attributes of 
command, communication, and flexibility that the Spartan forces at Thermopylae 
demonstrated so effectively, however the importance of these attributes were known 
to the Athenian general Demosthenes, who directed the Athenian effort at 
Sphacteria. Thucydides states that the Athenian forces included 800 archers, a 
similar number of peltasts, and the crews of 70 ships, variously equipped; these men 
were organised into units of around 200, occupied the high ground, and constantly 
harassed the Spartan hoplites; their missiles were highly effective, and they appear to 
have remained under command and control by their own commanders throughout the
“770engagement. Local knowledge was also important: the commander of the 
Messenian contingent requested that he be given a unit in order to find a path behind 
the Spartan position, while the Spartans themselves were unaware of the 
vulnerability of their position until it was too late 280
6TTEi5ri 5e aTTEpavTOv rjv, TrpoaEAGwv o twv MEaar|viwv oTpairiYbg KAewvi Kai 
AhmocjGevei aAAwg £cpr| ttoveTv acpag: £i 5e pouAovrai £outw 5o0vai twv to^otwv p^po^ 
ti Kai twv ijjiAwv TTEpiisvai koto vwtou auToig o5tp [j av  auToq supp, 5okeTv piaaEaGai 
Tfiv ScpoSov.
277 Thucydides 4.32-3. In the fourth century Spartan hoplites caught enemy peltasts at least once: 
Xenophon Hellenica 4.4.16. See chapter 5 for discussion regarding the flexibility of hoplites in Greek 
warfare. C.f. Herodotus 7.112.
278 On whom see Woodcock (1928); Treu (1956); Best (1969) 18-20; Roisman (1993); Wylie (1993.)
279 Thucydides 4.31-2. Homblower (1996) 189.
280 Thucydides 4.36. Thucydides compares the Spartan situation to that of Thermopylae, however it is 
likely that this is as a result of the encirclement which ended the engagement, rather than the 
significant role of any path. Homblower (1996) 32-4,191-2. Connor (1984) 118 for the comment that 
Thucydides’ comparison is designed to enhance the shock of the Athenian victory as the Spartans 
would have been expected to fight to the death.
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“With no end in sight, the commander of the Messenians came up to Cleon and 
Demosthenes and told them that they were wasting their efforts: if they were 
prepared to let him have a section of the archers and the light infantry he would 
go round behind the Spartans by any route he could find, and he thought he
9 R1could force the approach.”
The allusion to chance or luck (...any route he could find...) here is suspect, 
indeed Thucydides credits the Athenian general Demosthenes with so much luck 
during the Pylos/Sphacteria campaign that his account has been doubted in this
9R9regard: Messenian reinforcements just happen to arrive before the engagement, 
and the Athenians accidentally bum down the woodland on Sphacteria, thus
0^1
revealing the Spartan positions. It would be fair to state that the Messenian 
commander knew of, or had been told about, a path behind the Spartan position, and
JO Asuggested to the Athenian commanders that an attack be launched to exploit it. 
The whole engagement epitomises the combination of qualities and techniques 
which Aeneas Tacticus advises are most important: the Athenians scouted the terrain, 
removed obstacles, occupied high ground, attacked with a mixed force, and used 
ruse and surprise to their advantage. The Athenian general, Demosthenes, does not 
appear to have joined in the fighting, instead he appears to have taken on the role of 
director, as Aeneas Tacticus advises: the fact that the Messenian commander sought 
out Demosthenes and Cleon to request forces for his flanking attack indicates that 
both were distant from the front line, perhaps they remained with the hoplites on an 
elevated position and let subordinates carry out the attack as previously planned -  
Thucydides does not say. The Athenian attack relied upon several units of light
281 Thucydides 4.36 (trans Hammond, modified.)
282 Thucydides 4.9.
283 Thucydides 4.29-30.1 find it entirely unlikely that the fire was accidental: Thucydides himself 
points out the importance of fire to Demosthenes defeat in Aetolia only the year before. See also 
Woodcock (1928) 101; Best (1969) 21-4; Wilson (1979) 103; Roisman (1993) 33-41. Also Miller 
(1998.)
284 Thucydides 4.36.
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infantry attacking simultaneously, these units were under the command of 
subordinate officers who appear to have been aware of an overall strategy, but who 
had to request permission to deviate from this strategy from Demosthenes. The 
victory on Sphacteria was not lucky, or based solely on a mis-match between light 
infantry and hoplites fighting on difficult terrain, rather it was based on intelligent 
generalship and the effective use of multiple subordinate commands.
The use of subordinate commanders by the Spartan general Brasidas in 
engagements in 423 and 422 differed significantly from that of Demosthenes. At the 
battle of Lyncus in 423 Brasidas commandied a phalanx of 300 hoplites as a ‘flying 
rearguard’ and left the command of his main phalanx to a subordinate. This battle 
was not a pitched battle, but it is of central importance to this discussion as a Spartan 
subordinate commander, Clearidas, is directly mentioned by Thucydides, and the 
presence of such commanders in the Athenian army can also be inferred. The 
engagement is also vital to my purpose as it demonstrates that armies could survive 
the death of their general if a clear chain of command existed and could continue the 
engagement with little interruption. Indeed, the Peloponnesian force was able to 
make a significant tactical shift during this final phase of battle, a shift which 
resulted in a comprehensive victory and which is all the more significant when it is 
remembered that Brasidas’ mortal wounding occurred early in the battle. The 
existence of an authoritative and immediate source of orders and authority appears to 
have been more important than the continued existence of the ultimate source of 
orders and authority as vested in Brasidas. The ability of the pursuing army to break
285 Thucydides 5.9-10.
286 Thucydides 5.10. He was carried from the fighting back to the city, apparently expiring shortly 
after being told his attack had been successful.
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the elevated Athenian position successfully can safely be attributed to the continuing
9 8 7issuing of orders, and the continuing existence of command and control.
Brasidas was aware that Cleon was advancing on Amphipolis, but decided to 
withdraw rather than risk a pitched battle; Thucydides reports that Brasidas regarded 
the Athenians as being superior troops, although given Brasidas’ previous experience 
it is more likely that the expertise of his troops lay in methods of engagement other
988than pitched battle, such as ambush, ruse, and shock attacks. This expertise was to 
be demonstrated with a planned assault from two city gates, although Cleon was able 
to deduce such an attack was imminent and passed orders to begin an immediate 
withdrawal to the nearby port of Eion.289 This order resulted in the Athenian right 
flank marching parallel to the city, thus presenting their shield-less side to attack, an 
opportunity that Brasidas seized immediately, leading 150 hoplites directly against 
the Athenian centre.
This advance was supported by the rest of his forces, led by his subordinate 
Clearidas, who led the main phalanx from a different gate. The charge met with 
instant success, indeed Brasidas had chosen the perfect moment to attack - the 
Athenian forces were disorganised and out of position thanks to Cleon’s order, and
287 See also Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.17-20 where a Spartan force was able to rally and counter attack, 
despite having lost their commander -  a subordinate or other influential individual must have played 
an important role.
288 Thucydides 5.8. Gomme (1962) 116 describes Brasidas’ admission as a “...notable tribute to the 
Athenian hoplite...” Homblower (1996) 440 agrees, describing the “...reference to Peloponnesian 
inferiority in quality (as) remarkable...” However see Lazenby (2004) 101-2 for the opposing view.
289 Anderson (1965) 1-4 suggests the signal was given by trumpet but was not immediately obeyed by 
the whole army; Krentz (1991) 116-7 suggests a trumpet signal in such a scenario is insufficient given 
the complicated nature of the command. Cleon would have had to make several manoeuvres if he was 
to withdraw without presenting his phalanx’s shield-less side to the city. Lazenby (2004) 103 suggests 
the order could have meant ‘retreat in good order’, given that Thucydides has Nicias believe he had 
plenty of time to make his reconnaissance and withdraw. See also Kagan (1974) 327-9; Homblower 
(1996) 446-7.
offered little serious resistance to the surprise attack: Thucydides states that Brasidas’ 
force suffered only seven casualties, although Brasidas himself was one of these.290
The Athenian force was pursued and harried for some distance, although the
901right wing offered some resistance and was able to retreat to a nearby hill. 
Thucydides does not comment on how this retreat was organised, but given that 
Cleon had been killed it is reasonable to assume that subordinate commanders or 
experienced individuals, perhaps ex-generals themselves, were able to rally the wing 
and establish some sort of order. From this hill the Athenians were able to repulse 
two or three attacks from the main body of Peloponnesian hoplites before being
9 0 9surrounded by cavalry and peltasts and broken by a hail of javelins. The 
marshalling and effective use of cavalry and peltasts by the Peloponnesian force also
9QO
points to an important role for Brasidas’ subordinate commander, Clearidas. 
Realising the strength of the Athenian position, and the danger of continuing to 
attack with his hoplites, Clearidas was presumably the source of the orders which 
resulted in the cavalry and light infantry surrounding and attacking the Athenians 
from range.294 Brasidas’ command style certainly seems to have been innovative and 
very much ‘hands on’: he was wounded at Pylos, displayed impressive coolness and 
clarity of thought in Macedonia, and is even credited by Thucydides for being not
90Sbad at speaking, for a Spartan.
290 Thucydides 5.10.
291 Thucydides 5.10.
292 Thucydides 5.10.
293 Thucydides 5.8.
294 Thucydides 5.8. Homblower (1996) 440; Lazenby (2004) 102. Gomme (1966) 116 considers this a 
“...notable tribute to the Athenian hoplite”, however Brasidas’ remark is less a tribute to the quality of 
the Athenian troops than a realisation that his own troops were unaccustomed to fighting pitched 
battles versus hoplites. Lazenby (2004) 102 makes the valid point that if Brasidas felt his troops to be 
inferior in every respect then one has to wonder why he attacked at a ll .
295 Thucydides 4.12, 4.84.
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Thus far we have seen units of 300 forming ‘flying reserves’ and rapid 
reaction forces, as well as a unit of 150 forming a ‘shock’ phalanx used in an ambush 
which, although led by a general, not a subordinate, was based on the same principle: 
a small, manoeuvrable and flexible force with which to disrupt and distract the 
enemy. Two other uses remain to be analysed: small units led by subordinates on the 
battlefield, and the use of such units in integrated phalanxes. In 414 a unit of 300 
Athenians hoplites was created in order to secure a section of the Syracusan wall, 
which they captured with the aid of an unspecified number of light infantry. 
Thucydides describes the light force as ‘picked’ (Aoyaq) and explains that the rest of
the army was divided into two, each half commanded by a general, which suggests
297the picked force was under the command of at least one subordinate. A 
comparison to the picked force of hoplites and archers which the Athenians deployed 
at the battle of Plataea can be made: both were used to solve particular problems, 
both involved the combined use of hoplites and light infantry, and both operated 
under the command of a subordinate. Some 66 years separates the engagements and 
as such I am reluctant to describe this as a specialist ‘Athenian tactic’, however the 
similarity is so striking that the possibility Olympiodorus’ command survived in the
296 Thucydides 6.100-101.
297 The Athenian force had been reduced to two generals after the arrest of Alcibiades: Thucydides 
6.62. Nicias and Lamachus had , after this, split the army between them by lot, and so were 
presumably familiar with the men under their direct control. One of the Athenian responses to Nicias’ 
letter in book 7 was to ‘promote’ two officers, Menandrus and Euthydemus, to act as co-commanders. 
It is possible one, or both, of these individuals was in charge of the unit of 300 -  Develin (1989) 
suggests, plausibly, that they had been taxiarchs up to the point they were promoted. They appear to 
have been promoted to ‘full’ command (arparriyoi) but do not feature in the discussion between 
Nicias and Demosthenes after the failed attack on Epipolae (7.47), hence they may only have acted as 
generals when Nicias required assistance and before the reinforcements arrived. Dover (1988) 392; 
Hamel (1998) 196-200; Homblower (2008) 569-70.
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collective Athenian military memory, or was an ingrained or ‘default’ response to 
emergencies, cannot be dismissed.298
So small units under subordinate commanders could also be used as striking 
forces on the battlefield, as also demonstrated by Pelopidas’ command of the Theban 
Sacred Band at the battle of Leuctra, discussed above. Small units can also be found 
as part of larger formations, where they acted either as a bodyguard to an important 
figure, or formed the ‘cutting edge’ of a phalanx, and in both of these cases there 
must have remained some element of subordinate command.299 This element of 
command may only have been an increased ability to work together, or a familiarity 
with, and understanding of the need for, continual communication, however it 
remained the primary reason why such units distinguished themselves. The 300 
Spartan hippeis demonstrated this at the battle of Leuctra, a battle where the Theban 
Sacred Band also played an important part.
The opening stage of the battle was complex; Epaminondas stacked the 
Theban ranks some fifty deep and placed them directly opposite the Spartan 
contingent, thus preferring a direct confrontation with the Spartan right wing instead 
of overlapping their left. Pelopidas and the Sacred Band were stationed on the
298 Yaginuma (1990) 281-5 for the observation that this sentence contains 137 words, compared to an 
average in Thucydides of 25.3, because of the scale of Athenian action in the build-up to the capturing 
of the wall. The situation was certainly complex, involving numerous units and phalanxes all working 
to one goal, but semi-independently of each other, another reason to compare this engagement with 
that of Plataea.
299 E.g. 300 Thebans at the battle of Delium, and 300 hippeis at the battle of Mantinea: Diodorus 
Siculus 12.70; Thucydides 5.72.
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extreme left, possibly to act as a deliberate check to the ‘predictable’ Spartan attempt 
at outflanking.300
Epaminondas’ phalanx engaged and defeated the section of line where 
Cleombrotus was stationed, however the Spartan phalanx was not totally broken, and 
was able to retreat, slowly back to camp, despite the death of Cleombrotus and
■j a  i
several other prominent Spartans. Xenophon does not directly comment on how 
the Spartans were able to achieve this ‘fighting withdrawal’, but he does report that 
the hippeis were placed around Cleombrotus. These men were able to carry the 
mortally wounded King from the phalanx and continued fighting until several other
0^9important Spartans were killed, at which point the withdrawal began. The sources 
differ in their descriptions of the withdrawal -  Xenophon’s text suggests it was 
undertaken in good order, while Diodorus and Plutarch suggest it was more a rout 
than an organized retreat.303 If the reported casualties can be trusted it appears the 
hippeis were almost wiped out during the retreat: Xenophon reports that of about 700 
Spartiates present, 400 were killed, which, given the Theban attack fell directly on 
the position of the King, would account for the entire unit along with 100 others.304 
Three options present themselves: 1) the hippeis refused to retreat and were wiped 
out while holding off the Thebans, allowing the rest of the Spartiates to retreat in 
safety; 2) the mortal wounding of Cleombrotus occasioned such shame for the
300 Buckler (1980) 63; Hutchinson (2000) 163. Cawkwell (1979) 261 for the suggestion that the deep 
ranks played a role other than reserves and replacements for the front rank.
301 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13-14.
302 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13-14.
303 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.15; Diodorus 15.56.2; Plutarch Pelopidas 23.
304 Lazenby (1985) 156-7, although see Figuera (2006) 73-4 for the conjecture that 100 of the hippeis 
were stationed with the king with the other 200 forming the front rank of the phalanx. If this was the 
case then my point still stands -  these men were the first in contact with the enemy, least likely to flee, 
and would have accounted for the majority of the casualties taken.
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hippeis that they lost their discipline and died in the same manner as Aristodemus at 
Plataea: fighting out in front, seeking to perform heroic deeds to make up for his
305failure; 3) the hippeis attempted to keep the majority of the Thebans engaged 
while also withdrawing in good order.
The first and second possibilities seem less likely than the third, which best 
accords with the evidence of previous Spartan units operating under subordinate 
officers, and also best matches the primary skills of Spartan forces: organization and 
discipline. Thus the 300 hippeis, at the ‘cutting edge’ of the Peloponnesian phalanx 
and without the guidance of their King or the Polemarch Deinon, were able to 
continue operating as a cohesive unit while fighting the enemy to their front, backing 
off slowly to their camp, and possibly even watching their allies turn to flight. That 
Xenophon does not describe a total rout can best be explained by the ability of 
Spartan forces, the hippeis especially, to fight in formation without the direction or 
presence of a ‘supreme’ commander; the Spartan system of official subordinate 
command ensured that the loss of a king or general did not result in the loss 
command, rather its transfer to those next ‘in line’, whether that be a polemarchos, a 
lochargos, a commander of fifty, a commander of 16, or a file leader. Leuctra was 
undoubtedly a disaster for Sparta, yet it also teaches us a great deal about the Spartan 
system of subordinate command, a system that can also be seen in battle descriptions 
of Herodotus and Thucydides.
305 Herodotus 9.71.
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Conclusion
Subordinate commanders were a vital element of Classical hoplite armies,
and played a significant role in battle. Their presence in Athenian and Spartan armies
is attested, or can be inferred, in every major Classical historical source, and in the
phalanxes of other states through the actions they performed in various battle
descriptions. The presence of these subordinate commanders adds an important level
of sophistication to our understanding of Classical Greek battle, and puts the lie to
the view that battle was simple because generalship could not be exercised, or
because the Greeks did not want to win battles through its use. Indeed, the very
opposite is now suggested: battle was complicated and commanders could influence
it from beginning to end, but the Greeks recognised that in order to maximise the
offensive and defensive qualities of the phalanx a great deal of direction, battlefield
control, and micromanagement was needed. This control came in the form of
subordinate commanders, individuals with recognised authority who were present to
ensure that sections of the line did not descend into chaos and confusion when
decisions needed to be made. These decisions may have been as simple as ‘should
we push or defend?’ but they were nonetheless vital and needed to be made quickly:
a poor choice enacted rapidly and with purpose can result in a better outcome than if
no choice is made at all, and a dithering or hesitant section of a phalanx represented
a significant weak point. While the general was able to influence matters on the
large scale, he was simply unable to have a direct presence in every clash and
306 The moral fortitude of phalanxes was something that Thucydides recognized as being vital: 
Brasidas, probably the most vibrant and effective commander he describes, described an Athenian 
army as being one which would not stand up to an attack, based upon observations of their body 
language. Thucydides 5.10. The opposite could also hold true: Agesilaus was dissuaded from 
attacking Chabrias’ mercenaries by the ease and smoothness with which they followed commands: 
Diodorus Siculus 15.32-33. See also Polyaenus Stratagems 3.9.8.
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flourish of fighting that took place along the line; this does not diminish his 
importance to the army as a whole, but it does significantly increase the importance 
of subordinate commanders at every level.
Thucydides remarked that the entire Spartan army was a system of command 
and control, down to the youngest and most inexperienced hoplite. This system 
ensured that each individual knew his place in the chain of command, Spartan forces 
were thus totally integrated, capable of responding quickly to changing events, and 
capable of maintaining discipline and cohesion even after a direct and successful 
attack against the ‘command position’ of the line: it was the Spartan system of 
subordinate command that was responsible for her dominance on the battlefield.
The importance of small units and subordinate commanders is also connected to 
the model of hoplite combat that has been presented in the previous chapters of this 
thesis. This model has a ‘loose’ formation at its very core, a formation which accords 
with the presence of subordinate commanders, the mechanics of fighting with shield 
and spear, and the bloody nature of hoplite combat. The image of fighting in the 
front ranks presented here is one of a highly fluid situation: different sections of the 
line advanced and retreated according to their immediate situation and the ability of 
subordinates or alert individuals to recognise advantageous or dangerous situations. 
Fighting continued across the line until an attack met with such success that it 
allowed the attacking hoplites to penetrate the front ranks of the enemy phalanx, 
spreading chaos, confusion, and death through the rear ranks.
307 Thucydides 5.66.
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Subordinate commanders are found in many different situations in the source 
material, from leading small ‘picked’ or elite phalanxes, to being placed across the 
line in command of divisions or regiments, to commanding phalanxes when the 
supreme commander had been killed. They are also discussed in detail by a much 
underused source -  Aeneas Tacticus. That Aeneas Tacticus assumed even small 
states would be able to organise their armed forces into small units commanded by a
'ino
recognisable individual; recommended the use of semi-independent and vitally 
important scouting parties;309 and also advised using coordinated attacks using
-3 1 A
mixed forces, indicates the extent to which his conception of warfare relied upon 
subordinate commanders. This reliance is not presented by Aeneas Tacticus as a new 
or radical idea, indeed although he is the first of the ancient authors to directly advise 
that subordinate officers be used this is to be expected given his status as the first 
known author of a military manual; other authors were writing for very different 
reasons, and so only recorded fine details of military structures when necessary, as 
Thucydides did regarding the Spartan army at Mantinea. Aeneas Tacticus’ work 
represents a superbly detailed account of Greek attitudes and approaches to warfare, 
and his focus on the need to organise men, prevent panic, and, micromanage strike 
forces can be detected in the pages of all the historians who came before, and were 
contemporary with, him. All of these sources describe a form of warfare and combat 
that relied heavily upon generalship and subordinate commanders to be effective, 
was flexible and limited only by the imagination of the individual in command, and 
which was focused upon a single goal: defeat of the enemy by whatever means 
necessary.
308 Aeneas Tacticus 1.4-7.
309 Aeneas Tacticus 6.
310 Aeneas Tacticus 16.
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Chapter 4:
Aeneas Tacticus and the Practicalities of Generalship
The arguments presented in the previous chapters rely on pieces of evidence 
scattered throughout the main literary sources of the fifth and fourth centuries, about 
which logical inferences and conclusions regarding the ability of generals and 
subordinate commanders to influence battle have been made. This ability is rarely 
directly expounded by these sources, however one ancient author, already introduced 
and discussed to some extent, makes frequent and direct reference to the ability, 
indeed the necessity, of generals and subordinate commanders to influence battle. 
Aeneas Tacticus’ advice regarding how to resist invasion is comprehensive and 
systematic, and relies on generals utilising communication, organisation, 
reconnaissance, and coordination to craft an appropriate and powerful response to 
enemy forces which should be met in the field, not from the walls of the city. The 
command style of Aeneas Tacticus’ general, and his subordinate officers, is versatile 
and flexible, and perfectly encapsulates the Jiu, or ‘soft’, element of Jiu Jitsu: 
withdraw when the enemy pushes, strike when he retreats. As discussed in the 
introduction the modem reception of Aeneas Tacticus has been narrowly focused on 
the information he provides regarding siege situations, as per the title of his work, 
Poliorketika. While his work contains much valuable information directly relating to 
a besieged city, it also contains a great deal of information and advice which relates 
to engagements in the field, many of which shed light on the extent and importance 
of battlefield command, commuication, and organisation. These examples do not 
directly deal with the minutiae of battlefield command, however they do represent 
strong evidence for Aeneas’ conception of generalship and his emphasis on the
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importance of avoididing a siege by meeting the enemy in battle. His work is not a 
treatise limited to a direct siege situation, but can be viewed as a commentary on 
warfare as a whole.
Aeneas Tacticus recognised that a siege is a matter of mentality rather than 
physical structure; an army in the field could be besieged as readily as a city, and he 
advises that combined forces which made use of the advantage of local terrain were 
required: a form of ancient ‘guerrilla’ warfare. An invading force would thus find 
itself being delayed, distracted, and under attack from the moment it entered the very 
outer territory of the city; if they sought a direct and ‘pitched’ confrontation then 
their desire would be frustrated, while small groups of men, operating under their 
own subordinate commanders but also receiving orders and information from the 
supreme commander in the city, harassed and attacked them. Aeneas Tacticus advises 
that an organised display of resistance at on the borders of territory could prove 
valuable, demonstrating to the enemy that the city was prepared, willing to resist, 
and with its armed forces under the direction of a man who will not simply march 
out and meet the enemy in ‘pitched’ battle. However the objective here was not to 
defeat the enemy utterly or to risk friendly forces in non-essential engagements; 
rather the objective was to inflict sufficient damage, and offer sufficient resistance -
311or give the impression o f an ability to do so - to make the enemy withdraw.
The nature of this initial resistance, and Aeneas Tacticus’ concern for 
contingency plans, means that his text contains a great deal of information and 
advice regarding the ability of the general and subordinate officers to influence both
3,1 Aeneas Tacticus 1.6-8. Ober (1985) 77-86; Whitehead (2002) 22-4.
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strategic and tactical thought. A clear concern of Aeneas Tacticus is that this general
be intelligent, and have the capacity to organise, and keep safe, several lines of
communication, combined with the imagination to engage in an energetic defence of
territory using a mixed force.312 According to Aeneas Tacticus the general should
plan, organise, analyse information, and prepare the countryside and city for enemy
incursion; he should not move to engage until he has secured an advantage, and he
should certainly not risk his life in combat unless part of the city is directly
 ^1 ^threatened and his presence would bolster the defences. As such Aeneas Tacticus 
is concerned for the safety of the general and suggests that he should be stationed at 
the agora, or, if this is a weak position, at the most defensible position of the city and 
have easy access to runners and a trumpeter.314 An image of a ‘command centre’ 
immediately springs to mind, a place where the general would receive information 
from scouts and reports from subordinate commanders, and then issue basic orders 
via trumpet, while sending more complex orders to the scouts and subordinate 
commanders in the outer territory via runner. The main concern is on the engineering 
of advantage and the avoidance of an unwise engagement through the intelligent use 
of information and reconnaissance; a concern that can also be found in the accounts
O 1 £
of large battles found in the Classical historians.
In addition to the creation of a ‘command post’ and street-commanders, 
Aeneas Tacticus recommends that a rendezvous point should be established to which 
friendly units can retreat in the event of a surprise attack or storming of the walls.
3,2 Communication: Aeneas Tacticus 4, 6-10, 22, 26, 31. Importance of mixed forces: 6, 16-18.
313 Aeneas Tacticus 38.2; nowhere else in the text does Aeneas advocate the general actually joining 
the combat.
314 Aeneas Tacticus 22.2-3. C.f. Xenophon Anabasis 7.4.16. Anderson (1970) 81.
315 See, e.g. the battles of Marathon, Plataea, and Leuctra.
316 Aeneas Tacticus 39.5
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This rendezvous point would serve to prevent friendly forces being mistaken for 
invading forces: again, a contingency is in place for unexpected events which would 
disrupt the normal chain of command. Should the general be killed or his runners 
be intercepted, then a recognised chain of command still existed, a factor shown to 
be vital to the ability of Spartan forces to withstand the death of their general and, 
indeed, to their basic approach to battle. If the enemy penetrated the walls or routed 
the defenders, then resistance could still be offered after rendezvousing at the 
prescribed place, where a new chain of command could be established amongst those 
surviving street-commanders.318 These three factors: command post, street- 
commanders, and an organised rendezvous point, all combine to form a sophisticated 
system that would allow the effective collating of information and passing of orders, 
as well as having an inbuilt failsafe.
The system outlined above relied on a final factor that Aeneas Tacticus 
regards as essential for effective generalship: the ability for subordinate commanders 
to communicate rapidly and effectively, with the general. This communication 
ensured that the general could remain updated on the movements of the enemy, and 
that the various elements attacking or scouting the enemy could be coordinated from
T1 Qa central point. Thus Aeneas Tacticus emphasises the importance of maintaining 
communications between different battlefield elements while in the field, and makes 
frequent reference throughout his work to the use of scouts and the various ways in 
which swift and reliable messages could be sent between the general and his 
subordinate commanders. This focus on scouting and information gathering is an
317 See also Aeneas Tacticus 4.
318 Thucydides 5.66 for the Spartan system of command.
3,9 Aeneas Tacticus 4.1-12; 6.4-7; 7.1-4; 15.5-7; 16.16-7; 22.21-4; 26.12-14; 27.1-4.
320 Aeneas Tacticus 15.4
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essential element of Aeneas Tacticus’ conception of warfare: he advises that outposts 
should be placed on strategic high ground around the city, and in the absence of such 
ground a system of runners should be set up to allow messages to reach the city in 
good time.321 The accuracy and reliability of the information thus transmitted is of 
great concern to Aeneas Tacticus and he advises that these stations should be manned 
by at least three experienced men, who should be able to recognise and report on 
enemy dispositions and movements, be able to recognise feints and diversionary 
tactics, and be able accurately to judge the strength of the enemy force and their line 
of march.322 We can consider each of these outposts to be a subordinate command, 
and their ability to effectively judge and transmit information is central to Aeneas 
Tacticus’ recommendations.
This concern for strategic awareness is constantly emphasised, indeed Aeneas 
Tacticus assumes both that the presence of enemy forces will be reported before they 
reach the borders of the territory, and that the enemy will have an equal, if not 
greater, concern and capacity for information. A further, and equally important, 
assumption is that the state will have a ready supply of men with the tactical and 
strategic knowhow to recognise the important movements and actions undertaken by 
an invading force. The natural consequence of this, combined with Aeneas Tacticus’ 
frequent allusions to the advantage of knowing the local terrain, suggests that the city 
would have a pool of experienced individuals and subordinate commanders who 
could be trusted to perform the vital roles of scouting, and information gathering as
321 Aeneas Tacticus 6.1-6. Pritchett (1971) 127-33; Ober (1989) 197. Xerxes’ scouts occupied elevated 
positions on Euboia: Herodotus 7.183, 192, 219. Whitehead (2002) 109-10.
22 Aeneas Tacticus 6.1-3.
323 Aeneas Tacticus 9.1. The enemy’s capacity for gathering such information would be increased due 
to the presence of informers and malcontents within the city itself.
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recommended.324 The emphasis on experience suggests that these scouts were not 
hoplites serving in a scouting capacity, but were perhaps specialists; we can certainly 
assume that they were familia? with the local terrain, and may also posit that they 
were lightly equipped. This accords with the importance Aeneas Tacticus attaches to 
rapid communication combined with strategic and tactical flexibility; such a force 
could respond rapidly to a threat, could skirmish and harass the enemy, and would be 
able to operate unsupported by heavy infantry or cavalry if necessary: further 
emphasis of the reliance Aeneas Tacticus places on subordinate commanders.325 
These qualities all contribute to the overall image of generalship that Aeneas 
Tacticus’ text generates: a ‘tailored’ resistance to invasion or threat, not on a standard 
‘invitation’ to pitched battle.326
Perhaps this form of warfare is representative of warfare between smaller 
states, a form that is the very opposite of the large pitched battles that dominate the 
pages of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon; small engagements involving 
multiple and mixed forces, ambushes, and delaying tactics were all to be 
aggressively undertaken, and a full attack should only be launched if a distinct 
advantage in information, terrain, and organisation was held. The ability of small 
units, led and directed by subordinate commanders, to improvise and react to 
changing situations, while communicating with other units and the general himself, 
is key to Aeneas Tacticus’ broad conception of warfare.
324 The frequent references to the advantages of intimate local geographical knowledge would seem to 
discount the possibility of these scouts being exclusively mercenaries.
325 See below for the importance of hoplite phalanxes accompanying lightly armed forces but not 
engaging the enemy. Although effective this was not an essential element in the use of light infantry; 
the Athenian general Demosthenes was defeated in 426 by an Aetolian force which lacked heavy 
infantry support. Thucydides 3.97-98; see Roisman (1993) for a detailed discussion of Demosthenes’ 
military capabilities, or lack thereof. Also Best (1969) 188-9.
326 Thucydides 2.81 for a prime example of this.
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In chapters fifteen to sixteen Aeneas Tacticus presents an outline of what he 
considers an ‘ideal’ attack upon invading forces. This outline is useful as it involves
'l'ynan important role for subordinate commanders, indicates the scale of organisation 
and coordination that would be required, is presented as a realistic response to a 
hostile force in the field, and is based upon the effective use of communication, 
intelligence, local knowledge, and leadership. First of all, cavalry and lightly 
infantry should march in the vanguard of any force in order to scout the ground 
ahead, occupy suitable elevated positions, and function as a screening force to 
prevent enemy units from scouting or attacking the hoplites, who would be following 
behind.330 A high degree of organisation and caution is advised; the various elements 
must be constituted rapidly but not at the expense of good order, and should remain 
close enough to each other for quick communication and physical assistance to be 
rendered when necessary.331 Caution on the march is emphasised, with Aeneas 
explaining that intelligent enemies will not simply march into a territory expecting a 
pitched battle, but will have been vigilant in their reconnaissance and will most 
likely have sent peltasts in advance to stage ambushes. This last point adds further 
weight to the image of ‘typical’ Greek warfare as being more mobile, vicious, and 
intelligent than has previously been imagined; it explicitly denies that an invading 
army would march, openly and brazenly, into enemy territory and invite attack.
327 Aeneas Tacticus 15.3, 16.7.
328 Aeneas Tacticus 15.1-5
329 Aeneas Tacticus 16.4-22.
330 Aeneas Tacticus 15.5. Also 27.15 and 28. 5 where Aeneas advises that reconnaissance should be 
undertaken before the night-time guards are stood down and that nobody should be let out of the town 
before reconnaissance of the immediate neighbourhood had been undertaken. See Xenophon 
Hellenica 7.1.15-17 for an example of an attack timed to coincide with the end of the night watch and 
the rousing of the army.
331 Aeneas Tacticus 15.4.
332 Aeneas Tacticus 16.4. The peltasts are likely those referred to as the ‘strongest forces’ in the next 
paragraph. Whitehead (2002) 141.
333 The large Peloponnesian invasions that occurred during the Archidamian War were probably not 
serious attempts to draw the Athenians into battle. By sending armies which so heavily outnumbered
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Aeneas Tacticus recognises the folly of such an action, and is at pains to 
ensure that his putative general does not underestimate the capacity of his enemy to 
gather intelligence, set traps, and coordinate a mixed force. Indeed, although Aeneas 
Tacticus views this sort of enemy as both intelligent and knowledgeable, he advises 
us that they can, indeed should, still be attacked: in order effectively and safely to 
engage a force such as this he advises stealth and patience -  two attributes rarely 
associated with Greek warfare by modem scholars.334 The general should wait until 
the enemy became complacent (and preferably drunk!) before setting his own 
ambushes with picked units of light infantry, and engaging with the remainder of his 
light forces.335 Of note is Aeneas Tacticus’ observation that the advantage gained by 
attacking an army which has been eating and drinking is that the ability of its officers 
to control the men would be diminished. He is not concerned with the slowing of 
reflexes and thought-processes that the consumption of alcohol would bring about, 
but with the increased belligerence which would also occur. This belligerence would 
reduce the ability of the enemy force to organise an effective response, further
• • 336emphasising the importance of generalship to the form of warfare he is discussing. 
While it is true that there are no known instances of troops getting dmnk on the 
march in the historical sources, it seems unlikely that Aeneas Tacticus would make 
his observation had this not occurred, and even less likely that it is a joke or flippant
the Athenians the Spartans could not have expected to have encountered serious resistance, see Krentz 
(1997).
334 Although several battle descriptions imply a great deal of both: see, e.g. the battles of Marathon, 
Plataea, Sphacteria, and Piraeus.
335 Aeneas Tacticus 16.5-7.
336 Hanson (1988) 206 and (2000) 126-131 discusses the consumption of alcohol by hoplites. While it 
is likely that some diluted wine would form an important part of everyday rations, I find no 
justification for the remark that hoplites advanced into battle ‘almost’ drunk, or that Xenophon 
“...acknowledges that the prebattle ration of wine might have aroused the (Spartan) troops a little too 
much...” before the battle of Leuctra. Why on earth would Spartan hoplites need to find courage in 
their cups? Indeed, Plutarch Lycurgus 23 recorded that one of the ways in which the Spartans 
oppressed the helots was to force them to get drunk and sing common songs, a practice that also 
served to demonstrate to the younger Spartans the folly of imbibing too much wine. A long tradition 
of Spartan professionalism in combat, combined with recognition of the danger of too much wine, 
cannot be moulded, via one very ambiguous reference, into an excuse for their defeat at Leuctra.
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'1 ' iHcomment of some sort. Whitehead suggests that this is a reference to a force that is 
not on the march, but is ‘off-duty’: a sensible suggestion. The point that Aeneas 
Tacticus is putting across can be seen to be a general one: he refers to launching the 
attack at night when the enemy is unprepared and when the attacking forces have 
every possible advantage, a drunk enemy would obviously be a further advantage, 
although not an essential one! The infantry used in the ambush would most likely 
have been peltasts -  they held an advantage over other forms of lightly armed due to 
the nature of their style of engagement; they were more flexible and probably much 
more damaging than other forms of light infantry because they operated so close to 
the enemy and, thanks to their shield and skirmishing nature, were potentially able to 
enter close combat.338
To complete his outline of this attack Aeneas Tacticus assigns a role to the 
heavy infantry. The hoplites should move up behind the light elements, although a 
direct combat role is not specifically assigned to them; perhaps Aeneas has a 
‘checking’ role in mind for them.339 This involved hoplites acting as either bait or a 
constantly threatening, but never engaging, strike force, while other contingents 
under subordinate commanders engaged the enemy from range. A high degree of 
coordination and communication between all the elements involved was necessary, 
and each contingent needed to respond to changing circumstances rapidly; such 
attacks are the epitome of an experienced and integrated force led by a general 
confident of the ability and skills of his subordinates. An Athenian hoplite force was
337 Hunter & Handford (1927) 151.
338 Best (1969) 19-20.The equipment and style of engagement of peltasts did not preclude them from 
fighting hand-to-hand. Indeed, if individual hoplites could be drawn far enough away from the 
protection of the phalanx then the peltasts’ advantage in speed and numbers would best be expressed 
in a rapid switch to close-quarters battle.
339 Aeneas Tacticus 16.7.
118
present on the island of Sphacteria in 425 and was never actually engaged in close 
combat; instead it served as a lure to the Spartan hoplites and as a checking force, 
preventing the Spartans from being able to pursue the light infantry too 
vigorously.340 A hoplite force commanded by the Athenian general Callias 
accompanied Iphicrates’ peltasts when they attacked a Spartan mora near Laecheum 
in 390. Callias did not engage, but remained close enough to the Spartan phalanx to 
limit their response to the skirmishing attacks of the peltasts; the mora, having 
retreated to a hill, was finally broken at the sight of Callias’ phalanx advancing.341 
These checking forces will have operated in a fine envelope; they would have to be 
close enough to the enemy phalanx to pose a threat, yet far enough away to avoid 
being targeted over the attacking light infantry. Aeneas Tacticus seems to have a 
similar role in mind for the hoplites in his attack; he does not give them a direct 
combat role, but seems to view them as a bastion to which the light infantry and 
cavalry could retreat to, or as a force ‘in being’ which would limit the actions the 
enemy could undertake without actually being engaged.342
Aeneas Tacticus has presented us with a highly organised and sophisticated 
method of engagement which relies upon the ability of subordinate commanders to 
work and communicate together, and which makes use of all the major unit types of 
the day: cavalry, heavy infantry, and light infantry. This force must not rush to 
engage but should be cautious, gather information, and attack on its own terms, 
preferably when the enemy is dispersed and lacking in discipline; communication,
340 Thucydides 4.32-9.
341 Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.13-18.
342 That is, a phalanx which the enemy knows is in the immediate area, but whose precise location is 
unknown. The phrase is adapted from the naval term ‘fleet in being’, meaning the ability of a 
technically inferior fleet or vessel to ‘tie up’ much greater resources by refusing to directly engage. 
Maltby (1994) 160.
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intelligence, and strong leadership are all required, and advice is given regarding 
how these factors can be strengthened. A further level of sophistication is added 
when Aeneas discusses the use of naval transport to aid attacks on an enemy force.
The Poliorketika ends with the enigmatic statement that “A fleet may be 
equipped in two ways...”,343 suggesting that his work moved on to discuss either 
how to utilise naval forces to defend the state, or to naval matters in general. 
However Aeneas Tacticus also discusses the use of naval forces in three passages of 
the Poliorketika that survive, two of which emphasise his advice, given throughout 
the text, that the general is better off relying on speed and surprise than brute force 
and that forces should not be committed unless they have an advantage. First we are 
advised that if boats are available then they should be used to transport troops behind 
retreating enemies, thus both reducing the possibility of the pursuing troops being 
ambushed and ensuring that they arrive fitter and fresher than those retreating.344 
Secondly a fleet of boats should be used to deposit troops behind the enemy in order 
to ensure complete surprise and maximum impact when the enemy forces are finally 
engaged by the mixed force Aeneas Tacticus advises be used.345 So in addition to the 
other troop types outlined above we see marines being put to use; the hypothetical 
enemy is now being shot at from range by light infantry, ambushed by peltasts, 
chased down by cavalry, threatened by hoplites, and attacked from behind by 
marines -  a flowing melange of styles and equipment that is a stark contrast to the 
pitched battle, and one which relied upon generalship and subordinate command in 
order to be effective.
343 Aeneas Tacticus 40.8.
344 Aeneas Tacticus 16.13.
345 Aeneas Tacticus 16.21-2.
120
Should it prove impossible to engage the enemy at a distance from the city 
then the physical structure and immediate terrain features of the city itself come into 
play, with Aeneas Tacticus recommending that advantageous positions be occupied 
and used as bases for attack and retreat.346 The emphasis remains on attack, although 
with the city in such close proximity Aeneas Tacticus seems to be recommending a 
shift from the flowing counter-attack useful in the outer territories to a relatively 
compact attempt to draw the enemy into position and attack them from the city. 
Aeneas Tacticus concentrates heavily on the advantages to be gained from local 
knowledge and familiarity with terrain, so it would seem he still regards this position 
as a flexible one; perhaps he is thinking of a situation such as the Plataean break out 
in 428, except on a larger scale and with the focus on causing the enemy to 
withdraw, not on escape to a friendly territory.347
Aeneas Tacticus seems to present three more levels of proximity and danger 
to the city which should be considered: defence of the city walls, internal defence, 
and factors regarding the mental health and morale of the city. Regarding the first 
two he has little extra to say about generalship beyond what has already been 
discussed, and his comments regarding maintaining the morale of citizens all focus 
on ensuring that discipline and morale remain high by becoming actively involved 
with the everyday tasks of the guards, patrols and gatekeepers. This system of 
increasing proximity and danger to the city is logical and systematic: the general’s 
first concern should be to organise and co-ordinate the defence of the outer territories 
by sending and receiving messages and building up an overall image of the invading 
forces and their strategy. If the outer territories cannot be blocked or the attempts at
346 Aeneas Tacticus 16.18.
347 Thucydides 3.20-24.
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delay or dissuasion fail then the general should prepare for a defence of the local 
territory.
The rings of danger and proximity to the city I have identified demonstrate 
that Aeneas Tacticus recognises at least three phases of an invasion during which a 
city should mount a highly active external defence. This point is forcefully made by 
Aeneas in his preface, where he states that:
"Oaoi<; twv avGpwiTwv ek iffo aunuv oppw|j£voi<; x^paq uuEpopioi te aycJVEg Kai 
ki'v5 uvoi aupPaivouaiv, av ti acpaApa Y£vrlTa| koto YHV H koto GaAaaaav, 
UTToAEi'nETai toi<; TTEpiyiYvoiJEvois auTWV oiKEi'a te xdJpa Kai ttoAi£ Kai TTOTpi^ , wote 
ouk av ap5r|v ttcivte^  avaip£0£ir|crav.”
“When men leave their country and engage in warfare and encounter perils 
beyond their own frontiers, and disaster occurs by land or sea, the survivors 
still have their own country and city and fatherland between them and utter 
destruction.”348
By engaging the enemy at the greatest possible distance from the city itself, it 
was still possible to have native soil, however little, between the soldiers and utter 
extinction, and Aeneas Tacticus recommends that the general make the most of this 
window of opportunity by undertaking an aggressive defence. This defence should 
not consist of a challenge to or acceptance of any form of ‘pitched battle’, but should 
be multifaceted, utilising naturally strong defensive points, constant skirmishing 
operations, and retreat to the next ring if the enemy is determined enough to try and 
force the matter; indeed, the last thing the general should do is seek a direct and final 
confrontation as the loss of such an event could lead to an immediate physical siege
348 Aeneas Tacticus Preface 1 (trans Whitehead.)
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of the city itself.349
The image of command, and warfare in general, which Aeneas Tacitcus’ text 
generates are well illustrated by two apothegms regarding the Athenian mercenary 
commander Iphicrates. In the first:
’Ic p iK p c rrr is  T i iv  o u v t c ^ i v  t w v  O T p a T O T T e S u jv  e i k a ^ e  t u )  c r ib p c m .  B w p a K a  £ k 6 A ei T r iv  
9 a A a Y Y a ,  X E fp a S  t o u g  ip iA o u g ,  TTo5 a ^  T q v  i t t t t o v ,  K E cpaA rjv  t o v  c r r p a i n Y b v .  ‘t o  i j e v  5 ri 
a A A a  o i a v  ETTiAEifrn. x w ^ o v  K a > n r i p o v  t o  o t p c i t o t t e S o v -  o t o v  5 e  o  O T p a T r iy o ^  
a n o A r i T a i ,  t o  t t c i v  a x p n a T 0 V  oT xetcm
“Iphicrates likened the formation of armies to the body. He called the phalanx 
the trunk, the light-armed the hands, the cavalry the feet, and the general the 
head. “When the other parts are missing, the army is lame and disabled. But 
when the general is killed, the entire army is useless.”
Aeneas Tacticus’ advice requires all of these body-parts to be deployed in 
concert, and his concentration on the gathering of information, the issuing of orders, 
and the physical safety of the general illustrates the importance he attached to the 
‘head’ of this figure. Indeed, the head should only be exposed to danger once all 
other possibilities have been exhausted, indicating the ability of generals to 
coordinate skirmishes and engagements from a central position, some distance from 
the action. Although Polyaenus has created a convincing simile here, he has left out 
one vital component, blood, which could be categorized as the overall morale of the 
army or state. If the general was unable to mount the visible and energetic defence 
that Aeneas Tacitcus recommends, and the enemy were allowed to begin an active 
siege, then the possibility of the figure bleeding to death before taking any 
significant wounds comes into play, hence Aeneas Tacticus’ other main concern that
349 Whitehead (1991) 24: “He is certainly no prisoner of the pitched-battle mentality...”; van Wees 
(2004) 123-4.
350 Polyaenus 3.9.22 (trans Krentz & Wheeler.)
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the enemy should be met in the field at some distance from the walls of the city.
Plutarch records a second valuable insight into Iphicrates’ thoughts on 
command:
pr)TOpog 5 e Tivog ettepujtu)vto<; auTOv ev EKKAriaiQi, ‘ti's l jv  pEya cppovEig; t to te p o v  
iiTTTEu  ^ n OTTAiTr]^  n to£6ths n TTEAiaaing;’ ‘o u 5 e iV  E(pn, ‘to u tw v , aAA’ o Tracn to u to is
ETTIOTapEVOg ETTITaTTEIV.’
A certain speaker interrogated him in the Assembly: ‘Who are you that you 
are so proud? Are you cavalryman or man-at-arms, archer or peltast?’ ‘None 
of these,’ he replied, ‘but one who understands how to command all of 
them.’351
Aeneas Tacticus would most likely approve of this, indeed it closely matches 
the overall image of command and control that his text generates: the general should 
understand the advantages and disadvantages of the various troop types, and be able 
to effectively direct and coordinate them -  he does not just take his place in the ranks 
and fight. The sentiment recorded by Plutarch can also be found in many of the battle 
descriptions taken from the historical sources: the Athenians and Spartans at the 
battle of Plataea apparently knew how to coordinate archers and hoplites, as well as 
being aware of the danger posed by cavalry, and how best to counter it. Similar 
knowledge can be imputed to the generals involved in the vast majority of battles 
found in Thucydides and Xenophon, from Hippocrates launching a cavalry strike 
during the battle of Delium to Nicias commenting on the Sicilian Expedition’s need 
for a mixed force of hoplites, light infantry, and cavalry, to the victories of Iphicrates 
over Spartan hoplites, and the ability of Epaminondas to manoeuvre a large army so 
well that even Spartan observers were fooled as to his intentions. Indeed these
351 Plutarch, Moralia, 187B (trans Babbit -  modified.)
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engagements conform to the advice that Aeneas Tacticus gives -  all had their focus 
on the creation of advantage through generalship, manoeuvre, and the aggressive use 
of mixed forces.
Aeneas Tacticus does not appear concerned with received standards of glory 
or heroism; he does not want the city to go ‘all in’ and invite the enemy to engage in 
combat, rather the city’s forces should harass, annoy, and fall back to prepared 
positions if necessary. Indeed, there is no hint of moralising, rules, or anything 
regarded as ‘acceptable’ behaviour in Aeneas Tacticus’ text: the enemy must be 
confronted and defeated by any and all means possible, and a good general is one 
who can recognise their weaknesses and respond appropriately, however this may be. 
This image of the Greek general is one that clashes strongly with current scholarship 
regarding command and control in amateur Greek armies, and the ‘agonal’ element 
of Greek warfare: Aeneas Tacticus advises that the general should not strike until he 
has secured a significant advantage, indeed he should lure the enemy into a false 
sense of security, and allow them to become drunk, before attacking and, 
presumably, massacring them.352
Aeneas Tacticus is not the first of the Greek writers to suggest that generals 
should do everything in their power to achieve victory, but he is the first to suggest it 
directly, unapologetically, and plainly. The Athenians at Marathon attacked at a 
moment, and in a manner, which gave them all the advantage they could get; the 
Athenians commanded by Myronides in 457 who surrounded and stoned to death 
some Corinthian hoplites did the same, as did the Spartans at Nemea and the
352 Aeneas Tacticus 16.5.
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Thebans at Leuctra. However the accounts of these battles are not straightforward, 
they are not neutral, and they are certainly not direct or plain with regard to tactical, 
strategic, or personal motive; as such they invite various interpretations. Aeneas 
Tacticus does not, and his message is simple: a good general can kill many of the 
enemy without placing his own troops at risk. In advocating this Aeneas Tacticus 
demonstrates his military credentials and gains entry into a supposedly select club of 
individuals from antiquity: those who were concerned with outcomes rather than 
methods and who were able to see beyond the supposed limitations of the hoplite 
way of war to the usefulness of combined forces. From Aeneas Tacticus’ treatise we 
can reconstruct a relatively detailed picture of the importance of generalship, 
subordinate commanders, and organisation to ‘everyday’ warfare between average 
sized poleis. This picture demonstrates that a notion of generalship as somehow 
simple or limited, and a narrow focus on the hoplite and the pitched battle, is one that 
is simply not representative of warfare in Greece, and that by engaging with this 
unfairly ignored source our understanding of the techniques, purpose, and 
remarkable sophistication of Greek warfare can be greatly improved.
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Chapter 5: Phases of Battle
Most recorded hoplite battles fought in Classical Greece followed a 
recognisable pattern: advance, fighting, pursuit/retreat. The following sections 
analyse these ‘phases’ of battle, as well as the controversial othismos, and highlight 
the ways in which Greek generals could influence them.
Section A: The Advance to combat
The first identifiable combat stage of a hoplite engagement was the advance 
into combat. Although the advance features in most modem accounts of hoplite
-j o  • •battle, it has not been the subject of a single detailed investigation; this is 
surprising and unfortunate given the possibility for tactical innovation it represented, 
and the influence that it had in determining the length, nature, and intensity of the 
stages that followed. In this chapter I shall give a detailed analysis of the ability of 
generals to influence the advance into combat, and will also offer a discussion of 
how these advances would have taken place. This is necessary because currently the 
model most scholars prefer is a charge of around 200 yards ‘at the run’ directly into 
combat, a relatively simple scenario which requires little to no action on the part of 
the general, and has serious implications for the course of battle. If the evidence 
suggests that different battlefield considerations and terrain resulted in different 
forms of advance, then our understanding of the ability of generals to influence battle 
needs modifying accordingly.
353 Indeed the majority of scholarship has focused on aspects of fighting and othismos. The lack of 
attention paid to the advance has resulted in the important tactical and organisational mechanics that 
determined a successful advance, and influenced the ensuing combat, being passed over by much 
scholarship.
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As with the other phases of battle, there are currently two opposing theories 
about how the advance occurred: an advance ‘at the run’ over the final 200 yards or 
so which resulted in two phalanxes crashing directly into each other, or a more 
cautious and slow advance into combat from spear-range. An advance ‘at the run’ 
directly into combat, as advocated most prominently by Hanson would result in a 
head-on clash of phalanxes.354 According to Hanson, this collision could result in an 
almost immediate victory, as one side literally crashed through the other, or it could 
result in an almost immediate transition to othismos, with the primary concern being
355the maintenance of momentum rather than formation. An alternative view centres 
around the physical and psychological problems associated with charging directly 
into combat against an almost identically equipped enemy; van Wees and Lazenby 
have suggested that the charge did not actually result in a collision, rather in a 
tentative advance into, and beyond, spear range. The following analysis of the 
surviving source material will indicate that the latter position is to be preferred but 
requires some modification to take into account the variety of evidence that is 
presented. This analysis is split into four sub-sections, each of which contains direct 
and indirect evidence regarding the battlefield role of generals.
Theoretical objections against an advance ‘at the run’ into combat.
A number of practical points raised by modem commentators need to be 
examined before we approach the ancient evidence in detail. These points reinforce 
the impression found in the sources that a charge ‘at the run’ over the final 200 yards
354 Hanson (2000a) 135-159.
355 Hanson (2000a) 156-162.
356 Lazenby (1991) 90-91; van Wees (2004) 188-89. See also Keegan (1976) 71. Wheeler (2007a) 
205-6 offers a summary of the evidence and modem positions but does not give a firm conclusion.
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was not the ‘standard’ beginning to a hoplite battle, which itself leaves open the 
possibility for battlefield command.
The first of these points is Hanson’s assertion that an advance ‘at the run’ 
during the final 200 yards and leading directly into combat would result in the 
immediate infliction of a number of fatal and disabling wounds, due to the extra
o c  n
power such a charge would apparently lend the opening blows. Given the strength 
of frontal defence offered by hoplite equipment, he argued that such a strong initial 
blow would be vital if a protracted fight was to be avoided; perhaps this blow would
OfO
even be able to penetrate directly through the shield. However, this scenario 
presents a number of physical and ergomonic problems. A mass charge leading to a 
direct collision with an enemy phalanx of approximately equal size would result in 
the front ranks coming to an abrupt and incredibly violent halt. Assuming that spears 
had been carried in an underarm position (the most logical for a 'charge' of any sort) 
this would result in the second, and possibly even third, ranks having to take action
l f Q
to avoid the suddenly static row of butt-spikes they would be running into.
While ranks two and three would have to avoid the butt-spikes of friendly 
hoplites, the front rank was faced with the even more dangerous scenario of charging 
directly into the weapons of the enemy front rank; such a scenario simply cannot be
5/rn
reconciled with the low casualty figures attested for hoplite battle. Those who did
357 Hanson (2000a) 135-159.
358 Hanson (2000a) 140-2, 162-4; Matthews (2009) 411.
359 Goldsworthy (1997); Schwartz (2009) 91-2; Matthews (2009).
360 On which, see Appendix 1.
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make direct contact with an enemy were unlikely to come away unscathed or be able 
to continue fighting immediately; the physical shock of the collision would be such
i/r  i
that they would most likely end up ..sprawling on the ground.” Even those who 
managed to retain their footing would be highly vulnerable for a vital few seconds as 
they took in their immediate environment and perhaps struggled to adjust their 
equipment, or even identify friend from foe: the nature of the hoplite panoply, 
especially the helmet, ensured that even this was not a simple matter.
Finally, there was no need for a lengthy or rapid advance in order to give 
extra strength to a blow; a few metres would suffice to generate additional power, 
with any extra distance only serving to tire the hoplite for no additional benefit. Van 
Wees suggests a maximum distance of 15 metres, which is a sound figure, if maybe 
slightly too long; a few strong steps would be enough to gain the maximum power 
for an accurate thrust from the shoulder.363 This principle is evident in many athletic 
events: athletes are not able to generate more lift or power the further they run; rather 
there is an optimum distance at which their speed and strength can be used to full 
effect, and beyond which diminishing returns set in. Besides the length of this 
optimum distance, the ability to retain balance and control remains essential; this 
would be very difficult indeed if running downhill or over uneven terrain, trying to 
maintain formation, and carrying hoplite equipment, and not to mention the 
psychological impact of the enemy phalanx at which they would have been 
charging.364
361 van Wees (2004) 188.
362 Hanson (2000a) 71-76. Schwartz has recently re-affirmed the impact that a hoplite helmet of any 
style Schwartz (2009) 55-66, esp 62. See also Hanson (2000a) 71-74.
363 van Wees (2004) 188.
364 Donlan & Thompson (1976) and (1979) for the difficulty of running and keeping formation. Also 
Goldsworthy (1997).
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Battles where armies did not advance ‘at the run’
Those occasions when armies did not advance ‘at the run’, but advanced 
slowly instead, indicate that the respective generals were not concerned with the 
generation of momentum or psychological shock, but placed greater value on other 
attributes. Advancing at a pace less than a run would allow changes of formation and 
direction, and also ensured that a phalanx did not become totally committed to an 
attack once it had begun. Such advances could indicate that Greek generals 
recognised that their role did not end with the signal to advance, and also suggest 
that hoplite battles were more sophisticated than simply lining up, advancing at a 
run, and hoping for the best.
The first battle where there was no advance ‘at the run’ is the justly 
celebrated engagement at the pass of Thermopylae. The battle was not fought 
between two phalanxes of hoplites, but Thermopylae remains of great use in helping 
to discover the influence that a general could exert during an advance, how flexible a 
phalanx formation could be, and the ability of hoplite forces to respond to their 
tactical and geographical environment. While the battle is important for 
demonstrating these key features it is to be remembered that the engagement 
involved elite Spartan troops, not ordinary Greeks, and as such we must be careful 
not to generalise from it; I analyse the engagement because it goes some way to 
showing us the ‘upper ceiling’ of command and control in Greek armies. A further 
problem regards the nature of the very formation the Spartans fought in as there is 
still controversy regarding when hoplites began to fight exclusively in phalanx 
formation, other troops having been excluded from the formation. The continuing
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argument over when a ‘true’ phalanx formed is not the subject of this thesis; suffice 
to say here that I consider Marathon to represent the first appearance of a 
recognisable phalanx, although the formation did not reach its final form until later 
in the fifth century, during the pentecontaetia, a form which remained essentially
‘j / 'c
unchanged until Philip’s reforms of the Macedonian infantry.
The Greek tactics at Thermopylae relied on baiting Persian troops into a 
pursuit by pretending to flee, and then at some point about facing in order to engage 
the Persians in close combat.366 This appears simple: the Spartans ran away, and then 
turned around. However these actions imply that the Spartan phalanx possessed a 
number of vital attributes, most notably the ability to hear and obey the commands of 
their general.367 Indeed, precise timing and clear communications would have been 
vital in order for this tactic to have been effective; if the order was given too late, or 
could not be heard and acted upon immediately, then the Persians might not have 
been fooled into pursuing as the distance would have been too great, or may have 
launched a pursuit, but abandoned it for the same reason. Equally, if the order was 
given, or heard, too late, then the phalanx would not have had time to pretend to flee, 
and would have been forced to meet the advancing Persians head on. The 
transformation of the ‘fleeing’ hoplites into an intact phalanx must have been a 
terrifying sight to behold, especially if it was achieved with a single shouted 
command, issued at just the right time and with all the authority and power of a
365 See Schwartz (2009) 102-146 for the most recent analysis of the development of the phalanx.
366 Herodotus 7.211.
367 See chapter 2 for the importance of the Spartan chain of command, and for the impact that a noisy 
and disruptive enemy could have on the ability o f Spartans to communicate mid-battle. This ability to 
communicate information and call for defensive or offensive measures was the greatest advantage 
Spartan forces held over the other, amateur, armies of Greece.
3 Herodotus 7.211. Anderson (1970) 41; Lazenby (1985) 88-96; van Wees (2004) 180-1 -  although 
he focuses on the heroic nature of the Spartan’s death, rather than their effective tactics. See also 
Schwartz (2009) 138.
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Spartan king behind it. The chasing Persian troops would have crashed into the 
Spartan phalanx in disarray,369 while the Spartans themselves were most likely 
advancing slowly given they seemed to preserve and maximise the discipline and 
teamwork that Herodotus emphasises so strongly. Thermopylae was not just a 
demonstration of the strength, endurance, and self-sacrifice of the Three Hundred 
and their allies, but was a display of manoeuvre, communication, and effective 
command that is not matched in the sources until Brasidas’ fighting withdrawal from 
Macedonia in 423.370
After the engagement at Thermopylae we come to the battle of Plataea, a 
more recognisable ‘pitched battle’ during which one significant advance into combat 
took place. This occurred several days after the death of the Persian cavalry 
commander Masistius, and began the final engagement of the campaign. The Tegean 
contingent of the Greek line advanced first, quickly followed by the Spartan 
contingent.371 Up to this point Pausanias, the Spartan general, had been holding his 
phalanx in place while waiting for favourable omens, despite the Persian archers
'lH'J
being in range and inflicting casualties. Pausanias’ role should not be 
underestimated here, indeed his ability to hold the line and restrain the advance was 
a vital one; his delay may have allowed the advancing Persian line to become so 
committed, and grow so deep, that its ability to retreat or otherwise manoeuvre was
369 How & Wells (1912) 224.
370 Thucydides 4.125-7: Discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
371 Herodotus 9.62.
372 Herodotus 9.60-1. The Persian archers were causing damage to the Greeks at this point: Herodotus 
mentions the Spartan Callicrates was struck in the side and died shortly after. Herodotus describes 
him as the handsomest man of his generation, which leads one to wonder how many less-blessed 
Greeks were struck down by Persian arrows, but not mentioned by Herodotus, while waiting for 
Pausanias to discover good omens. Anderson (1970) 69 remarks that “Unfavourable omens seem 
sometimes to have been used as an excuse for not doing something...” A powerful means to hold a 
position when ‘ordinary’ soldiers may not have understood the need to do so.
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compromised.373 This would account for the Persians’ laying down of their bows and 
attacking the phalanx in close combat: they were unable to withdraw or otherwise 
avoid the advancing Greeks due a lack of space caused by the number of friendly 
troops present.374 This indicates a concern for tactical circumstances beyond lining 
up his phalanx and advancing; Pausanias may well have been waiting for the omens 
to be auspicious before engaging, but an equally possible explanation is that he was 
able to hold his forces in position despite the presence of other, perhaps lesser, 
commanders who wished to advance.
Thucydides’ account of the battle of Mantinea in 418 is one of the most 
detailed accounts of a pitched battle between hoplites that survives to us, and it 
contains much useful information regarding the battlefield role of the general during 
the advance.376 I begin with an examination of the events which occurred on the day 
before the actual engagement; these events are, if anything, even more useful for my 
purpose here than the account of the battle itself, and have been largely passed over 
by modem scholarship investigating Classical Greek battle.
The day before the battle of Mantinea proper the Spartan King Agis 
attempted to lead a Peloponnesian phalanx against an Argive-led force that had taken
n n  n
up a strong elevated position in the territory of Mantinea. Details of the battle can
373 Bum (1984) 538; Lazenby (1993) 242.
374 Speed and manoeuvrability were required if light infantry was to effectively engage an intact 
phalanx.
375 A comparison to the delay at Marathon can be made: neither is explained as being due to tactical or 
strategic circumstances, however both delays seem to have allowed the Greeks to attack at a time 
which suited them best. I would suggest that Herodotus was not aware of, or did not understand, the 
tactical decision making behind both delays. Lazenby (1993) 228.
376 Thucydides 5.64-73.
377 Thucydides 5.64-5. Lazenby (2004) 119 views this as an attempt by the Argives to counter the 
Spartan expertise in pitched battle by forcing them to attack an elevated position. He describes the 
Spartans as “...taking the bait.” Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1970) 97 suggest that Agis may never
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be found in Chapter 2 so I will be brief here, suffice to say that the Spartan King 
Agis was able to halt and withdraw his entire force, made up of allied Peloponnesian 
contingents, from within javelin range of the enemy, and was able to do so safely, 
rapidly, and in such order that his army was left untouched. This suggests that the 
Peloponnesian phalanx was not advancing ‘at the run’, but that it was doing so at a 
slow and steady pace. Regarding the withdrawal Thucydides remarks:
oi 5 ’ ApyeToi Kai oi ^uppaxo i to pev TTpunov KaTcrnAaYevTEg tr oAi'you aicpviSiip
auTihv a v a x w p n a e i ouk eixov oti E k a a w a iv
“The Argives and their allies were at first astonished at the sudden Spartan
* 378withdrawal from so close, and did not know what to make of it.”
The astonishment of the Argives rapidly turned into anger at the inactivity of
their generals; the hoplites appear to have viewed this as an exploitable situation, and
berated their generals for not ordering an advance to take advantage of the Spartan
withdrawal. This anger is a clear indication that the generals could have ordered an
advance upon the Spartan army, yet chose not to, and is perhaps an example of the
phenomenon known as looking at something through ‘rose-tinted glasses’. The
Argive hoplites, buoyed with adrenalin following their near-engagement, were
convinced they ‘could have taken them’, had already forgotten the danger of the
situation and the casualties that would have ensued had they engaged, and so blamed
their generals for not ordering the advance. However the reluctance of the generals
was well founded, as demonstrated by the professionalism of the Spartan
withdrawal, and the inability of the Argives to match Spartan hoplites in the field the
have intended to attack the Argive position, but may have been hoping that the advance and retreat of 
his army would allow his baggage train to withdraw in safety, in which case the veteran’s role in the 
encounter may be doubted. However this does not significantly weaken my main point: the 
withdrawal still took place in very close proximity to the enemy, and was undertaken in such a 
manner that it dissuaded the Argives from attack. Homblower (2008) 170.
378 Thucydides 5.65 (trans Hammond.)
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following day. This encounter also demonstrates the ability of the general to 
influence a fluid situation, and the first phase of an engagement; Agis was able to 
halt and withdraw his phalanx while in close proximity to the enemy, while the 
Argive generals were able to hold their phalanx, in good order and in advantageous
(I'7Q
terrain, until the Spartan phalanx had passed out of sight.
Most modem commentators have pointed out the unsolicited advice of the 
older man who called out to Agis that his position was dangerous and the 
implications this has for the nature of the Spartan command system, however the
1QA
halting and withdrawal of the entire phalanx has largely passed without comment. 
This will not do, indeed, the passage is of vital importance to understanding the 
nature of the advance to battle in Greece. If events occurred as Thucydides describes 
them, and there are no compelling reasons why his account should be doubted here, 
then this is strong evidence for a slow and tentative advance into combat, based on 
practical reasons, as well as indicating that, at least amongst the Spartans, the general 
retained control over an advancing phalanx.
The day after this aborted engagement the actual battle of Mantinea took 
place. Thucydides describes the build-up to, and progression of, this battle in some 
detail, and his account is of great use when attempting to understand both the first 
phase of battle, and the general’s role in it. The first notable incident Thucydides 
records is that the Spartans were unaware of the Argive advance until the very last
379 It is possible that the Spartan advance was a feint designed to get the Argives to move from their 
elevated position and into combat. If this is true then the point remains the same: the Peloponnesian 
army was able to withdraw in order while in close proximity to the enemy, and while its being 
planned in advance may detract from the impressiveness of the manoeuvre, it adds to our 
understanding of the ability of generals to decide on various tactics before battle.
380 E.g. Lazenby (1991) 98; Hanson (2000a) 94,137; van Wees (2004) 111.
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minute, being shocked beyond anything they could remember at the appearance of 
an army in battle formation, indeed the very army that they had refused to engage 
only the day before. Lazenby believes this is the real reason for the Spartan 
surprise; not that the Argives literally ‘caught them napping’, but that they had 
voluntarily moved from their strong, elevated position, and moved to engage in a 
pitched battle: “One can imagine one of them telling Thucydides: ‘There they were,
•3 O'}
ready for battle -  most astonishing thing I ever saw.’” This may have been the 
cause of the Spartan surprise, however a failure of Spartan scouting and intelligence 
is just as likely: such a failure may have been responsible for the previous day’s 
abortive attack, while it could also account for Agis’ worry regarding his left flank -  
he did not have sufficient information about the enemy position to match it 
adequately, and was forced into a last-minute change of formation. Thucydides 
stresses the speed at which the Peloponnesian line was formed, a speed that was 
forced due to the sudden appearance of the Argive army, and which indicates that 
Peloponnesian forces, at least, did not simply line up and immediately charge. The 
build up to the battle of Mantinea proper tells us a great deal about the importance of 
generals and their ability to influence even large allied armies while in close 
proximity to the enemy.
Thucydides’ account of the battle of Mantinea contrasts the professional 
nature of the Peloponnesian army with the largely amateur nature of their opponents. 
He also ascribes the tactical manoeuvres of the Peloponnesian army to their general,
381 Thucydides 5.66.
382 Lazenby (2004) 120-1; Homblower (2008) 173. .
383 Tritle (2010) 124. Homblower (2008) 170, 173 for discussion of the presence, or lack thereof, of a 
wood mentioned by Pausanias (8.2.1), that could have obscured the Argive army. At the battle of 
Nemea the Spartan army only became aware of the enemy phalanx when it raised the paean:
Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.19. See also Hellenica 3.2.14-15.
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Agis, and gives no detail of the actions of the allied army’s generals, except to state 
that both Athenian generals were killed.384 Regarding the Peloponnesian advance 
Thucydides states that it was calm and steady, and was made to the tune of pipers; 
these pipers had no religious significance, but were present to help the ranks keep in 
step. Perhaps the majority of Thucydides’ audience would not have understood the 
need to keep in step to such a specific degree of accuracy, or were not familiar with 
the intricacies of Spartan military practice. The need to maintain formation while on 
the move was vital if a phalanx was to remain effective and make contact with the 
enemy with its discipline and ranks intact; it is to be remembered that one of the 
reasons Herodotus offers for the Persian defeat at Plataea was that they attacked the 
intact Spartan phalanx individually or in small groups. Thucydides contrasts the 
advance of the Peloponnesian phalanx with the violence and fury of the Argive 
advance, emphasising the difference between how the two armies prepared: the 
generals of the allied army gave rousing speeches to their soldiers, while the 
Spartans simply reminded each other that their long service in action would serve
-3 o n
them better than some few words of encouragement. Further evidence for the 
ability of Agis to influence the advance of the Peloponnesian phalanx, and the fact 
that this phalanx was advancing slowly, can be found in Thucydides’ account of Agis
300
sending a message to extend his flank, discussed in Chapter 2.
It is clear that although Thucydides considered Mantinea to be a complete
384 Thucydides 5.71-4.
385 Thucydides 5.70. Homblower refers to the passage as “...obviously polemical...” against popular 
superstition: (1996) 394.
386 Herodotus 9.62. Anderson (1970) 41; Lazenby (1985) 110; van Wees (2004) 181. While the 
heavier armour of the allied Greeks paid dividends, their ability to maintain formation and respond 
rapidly to a changing situation also played an important role.
387 Thucydides 5.69-70. Anderson (1970) 78-9; Lazenby (2004) 123; Homblower (2008) 183-5; Tritle 
(2010) 124.
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failure of technical manoeuvring by the Spartans, their courage and ability to 
maintain discipline allowed them to be victorious regardless; the steady advance of 
the Spartan hippeis was a terrifying sight on the battlefield, with most of the 
opposing hoplites fleeing before contact was even made.389 This calm advance 
contrasts with the fury of the Argive advance in another part of the line, however this 
charge was not ‘at the run’ directly into combat, but was an advance undertaken to 
exploit the gap in the Peloponnesian line. Thucydides’ account of the battle of 
Mantinea highlights the ability of a general to influence the course of the advance 
after it had started, as well as showing the flexibility, and some of the limitations, of 
the phalanx formation. Agis’ orders were transmitted and received but were 
ultimately not appropriate to the situation and so they were ignored, with the sheer 
size of the engaged sections of his phalanx, coupled with his indecisiveness, 
resulting in the Peloponnesian left wing being in a highly undesirable position when 
battle was joined
The battle of Nemea was fought in 394, was a large, ‘pitched’ battle, and is 
useful in determining what was possible for generals to achieve during the advance. 
The advance by both phalanxes at the battle of Nemea presents a stark contrast 
between the professional, or at least highly experienced, Peloponnesian troops, and 
the largely amateur allied forces which opposed them.390 The Peloponnesian advance 
was more ordered that the allied attempt, although it was organised at the last minute 
due to the sudden appearance of the allied army, another indication that 
Peloponnesian forces lacked scouting capabilities. Xenophon gives no explicit 
details regarding the roles of the opposing generals, although his account does
389 Thucydides 5.72. Figueira (2006) for a fascinating discussion of this Spartan institution.
390 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18-22.
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indicate that there was not an advance ‘at the run’ directly into combat during the 
battle. The two opposing phalanxes planned to outflank each other, and advanced 
into battle either with a pronounced veer to the right, or having extended their line by 
facing right and marching some distance; this outflanking manoeuvre may have been
'1 Q 1
undertaken at some speed, but it was not directly into combat. Good order and 
marching discipline were vital to accomplish this; indeed Xenophon’s account 
suggests that this was an engagement won and lost by tactics, and while the role of 
the generals during the advance, beyond deciding upon rank depth and initial 
marching direction, is hidden, their presence is more obvious during the other phases 
of this battle.392
Between the battles of Leuctra, which is discussed elsewhere in this thesis, 
and the second battle of Mantinea there are two battles of note recorded by 
Xenophon: the so called Tearless Battle in 368, and an engagement at Thyamia on 
the borders of Sicyon; both are of interest in that they highlight the need for restraint 
and control in the advance. Details for the Tearless Battle are few, but it appears that 
the majority of the Argive and Arcadian phalanxes broke and fled before
' IQ ' }
Archidamus’ Spartans came within spear-thrust. No mention of an advance ‘at the 
run’ is made, indeed Xenophon stresses that although the Spartans were difficult to 
restrain due to favourable omens, their leaders were able to maintain control; a 
poorly co-ordinated or unruly advance could prove disastrous, and the ability to 
prevent an advance was an important skill for the general, and subordinate officers,
391 Lazenby (1985) 139-40.
392 See below.
393 Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.29-32; Diodorus 15.72.3. Buckler (1980) 107.
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3 9 4to possess.
The final event to be discussed in this section the second battle of Mantinea; 
the battle proper was preceded by much manoeuvring by Epaminondas, in order to 
convince the enemy that he would not seek battle that day, but was planning to retire 
to nearby heights in order to encamp. The desired effect was achieved and when 
Epaminondas finally launched his attack it was against an unprepared and panicking 
army. The advance itself was undertaken in force on the left wing, which does not 
appear to have advanced ‘at the run’: indeed it is very difficult to see how a phalanx 
some 50 men deep could hope to do anything ‘at the run’ and expect to arrive in the 
sort of order needed to take advantage of their ranks. Epaminondas did not attempt 
any tactical manoeuvring once the attack had begun; the size of his force, and his 
desire to prevent the weaker elements from engaging, meant he had few options once 
his initial deception had developed into the advance to combat.
The above battles emphasise the ability of generals to influence the advance 
into combat, and the importance of advancing at a slow or steady pace; this pace 
ensured that generals could react to changing circumstances, and also allowed a 
coherent phalanx formation to be maintained up to, and after, contact with an enemy 
phalanx. A clear concern for the maintenance of command, order, and discipline is 
evident, three factors closely connected with the ability of generals to influence 
battle. However I do not claim that an advance ‘at the run’ was impossible or 
tactically unwise in all situations, and the next section examines those occasions 
when an advance ‘at the run’ is described, or implied, in the source material.
394 Lazenby (1985) 167. Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.30-32; Anabasis 1.8.19.
395 Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.19-23.
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Advances ‘at the run’
Probably the most famous example of hoplites advancing ‘at the run’ into 
battle is the charge by the Greeks at the battle of Marathon in 490, where the allied 
Athenian and Plataean phalanx charged directly into the Persian army. This is also 
the earliest battle of the Classical Greek world for which we have a detailed, and 
contemporary, account; although the battle is not a ‘pitched battle’ between opposing 
phalanxes of hoplites, its influence has been strong in the modem reconstruction of 
Greek warfare, and it remains valuable as an indicator of what was possible for 
generals, and a phalanx, to do.
Herodotus’ description of the legendary charge has had a profound impact on 
the study of Greek warfare, not least in the development of a charge over the final 
200 yards ‘at the run’ into combat as the standard opening to battles. The battle is 
also of great importance for our understanding of the battlefield role of the general; 
according to Herodotus Callimachos led the attack from the position of honour on 
the right wing and was killed, along with another general, Stesilaus, during the 
fighting at the water’s edge. Herodotus does not describe the actions of the other 
eight generals present during the engagement, although a distinct role for at least one
iqo #
more can be found in his narrative, and is discussed below. The ‘meeting of the 
generals’ that resulted in the Athenians deciding to fight, but waiting up to nine days 
to do so as command was passed to a different general each day, does not shed light
396 Herodotus 6.112.
397 Herodotus 6.110-4. Plutarch is also of use: he states that Aiantis, the phyle to which Callimachus 
belonged, was placed on the right of the Greek line. Moralia 628D. Plutarch cites ‘the elegies of 
Aeschylus’ as his source: Aeschylus supposedly fought at Marathon alongside his brother, who was 
killed: Pausanias 1.21.2; Justin 9.2.17-18. How & Wells (1912) lll.K rentz (2010) 159-9.
398 Herodotus 6.113.
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on the battlefield role of any of the generals present.399 However the delay may have 
been deliberate, rather than forced due to the multiplicity of command, with Krentz 
positing that the Athenians observed Persian troop and cavalry movements in order 
to determine when best to attack.400
According to much modem scholarship the charge by the Greeks at the battle 
of Marathon was necessary due to the danger posed to the phalanx from Persian 
archers, and was begun not from 8 stades distant, as reported by Herodotus, but 
when the Greeks found themselves within bowshot, i.e. around 150 metres.401 Thus, 
depending on the modem commentator, the Greeks faced a "...hail of Persian 
arrows..."; a "...barrage of arrows..."; or a "...murderous hail of arrows..." and were 
compelled to charge 'at the run' in order to limit the damage these archers would 
have caused.402 In the event the Greek charge was highly successful, with the Persian 
army being taken by surprise while still preparing its ranks; only 192 Greeks fell, 
with the majority of these casualties probably having occurred when the centre was 
broken.403 Herodotus makes no mention of the charge as a means of avoiding 
casualties from missiles; indeed although he mentions that this was the first occasion 
on which a Greek force began a battle with such a manoeuvre, he gives no 
information regarding the theory or motivation behind i t404 While an advance ‘at the 
ran’ would have reduced the phalanx’s exposure to Persian missiles, other 
possibilities present themselves; Storch thought that the Greek charge at Marathon
399 Lazenby (1993) 56-9.
400 Krentz (2010) 142-3. This explanation also helps account for the absence of Spartan and other 
reinforcements: “Miltiades must have seen an opportunity to exploit -  an opportunity that would not 
wait for the Spartans.”
401 How & Wells (1912) 112.
402 Hammond (1968) 46; CAHIV 511; Green (1996) 36. However see Gabriel & Metz (1991) 68-72; 
Hunt (2007) 122.
403 Herodotus 6.117.
404 Herodotus 6.112. Lazenby (1993) 67; Krentz (2010) 151-2.
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was simply an attempt to take the Persian forces by surprise, something they were 
able to do due to the lightness of the Athenian panoply by 490.405 In the most recent 
work on the battle of Marathon Krentz rejects modem assertions that a charge of 
around a mile in the full panoply was physically impossible, because the overall 
burden placed on the hoplite by his panoply was around half that previously taken as 
standard.406 Thus he views Herodotus’ figure of eight stades as an entirely possible 
distance for hoplites to mn, and then fight. He concludes by suggesting that the 
charge was a deliberate ploy by Miltiades in an attempt to “...get inside his enemy’s 
decision cycle...” by launching an attack at speed the Greeks could engage the 
enemy infantry before the Persian cavalry had deployed.407 In his view the charge at 
Marathon made sense not because it allowed a powerful impact with the enemy 
formation, nor because the threat of Persian archers demanded it, but because the 
Greeks needed to neutralise the threat of the Persian cavalry.
The first large hoplite engagement for which Thucydides records details is 
the battle of Delium in 424, where an Athenian army of around 7,000 hoplites faced 
off against a Boeotian army of similar size but which was superior in light 
infantry.408 The battle was initiated by the Boeotian general Pagondas, who began his 
advance while Hippocrates, the Athenian general, was still haranguing his troops; 
Thucydides tells us that the Boeotian army advanced downhill and the Athenian 
army responded by advancing at a mn.409 This is the only instance in Thucydides
405 Storch (2002) 390-2.
406 Krentz (2010) 50,147-50.
407 Krentz (2010) 143,151-2. Lazenby (1993) 62 for the observation that the Athenian line was 
formed in response to the Persian infantry, hence the Athenians were not completely taking the 
initiative.
408 Thucydides 4.93-4. Lazenby (2004) 88-9; Homblower (2007) 68 refers to the battle of Delium as 
“.. .our clearest account of a hoplite battle”; Wheeler (2007a) 190.
409 Thucydides 4.96. Homblower (1996) 303-4 for the observation that the subject of Spopoq is the 
Athenians, not both armies. Hanson (2000a) 138; Hutchinson (2006) 48.
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where 5po|jo£ is used in relation to a charge in a pitched battle, and such an action by
the Athenian army is indeed puzzling. This advance ‘at the run’ could have been a 
deliberate decision based on tactical circumstances, as with the advance at Marathon; 
it could indicate standard practice, although if this is the case then one wonders why 
Thucydides made the remark; or it could indicate a lack of preparation and discipline 
on the part of the Athenian force. The fact that Pagondas caught Hippocrates still 
addressing his troops suggests the Athenian advance was a ‘knee-jerk’ response to an 
unexpected circumstance; perhaps it was a desperate attempt to scare off the 
Boeotian army, or hope for the spirit of Marathon to carry the Athenians through the 
battle.410 Equally it could indicate a habitual or doctrinal response, however such a 
judgement seems unlikely given the weight of evidence against a phalanx advancing 
‘at the run’ directly into combat as the standard opening to hoplite battle, indeed, this 
is the only secure reference in Thucydides to such an advance being made.
Hanson refers to the Athenians’ advance as being a “...misguided 
attack...against Boeotian hoplites, men who already were running downhill...”411 
However there is no evidence that the Boeotians were running at all, indeed 
Thucydides’ contrast of the advance suggests they were doing quite the opposite: 
advancing in good order, albeit downhill, against an enemy whom they had taken by 
surprise. The argument for a disciplined Boeotian advance is strengthened if we can 
believe Diodorus’ evidence for the presence of the Theban Sacred Band, or a
410 Tritle (2010) 100 writes that the Athenian charge “...demonstrated great courage and discipline.” 
Courage can certainly be imputed to the men who fought at Delium, but I do not see the discipline of 
the Athenian army present here, especially given Plato’s discussion in Symposium 221B-C, where he 
emphasises the courage of Socrates in retreating slowly and in good order, remarking that he survived 
because others were fleeing in panic.
411 Hanson (2000a) 138 his emphasis.
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precursor of that institution;412 this group of 300 soldiers would probably have 
formed the front rank of the Theban contingent (making up the right wing of the 
Boeotian phalanx), which would have lent the “...already formidably deep Theban 
phalanx a real cutting edge”, as well as potentially aiding the maintenance of 
discipline and formation.413 Even if Diodorus’ evidence is to be rejected, it is 
possible that part of the Boeotian army was made up of veterans who had enjoyed 
success against the Athenians in the past as Pagondas’ first speech encouraged the 
older men to emulate their earlier deeds, presumably a reference to the Theban 
victory at Coroneia in 447.414 The presence of such veterans would have provided a 
substantial psychological boost to the younger members of the phalanx, as well as 
helping to calm and restrain any youthful impetuosity that could have disrupted a 
calm and disciplined advance.415
A distinct role for the general is difficult to discern for either side; Pagondas’ 
brief exhortation before the battle proper, delivered “...there and then...” was 
presumably short because he wished to take the initiative and advance on the 
Athenians immediately, a point supported by his earlier, and lengthier, speech, which 
Thucydides has him deliver while still at Tanagra.416 There is no surviving 
information regarding Pagondas’ role during the advance, although his ability to 
order a cavalry attack during the fighting suggests he could have been absent the 
ranks altogether by the middle of the battle, perhaps having retired wounded,
412 Diodorus 12.70.2; Thucydides 4.93.
413 Lazenby (2004) 88. Diodorus refers to ‘charioteers and sidesmen’ here, however this is no 
indication of their battlefield function in the Fifth century, c.f. Spartan hippeis. Van Wees (2004) 57- 
60.
4,4 Thucydides 1.113, 4.92. Homblower (1996) 296; Hanson (2000a) 93. Details for this battle do not 
survive.
415 Hanson (2000a) 89-95.
416 Thucydides 4.92. Homblower (1996) 290-7.
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exhausted, or specifically in order to launch the use his cavalry. Hippocrates did not 
survive the battle and Thucydides does not report that he attempted any tactical 
manoeuvres, possibly because he was unwilling to risk disrupting his phalanx by 
issuing orders in the face of an unexpected enemy advance.417 If this is the case then 
the tactical simplicity of the Athenian advance could have been deliberate, a 
recognition that they had been caught off-guard and would have to settle for a 
‘straight fight’, although it is conceded that Hippocrates may not have planned to 
undertake any tactical shift or manoeuvre during the advance. Indeed this last point 
seems most likely, given Thucydides’ comment that the extreme wings of both 
phalanxes did not make contact due to the geography of the plain of Delium itself; as 
such Hippocrates may not have had any tactical options other than to trust in his
418 *hoplites. Unfortunately for Hippocrates Pagondas was able to call upon his 
cavalry, a factor which ultimately broke the Athenian ability to resist.
The battle of Delium was a disaster for Athens; nearly a thousand hoplites 
were killed, as well as numerous light infantry and baggage-handlers.419 However 
while it marked the end of large-scale Athenian intervention on the mainland for the 
next six years, it also marked the rise to prominence, in Thucydides’ narrative, of the 
Spartan general Brasidas. The first notable instance of Brasidas’ leading or 
commanding an infantry formation occurs in Lyncus in 423, when he found his 
phalanx under attack by Illyrian light infantry; the engagement is more appropriately 
described as being ‘countermeasure taken on the march’ rather than a charge,
417 Thucydides 4.96.
418 Thucydides 4.96. Pritchett (1969) 32; (1980) 297; Homblower (1996) 304; Hutchinson (2006) 48.
4,9 Thucydides 4.101. Lazenby (2004) 90 observes that this represents 14% of the total Athenian 
hoplite force becoming casualties: “.. .perhaps the worst ever suffered by a hoplite army in a pitched 
battle.”
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however I include it here because it shows the level of influence a general could 
exert before battle was actually joined.420 Brasidas’ response to the attack was to 
form his phalanx into a square, within which he placed his light infantry and 
baggage-handlers, and advised his hoplites that good order was vital if they were to 
survive.421 He then ordered the youngest members of the phalanx to rush out 
between the ranks and meet the enemy if they attacked, and finally organised a rear­
guard of 300 picked hoplites which he led in person.422 His orders to the youngest 
members of the phalanx are of great interest here, and represent the first recorded 
instance of direct orders for what appears to have later become standard Spartan 
practice: the sending out of year-groups to chase down attacking light infantry.423 
The response was effective, with the attacking Illyrians switching their attention to 
Brasidas’ Macedonian allies, who were fleeing the battlefield in disarray.424 This 
engagement highlights the ability of a hoplite general to react to new and changing 
circumstances ‘on the fly’; Brasidas’ rearguard was able to defeat an attack and then 
launch a rapid assault against an enemy position on a nearby hill, all the while being 
aware of developing threats and the progress of the main phalanx.
The level of control that Brasidas had over his troops is impressive, as is the 
amount of tactical information available to him and his ability to recognise that a 
fighting withdrawal was more appropriate than trying to resist the enemy attacks
420 Thucydides 4.124-8.
421 Lazenby (2004) 97-8. Most of the hoplites were Chalcidian mercenaries.
422 Thucydides 4.125-7.
423 Thucydides 4.125. Although this appears to have been the initial Spartan response to the Athenian 
light infantry during the battle of Sphacteria, Thucydides does not record an order from the Spartan 
commander to that effect. Lazenby (2004) 98. Wylie (1992) 86 refers to the tactic as “...orthodox 
Spartan tactics.”
424 Thucydides 4.127. Homblower (1996) 400 describes this as “A first-class piece of professional 
soldiering under pressure.”
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with his own light infantry. This force was placed inside a protective square of 
hoplites and played no role in the engagement, with Lazenby suggesting that this 
was because they “...could engage the enemy over the heads of the hoplites forming 
the square.”425 The contrast between this battle and that of the battle of Aetolia in 
426 when the Athenian general Demosthenes found himself in a similar situation is 
stark: Demosthenes’ response was largely passive, with his static ranged troops 
putting up most of the resistance; as a result of this his main force was unable to 
effectively manoeuvre or escape, being destroyed as a result.426 Brasidas’ response 
was active, with his focus being on constant movement in order to occupy 
advantageous terrain; multiple small charges by defined groups allowed his main 
body to continue marching in the knowledge that they would be covered while doing 
so. Brasidas’ plan worked, Demosthenes’ did not; the decision to leave the light 
infantry inside the phalanx was not just to allow them to shoot over the heads of the 
hoplites, but to allow the entire force to withdraw as rapidly as possible. That this 
was successful demonstrates the importance of the general in rapidly and effectively 
organising an appropriate response to changing events, as well as the ability of 
hoplites to undertake running charges.
The first part of Xenophon’s Hellenica records a particularly turbulent time in 
Athenian history; he gives details of the eventual fall of the Athenians to the 
Peloponnesian League, and brings to life the internal strife that ravaged Athens after 
her capitulation. The first land engagements for which Xenophon records sufficient 
details are those that occurred during the rule of the Thirty, and all involve the
425 Lazenby (2004) 97-8; Wylie (1992) 86-7.
426 Thucydides 3.97-8.
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Athenian general and statesman Thrasybulus.427 Thrasybulus, having occupied the 
stronghold of Phyle, set out with a force of around 700 men to ambush the forces of 
the Thirty which were guarding the land near Phyle.428 This first engagement relied 
on a rapid and stealthy night march in order to catch the enemy at their most 
vulnerable. Xenophon records that Thrasybulus halted his troops three or four stadia 
away from the enemy camp, and rested until daybreak before attacking, with his 
reference to the grounding of arms indicating this was a force equipped as 
hoplites.429
The final advance was ‘at the run’ but not directly into combat with an enemy 
phalanx, indeed the enemy were emerging from tents, preparing horses, and 
generally preparing themselves for the day ahead. Xenophon records no specific 
details regarding Thrasybulus’ role during the charge, beyond stating that he chose 
the moment to attack; however it was presumably also Thrasybulus’ decision to 
begin the engagement ‘at the run’, just as it had been his decision to set up the 
ambush and to undertake a risky night march.430 The engagement appears to have 
been highly professional and well planned; it cannot have been easy to get a mix of 
mercenaries, foreigners, and Athenian citizen-hoplites, to ground their arms while so 
close to the enemy, even harder to restrain them until the right moment to attack, 
however Thrasybulus appears to have had the personality and experience to ensure 
that the element of surprise was not lost. His role during the actual advance is
427 On whom see Ste Croix (1981) 605; Krentz (1982); Hammond (1986) 464; Cartledge (1987) 367; 
Kagan (1987) 115; Homblower (1994) 76; Seager (1994) 114; Buck (1998) Reception has generally 
been negative, although Buck’s monograph presents him in a very good light.
428 Xenophon Hellenica 2.4.4-5. Diodorus 14.32.6-33.1 does not accord well with Xenophon’s 
account, Buck (1998) 75 suggests it is based on Ephorus, not the Hellenica Oxyrhynchus, and so 
should be ignored.
429 Xenophon Hellenica 2.4.5-6.
430 Xenophon obviously approved of such tactics: Krentz (1995) 141.
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invisible, but the decision of when to attack, to emphasise speed and surprise over 
formation, and the ability to approach undetected indicates Thrasybulus held a 
significant advantage in intelligence gathering and scouting ability; his decision to 
advance ‘at the run’ was a sound tactical response to the disposition of the enemy.431 
The composition of Thrasybulus’ force may also have contributed to his tactics; 
while the 700 men may have been equipped as hoplites they appear to have been 
something of a mixed force, with some being Athenians, others mercenaries, and 
others unpaid foreigners.432 Numbers were, therefore, rather limited, and there is no 
suggestion that an organised force of light infantry or cavalry was present, hence 
Thrasybulus was unable to set ambushes behind the enemy as Demosthenes did in 
426, or to engage the enemy with a mixed force in the manner that Aeneas Tacticus 
suggests.433 As such Thrasybulus’ decision to advance ‘at the run’ was also a sound 
tactic given the limitations of his force; it may well have been a case of ‘going all 
in’, but it was the right choice.
Two examples of phalanxes advancing ‘at the run’ can be found in 
Xenophon’s Anabasis: at 1.2.17-18 the mercenaries are deployed in formation to 
allow the Cilician queen to review Cyrus’ army. The Greeks formed up 4 deep and, 
at a trumpet signal, charged, finally breaking into a run on their own accord.434 As 
this was an army review rather than an actual battle there was no enemy force 
present, and so no pressing need for the Greeks to remain a tight formation, perhaps 
explaining their depth of 4, rather than the standard 8 or 12. The sight of the
431 Aeneas Tacticus would have strongly approved of this engagement: See chapter 4.
432 Krentz (1982) 83, (1995) 141 suggests there were slightly over 100 Athenian hoplites out of a total 
force of 700, based on a remark by Aeschines that 1,000 drachmas divided between those who were 
besieged at Phyle resulted in each man receiving less than 10 drachmas. Buck (1998) 75 does not 
approve, but offers no alternative numbers.
433 See chapter 4.
434 Xenophon Anabasis 1.2.16-18.
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advancing phalanx struck such fear into the barbarians and the Cilician queen that 
they fled, much to the Greek’s amusement.435 The advance of the Greeks at the later 
battle of Cunaxa struck a similar chord of fear into the opposing Persians:
WS 5£ TTOp£uo|jevwv e^EKupaive ti Tffc cpaAayYO ,^ to  uttoAeittoijevov np^aio Spopq) 
0eTv: Kai apa E(p0EY a^vTO TTavTEq olov tu) ’EvuaAiip eAeAi^ouoi, Kai ttovtes 5e e0eov. 
Aeyouoi 5e TivEg &<; Kai TaT<; aau ia i npog to  S op aia  EdouTrnaav <po|3ov ttoioOvte<; toi£ 
ittttoi^. TTpiv 5e TO^Eupa E i^KVEiaOai ekkAivouoiv oi pappapoi Kai (pEuyouai. Kai 
EVTaO0a 5ri eSi'wkov pev koto Kpaiog oi "EAAnvEg, ePowv 5e aAAr|Aoi  ^ pr) 0eiv Spopip, 
aAA’ ev Ta^ Ei ETT£a0ai.
“And when, as they proceeded, a part of the phalanx billowed out, those who 
were thus left behind began to run; at the same moment they all set up the 
sort of war-cry which they raise to Enyalius, and all alike began running. It is 
also reported that some of them clashed their shields against their spears, 
thereby frightening the enemy's horses. And before an arrow reached them, 
the barbarians broke and fled. Thereupon the Greeks pursued with all their 
might, but shouted meanwhile to one another not to run at a headlong pace, 
but to keep their ranks in the pursuit.”436
The charge was ‘at the run’ but not directly into combat; indeed Xenophon’s 
account, when taken with the earlier incident, indicates that the Greeks were aware 
of the impact their loud and rapid advance would have on their opponents, while also 
ensuring that they would be minimally exposed to missiles should the Persians have 
stood their ground, while Xenophon’s reporting of the mercenaries’ concern for the 
maintenance of formation indicates they were aware of the difficulties they would 
experience should they reach combat with disrupted ranks.437 The charges may thus 
have been a response to the deployment and equipment of the Greek’s immediate 
opposition, rather than a reflection of doctrine, and indicate some degree of pre­
battle planning. While there is little in Xenophon’s accounts that indicates the 
presence or influence of a general during the charge, the incidents are useful in
435 Xenophon Anabasis 1.2.17
436 Xenophon A nabasis 1.8.17-18.
437 Xenophon Anabasis 1.8.19-20; also at 1.10.11-12. C.f. Aristotle Politics 1297b.
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highlighting the tactical possibilities of this phase of battle, as well as the 
importance, and presence, of battlefield communication.
Similar tactics to those used by Thrasybulus, discissed above, were used by a 
mixed Phliasian and mercenary force in 366. The engagement was not a pitched 
battle, but was a surprise attack upon a force of Sicyonians who were fortifying the 
area; indeed Xenophon points out that there were more Sicyonian builders than 
hoplites present, so it is little surprise that the attack by Philasian cavalry and 
infantry, supported by the Athenian general Chares’ mercenaries, was successful.438 
The advance of this mixed force was rapid, with Xenophon stating that
TeAog 5 e oi pev im reis koto Kpaiog nAauvov, oi 5e ue^oi koto Kpcrro<; e0 eov dig 
5uvcrr6v ev tci^ ei
“...finally, the horsemen were riding at the top of their speed and the foot- 
soldiers were running as fast as it is possible for men in line to do.”439
While Xenophon uses TTE^oi here rather than OTTAhng, the reference to Tti s^ and his
earlier mention of Phliasian hoplites being present indicates that hoplites are being 
referred to here.440 The run was not directly into combat, but was a tactical advance 
designed to catch the enemy off guard while ensuring that cohesion was maintained 
should a battle ensue; the enemy were caught preparing dinner, bathing and making 
their beds, and fled in terror.441
438 Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.1, 21.
439 Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.22 (trans Brownson.)
440 Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.21.
441 Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.22.
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Although a 200 yard advance 'at the run1 directly into combat was not the 
standard case for hoplite battles, there was a scenario in which such a charge would 
be possible, and indeed useful. This is when such an action would limit the phalanx's 
exposure to missiles; by advancing as quickly as possible the window of opportunity 
for missiles to damage the phalanx would be reduced, as would the chances of 
inflicting damage due to the rapidly advancing formation. In such a situation the 
need to get to grips with the enemy quickly became more important than the 
maintenance of formation; the need for cohesion was doubly reduced due to the 
lightly-armed nature of the soldiers being charged. According to Xenophon:
auv  [jev yap  aM fl SuvapEi paAa eotiv £v0a iaxupw q wcpsAoOai acp£v5ovf|Tai 
napovTEs, auToi 6 e ko0 ’ outou^ o u 5 ’ av  oi navTE^ acpEvSovryrai [JEivEiav u a v u  
oAiyouq 6 (j 6 oe iovras au v  ottAoi^ aYXEMdx01 -^
"For in conjunction with other forces there are occasions when the presence 
of slingers is of very effective assistance, but by themselves alone not all the 
slingers in the world could stand against a very few men who came into a 
hand-to-hand encounter with them with weapons suitable for close 
combat."442
Xenophon's exaggeration makes his point all the stronger: although ranged troops 
could inflict damage from a distance, they were less useful once that distance had 
been fully closed. Such a charge could also unsettle the missile troops and perhaps 
even cause them to panic, especially if they themselves were the target of the charge. 
Spartan forces in particular appear to have been trained to deal with the attacks of 
light infantry by running from the phalanx in an attempt to scare off or cut them 
down. The various examples of this technique being used all demonstrate that 
generals were capable of issuing orders mid-engagement; indeed their orders were 
being given and transmitted while the phalanx was under direct attack from missiles
442 Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.4.15 (trans Miller.)
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and, on other occasions, while under threat of attack by an intact enemy phalanx at 
the same time. The orders are not being given before the engagement itself, although 
some degree of preparation seems likely; rather the sending out of specific year 
classes to deal with specific situations suggests that generals were able to have their 
commands heard and understood, and that hoplites were able to run and operate as 
individuals or small groups when required.
The battle of Coronea: Two different types of advance
The battle of Coronea is of great interest in determining the ability of 
generals to influence the first phase of combat, and the nature of the advance itself. 
There does appear to have been a charge ‘at the run’ once the opposing phalanxes 
were close to each other, culminating in a head-on collision, as well as a second 
advance into combat which was not made ‘at the run.’ The two can be treated as 
separate engagements, of the first clash Xenophon states:
(juviovtujv 5e T£wg p£v oiyri TToAAr) cut’ d|j(poTEpujv rjv: nvika 5 ’ otteTxov dAApAwv 
o a o v  crraSiov, aAaAa^avTEg oi ©nPcuoi 5popip ojjooe £(p£povTO.
“Now as the opposing armies were coming together, there was deep silence 
for a time in both lines; but when they were distant from one another about a 
stadium, the Thebans raised the war cry and rushed to close quarters at the 
run.”443
The Theban advance ‘at the run’ is only the second unambiguous reference to 
a hoplite force in a pitched battle undertaking such an action. It is also puzzling 
considering the Theban advance at Delium, which was not ‘at the run’, and the
443 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.17.
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Theban advances at Leuctra and Mantinea in 362, which were also not ‘at the run.’444 
Regardless of the reasoning behind this advance ‘at the run’, the evidence of earlier 
and later battles, and the second clash of Coronea itself, suggests it was undertaken 
for a specific reason, not that such a charge was standard practice.
The right flanks of both armies were victorious during the first engagement 
of Coronea, however neither army seems to have been aware of the defeat of their 
left flank, with the Thebans continuing their advance to the Spartan baggage train, 
and Agesilaus being garlanded in the field. The two phalanxes wheeled and met each 
other head-on in the second engagement, in what Hanson regarded as “Perhaps the 
most notorious case...” of two phalanxes crashing together at speed.445 Xenophon 
himself stated that Coronea was a battle like no other of his time; I would suggest, 
with Wheeler, that the reason for the uniqueness of this engagement was the fact that 
there does seem to have been a deliberate head-to-head collision between two 
phalanxes, neither of which attempted to outflank or otherwise seek an advantage 446 
But even in this second clash there is no specific detail regarding a charge ‘at the 
run’, Xenophon simply states that Agesilaus’ phalanx
aAA’ avTijjETWTTO^ cruveppa^E ToTq © npai'ois
“.. .crashed against the Thebans front to front.”447
444 Thucydides 4.96; Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.4-7, 7.5.19-23; Plutarch Pelopidas 20.
445 Hanson (2000a) 157.
446 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.16, Agesilaus 2. Wheeler (2007a) 209. Pelopidas, in command of the 
Sacred Band, fought his way directly through a Spartan phalanx at the battle of Tegya, so the Thebans 
fighting their way through the Spartans at Coronea cannot be what moved Xenophon to consider the 
engagement ‘unique.’ Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.23-5.
447 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.19 (trans Brownson.)
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If the Theban advance ‘at the run’ in the initial battle was an attempt to gain a 
tactical advantage then it suggests a battlefield decision, since such an action could 
not be undertaken before knowing the exact disposition of the enemy line.448 
Equally, Xenophon’s remark, and implied criticism, that, in the second clash, 
Agesilaus did not have to engage the Thebans in a frontal attack but could have 
simply let the Theban phalanx pass, suggests that Agesilaus had the ability to direct 
and manoeuvre his phalanx mid-charge, but decided against doing so.449 Xenophon 
was an experienced hoplite and general who was present on the day; his observation 
that Agesilaus could have taken a ‘safer course’ but chose to face the Thebans head 
on emphasises not only Xenophon’s admiration for Agesilaus, but also indicates 
what Xenophon may have considered the more ‘usual’ tactic given the situation: 
allowing the enemy to pass and then striking them in the side or the rear.450 The 
second phase of the battle may also have influenced Epaminondas and Pelopidas’ 
tactics at the battle of Leuctra; a massed attack, with deep ranks, directly against the 
position of the enemy general, a tactic that surely suggests the perceived importance 
of the general on the field as more than a figurehead for morale. This was partially 
successful at Coronea, with Agesilaus being wounded and carried from the phalanx, 
and some Thebans breaking through the Spartan line to Mount Helicon; it was to 
prove much more successful at Leuctra.451
448 As at the battle of Mantinea: see above.
449 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.19. Cartledge (1987) 221 suggests this was down to Agesilaus’ hatred of 
the Thebans, rather than a calculated decision. While the direct engagement was dangerous, despite 
the superior Spartan numbers, it did make sense; if  Agesilaus could complete his victory by 
destroying the Thebans, whose Argive allies were watching from Helicon, then Theban power and 
influence would have been even further reduced. Lazenby (1985) 146.
450 Cartledge (1987) 221; Hutchinson (2000) 155.
451 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.20. Although the Thebans did take casualties; 600, according to Diodorus 
14.84. Lazenby (1985) 146. Plutarch Agesilaus 18.3-4 claims the Spartans opened their phalanx to let 
the Thebans through, but also claims they then struck the Thebans in the flank, with Frontinus 
Strategemata 2.6.6 and Polyaenus 2.1.19 stating that the Spartans then struck the Thebans in the rear. 
This is the opposite of what Xenophon, who was present at the battle, states the Spartans did; his 
account is surely to be preferred.
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The battle of Coronea was unlike any other of Xenophon’s time not because 
of the eerie silence he reports, but because it covered the whole gamut of hoplite 
tactics during the advance: phalanxes ran to gain position, charged to frighten 
enemies off, outflanked each other, and, remarkably, marched head-on into a second, 
and final, clash.452 The breadth of tactics used highlights the ability of generals to 
respond to immediate tactical circumstances and to adjust the nature of their advance 
accordingly.
Conclusions
There are three main types of advance in the battle descriptions of Herodotus, 
Thucydides, and Xenophon: firstly rapid charges over the final 200 or so yards, 
sometimes ‘at the run’ as part of an attempt to either launch a surprise attack or 
exploit circumstances to tactical advantage. These charges could bring about a 
decisive advantage if they were undertaken at the appropriate time and in good order. 
However, if they were attempted during a ‘pitched battle’ then only part of the 
phalanx, or a specialised group, did so. The second type of charge was also ‘at the 
run’, being a response to the attacks of light infantry; Spartan hoplites were able to 
catch and kill skirmishing peltasts, but were not always successful, while the 
predictability of this response could be used to bait hoplites into an ambush. Finally 
there is the ‘standard’ charge, more properly referred to as an ‘advance’, which 
appears to have been relatively slow and measured. There is no indication that any of
452 Cawkwell (1979) 204 stresses the fighting of two separate battles as the reason for this remark. 
Cartledge (1987) 220; Schwartz (2009) 249 suggests the ‘unlike any other in my time’ remark is due 
to the “...unnatural silence from the hoplites on both sides.” However Xenophon also reports that the 
Thebans raised the war cry when they began their advance; the battlefield cannot have been eerily 
silent throughout the entire engagement!
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the battles discussed above involved two phalanxes advancing ‘at the run’ at each 
other; this points towards a more complicated and controlled opening phase of battle 
than is commonly accepted. Alongside this controlled opening of battle is the 
evidence for the ability of generals to do more than aim their phalanx like a missile 
and hope for the best; it is to be admitted that much of this evidence is lateral or 
inferred, but it is not ex silentio, and the evidence suggests that hoplites could be 
directed during the advance to battle, with such direction ranging from large-scale 
attempts to extend the line to smaller, but still vital, attempts to exploit local 
circumstances to tactical advantage.
There was no driving necessity for hoplite forces to charge into combat; there 
was no rule, written or otherwise, that dictated that the only response open to a 
phalanx was that of acceptance, and rapid advance into, combat. Indeed the evidence 
suggests that quite the opposite occurred, with the unique circumstances of each 
individual battle determining if and how a charge was begun; in some cases 
phalanxes preferred to maintain their position on advantageous ground in the hope 
that the enemy was unaware of the strength of their position, inexperienced, or 
simply over-confident. This much is suggested by Thucydides’ report of the 
encounter between the Peloponnesian and Boeotian forces on the day before the 
battle of Mantinea in 418BC, where the Argive phalanx maintained its elevated 
position, while Agis retained the ability to command his phalanx, even when the 
enemy was within javelin range.453 Not all armies will have possessed this ability, 
equally not all armies will have had the discipline to even maintain their formation
453 Thucydides 5.65.
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during the advance into combat; the Argive phalanx defeated at the battle of Miletus 
serves as a brutal demonstration of the consequences that could result from a careless 
and rash advance into combat.454 The ancient material makes it clear that generals 
were able to influence the advance, with the only limiting factor being their own 
imagination: generals ordered extensions of their line, ordered unexpected and 
sudden advances, and were expected to engineer an advantage before leading the 
phalanx into battle; so ingrained was this to the Greek psyche that Xenophon was 
able to write critically of a time when a general, a Spartan general no less, chose 
direct and head-on confrontation, rather than attempting to manoeuvre to ensure his 
forces held an advantage.455
There are other, practical, reasons why the advance to combat was not 
undertaken ‘at the run’ as a matter of course. Most important is the impact this would 
have on the integrity of the phalanx formation; as the phalanx charged different 
sections of the line, which were made up of men of differing fitness and motivation, 
would encounter different terrain, with the result being that the phalanx would enter 
combat as a disorganized mob, rather than a recognizable formation. Xenophon 
makes the concern of the 10,000 to maintain their formation while advancing at 
speed obvious.456 I do not mean to suggest that any attack on the run, no matter how 
far the distance charged, was always fatal to a phalanx’s cohesion, rather that the 
disadvantages to be gained from a running charge over the final 200 yards directly 
into combat outweighed the advantages. An advance ‘at the run’ would also have 
unfortunate effects for the rear rank when the nature of the spear is considered; the
454 Thucydides 8.25 -  The Argives advanced in disorder, believing that the Ionian Milesians they 
faced would not withstand their attack. They were defeated with the loss of 300 men.
455 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.19.
456 Xenophon Anabasis 1.8.19.
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presence of the butt-spike would be a serious threat if the phalanx came to an abrupt 
halt after crashing into an enemy formation. Finally there was no need for a lengthy 
run-up in order to generate momentum for an initial spear-strike.
Most telling of all against an advance ‘at the run’ into combat is that we are 
told, by Thucydides, that Spartan armies did not usually do so, and while this may 
indicate that other, less professional armies, did do so, this is not supported by the 
surviving evidence. Indeed there are relatively few surviving examples of a battle 
between phalanxes beginning with an advance into combat ‘at the run’, and even in 
these cases only one of the armies present did so; an indication of either a loss of 
control by the general, or a deliberate ploy or tactic appropriate to the 
circumstances.457 While other examples of phalanxes or special units advancing ‘at 
the run’ exist, these indicate rapid manoeuvres designed to take advantage of 
changing tactical situations or to chase down attacking light infantry, rather than 
attempts to literally smash through an intact enemy formation. Examples from the 
Persian Wars, that of Marathon in particular, belong to this category of advance: 
while the advance at Marathon may have been ‘at the run’ directly into combat, this 
was a deliberate tactical decision, a response to knowledge of the Persian strength in 
archers and cavalry.458 An advance ‘at the run’ was the logical and most tactically 
appropriate opening to this particular engagement; that few hoplite battles begin in 
this manner indicates that there were tactical and practical reasons not to do so. The 
phalanx was an inexorable, grinding formation, not one which was suited to crazed
457 Athenians run at Marathon: Herodotus 6.112. Athenians run at Delium: Thucydides 4.96. Thebans 
run at Coroneia: Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.17. Other examples of hoplites running in battle refer to 
attempts to chase down attacking light infantry, e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 4.15-17.
458 Krentz (2010) 137-143.
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charges and rushes into combat; its purpose was to maximise individual protection 
through cohesion and teamwork, two qualities that would be lost if a charge ‘at the 
run’ directly into combat was made.
A charge ‘at the run’ over some 200 yards by opposing phalanxes directly 
into combat may seem more exciting and evocative than a tentative advance into 
combat, but the surviving evidence demonstrates that the maintenance of formation 
and discipline offered greater advantages to a phalanx than any advantage that could 
come about through a charge ‘at the run’; the (small) additional power that such a 
charge would give to spear-thrusts was more than offset by the corresponding loss of 
formation. The nature of the charge depended on the immediate battlefield 
conditions, the number and quality of troops present, and the ability or desire of the 
general to manoeuvre; practical considerations dictated whether a charge was 
undertaken, and if so whether it was ‘at the run’ and into combat or an attempt to 
gain a tactical advantage. There is a clear role for the general here; whether it be in 
attempting grand-scale manoeuvres while advancing and in close proximity to the 
enemy, leading formations in an attempt to ambush the enemy or otherwise ‘steal a 
march’, or, conversely, in deciding not to advance while occupying advantageous 
terrain. Generals could also restrain overly enthusiastic hoplites, react to new 
information as it became available, and dictate the direction, speed, time, and 
purpose of the advance, all actions which indicate the level of control that could be 
found in both amateur and professional forces. The general could influence the 
advance into combat in many ways. He was not reduced to the position of a helpless 
observer, carried along in a sea of running men, desperately hoping that his spear 
would find the enemy while theirs would miss, but remained capable of command
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and control throughout the advance.
Section B: Fighting
The second recognisable phase of a hoplite battle, and the point at which 
various scholars declare the general’s role to have ended, is that of the actual 
fighting, first at the outer range of spears and then gradually into extreme close 
combat as the distance between phalanxes was reduced. This chapter will focus 
specifically on the battlefield environment in which generals operated, and shall 
attempt to discover whether this environment was conducive to the continued 
exercise of command and control, specifically: did this phase mark the breakdown of 
the ability of generals to influence battle? I shall argue that hoplite battle was fluid 
and chaotic, and will develop the argument, started in the previous chapter, that the 
phalanx was a more flexible formation than has previously been claimed. This point 
has a direct impact on our overall conception of the influence that generals were able 
to exert during battle. If the phalanx was so tightly packed that shields were 
communal pieces of equipment, and individuals were unable to move relatively 
freely, then the possibility for generals or subordinate commanders to exert any 
influence on the course of events would have been minimal; however, if the phalanx 
was not so tightly packed then the possibility remained. Thus, while the title of this 
chapter is ‘Fighting’, the focus is on the broader mechanics of battle, which are 
studied not in order to demonstrate the existence of a definitive fighting system, but 
to highlight the potential for continued and intelligent intervention by generals and 
subordinate commanders, and to shed light on the battlefield environment as a 
whole. This will allow the development of a context in which to place the battlefield 
role of the general, a context that will be completed at the end of the next chapter, 
which deals with othismos, the famous ‘push’ of hoplite battle.
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There are no detailed accounts of exactly what occurred in any given clash 
between phalanxes, despite the authors of some of our most reliable literary sources 
having served as generals and fought as hoplites and cavalrymen. Our sources did 
not feel the need to give details for an experience they assumed their audience would 
be familiar with, were themselves uninterested in the technical details of battles, or 
did not think it was possible to give an account of ‘everyday’ warfare.459 However, 
the patchwork that can be created from aggregating the scattered and partial 
surviving source material regarding hoplite engagements heavily implies ‘loose’ 
ranks and the ability of generals, and other individuals, to influence the course of 
battle 460 Many battle reports and anecdotes indicate that at least part of a phalanx 
remained under direct control during battle, for example many small units prove 
themselves highly flexible, generals initiate surprise attacks mid-battle461 and were 
regarded as important targets 462 This indicaties the use of advanced signals or the 
presence of the general outside the phalanx itself, and is a recognition of the 
importance of the general himself. This suggests that an image of the hoplite general 
as an individual whose job was finished once the phalanx had begun to advance is 
too simplistic, and the following discussion will investigate the scope and range of 
battlefield command. Individuals are also carried from the ranks, indicative of local- 
scale organization and control; while the response could have been a ‘standard’ and 
trained response, it would still require a co-ordinator or leader, such as a subordinate 
commander, to take charge.463
459 Homblower (2008) 474-5.
460 Wheeler (1991) 145-50.
461 E.g. Thucydides 4.96.
462 E.g. Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13;Polyaenus 3.9.22; Plutarch Pelopidas 2.
463 For the importance of signals, organization on a strategic scale, and small units see chapter 4.
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Generals influencing battle
I begin with an analysis of the various examples of generals directly 
influencing combat on a level above their personal physical intervention; these 
examples are relatively rare and are scattered throughout the historical sources, 
however they cast a great deal of light on the flexibility of the phalanx, and the 
ability of generals, and individuals, to exert their influence during a battle. The 
Spartan King Leonidas demonstrated an impressive level of control over his phalanx 
at the battle of Thermopylae, and made good use of the flexibility of the phalanx as a 
whole. The small size and elite status of Leonidas’ force was unusual and we must 
not generalise from the engagement; I include it as an example of what generals 
could achieve with well trained and organised hoplites.
Leonidas’ tactics relied upon the ability of his phalanx to feign retreat in the 
face of Persian infantry attack, inviting a rapid and chaotic pursuit.464 The Persians 
were cut down in large numbers when the Spartan phalanx, presumably at Leonidas’ 
command, turned, rallied, and began to fight. This is surely an indication that their 
ranks were relatively loose. Trained troops in an intact formation were now fighting 
untrained troops who had lost their formation, a brilliant example of how intelligent 
use of tactics, terrain, and timing could be just as influential as superiority in 
numbers or equipment.465
464 Herodotus 7.211. Discussed above.
465 Although Herodotus makes it clear that the Greeks also held the advantage in equipment: 
Herodotus 7.211. Green (1998) 135; Bradford (1980) 124-130 (for the suggestion that the other Greek 
contingents were commanded by Spartan officers); Hignett (1963) 142-4; Grundy (1901) 297-8; van 
Wees (2004) 180-1.
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Although the various battles of the Persian wars have some value for 
determining the true density of phalanxes, they only show that a phalanx could find 
an advantage against light infantry by adopting a relatively loose formation. To 
establish whether this formation could be successfully adopted against opposing 
heavy infantry requires the battles of the Peloponnesian and Corinthian wars to be 
analysed.
Thucydides’ account of the battle of Delium contains a brief, but vital, 
description of how the Boeotian general Pagondas was able to influence battle during 
the fighting phase: Pagondas was aware of the danger posed by the defeat of his left 
flank and sent two squadrons of cavalry to its aid. The decision to send this aid 
appears to have been made mid-battle, suggesting that Pagondas was somehow 
informed, or could himself see, the plight of the left wing, and that he was able to 
issue orders to send aid, orders which were communicated quickly enough to have 
the desired effect. This effect was to cause panic in the previously victorious 
Athenian right wing, which imagined the cavalry indicated the presence of another 
army. The Athenian left was unable to resist the concentration of numbers to the 
front, cavalry to the flank, and fleeing troops to the side, and also broke.466 
Pagondas’ army was much larger and not as well trained as Leonidas’ at 
Thermopylae and while he was unable to engage in the technically difficult 
manoeuvring that Leonidas commanded, he was able to influence battle on a broader 
scale. The decision to order the cavalry strike was ‘pure’ generalship, devoid of 
physical presence, and that it was done by an amateur, non-Spartan, general lends it 
great weight when we consider the ability of other generals to influence battle:
466 Thucydides 4.96.
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Spartan generals were not the only ones able to react to changing circumstances 
during battle!
Generals were able to influence battles, but in larger battles their personal 
influence, i.e. their ability to physically direct troops around them, was reduced due 
to the increased ratio of hoplites to generals. One way the Greeks attempted to 
ensure command was still spread throughout the ranks was by way of subordinate 
commanders, discussed in chapter 3, and another was to adopt a system of multiple 
generals. At the battle of Marathon all ten Athenian generals were present, a system 
which may have been responsible for the ability of the wings to return to the aid of 
the centre, although Herodotus also used it to explain the Athenian delay in engaging 
the Persian force. A multiplicity of generals could, therefore, have positive and 
negative implications for armies; Thucydides’ account of the battle of Syracuse 
implies he was aware of the danger of having too many generals on the battlefield: 
after an extended period of hand to hand fighting the Syracusans were driven from 
the field and forced to retreat.467 Thucydides gives no clue as to how the Athenians 
and their allies were victorious, although he does note that they were surprised at the 
extent of the Syracusan resistance.468
Greek generals were able to order small formations to advance and retreat 
and give orders to squadrons of cavalry mid-battle, and on those occasionas when 
they led from the front ranks in the right wing this was not necessarily to provide an 
inspiration to their men, but because they were thus placed to direct the thrust of the
467 See above, chapter 2.
468 Thucydides 6.70.
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best hoplites in the phalanx. There was also recognition that it was possible for ‘too 
many cooks to spoil the broth’: if a multitude Greek generals could influence battle 
too much then surely this suggests that individual generals were able to do so as 
well, and that there was a recognition of the concept of a ‘balanced command’, one 
which had enough generals and subordinate commanders, without there being too 
many ‘ultimate’ sources of orders.
The case for the ability of generals to in influence battle can be further 
strengthened by examining the nature of the phalanx formation as a whole, in order 
to examine whether it was a formation which required a tight or a loose order to be 
effective. The following discussion of the amount of space available to individuals in 
the phalanx has a vital bearing on the battlefield role of the general; if the phalanx 
was a very tight formation, with individuals having barely a shield’s width between 
them, then there can have been little scope for the exercise of command functions 
during a battle, with the general having little option but to remain in place 
throughout the fighting. If an intensely close order was essential to the nature of the 
phalanx then it is difficult to see how weapons could be used to any great effect, 
while a much looser order would make us expect a greater emphasis on individual 
weapons training and skill in the sources.469
469 Although the sources do indicate that generals recognised the need for fit and strong individuals, 
see e.g. Thucydides 1.84; Plato Republic 566C-D; Xenophon Hellenica 3.4.16; Plutarch Moralia 
192C-D.
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Room for command in the phalanx
In one of the most recent attempts to describe what happened when two 
phalanxes met, Schwartz argued that a closely-ordered formation is the most 
realistic.470 However, in a summary of his position Schwartz revealed his thoughts 
regarding a looser order, and demonstrates the false dichotomy that has formed part 
of the ‘orthodox’ argument for many years, namely that if battle was not in close 
order, then it was a free flowing series of duels:
“It is unrealistic to assume that hoplites were at any point free to move about 
as they saw fit on the battlefield: not only the weight of armour and weapons, 
but also the incredible awkwardness of it, ensured that hoplite battles were 
not enacted as series of loosely connected duels.”471
To my knowledge no scholar has clearly and plainly argued that hoplites in 
Classical Greece were ‘free to move about’ the battlefield fighting a series of duels. 
Some have questioned the density of the phalanx and suggested a rather looser 
structure than typically recognized, but none has gone so far as to propose that 
hoplite warfare was an affair of individual combats.472 Indeed the general approach 
has been to emphasise the practical nature of the hoplite and his equipment, largely 
based around the question that if an individual did not have the room to wield his 
weapons, then why did he carry them at all? The carrying of specific equipment 
presupposes the existence of a battlefield environment appropriate for its use, and the 
surviving evidence makes it clear that hoplites in phalanx formation had the space 
needed to wield their equipment.
470 Schwartz (2009) 98.
471 Schwartz (2009) 98.
472 E.g. Cartledge (1977) 13; Krentz (1985) 50-5; Cawkwell (1989) 377-383; van Wees (2004) 185- 
92.
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The orthodox commentators do not offer a definite figure for the amount of 
space available to individuals in the front ranks of a phalanx, but it is clear that they 
view the front ranks as being tightly packed, in both rank and file, out of a need to 
maximise the defensive qualities of the hoplite shield, in order to generate pressure 
and momentum for othismos, and because generals could do little more than organise 
their phalanx and hope for the best.473 This is also indicated by a modem emphasis 
on the supposed inability of hoplites to engage in single combat, which increases the 
reliance on tight ranks as hoplites were apparently unable to operate as individuals, 
and their insistence on the impracticality of the Thessalian trick, a technique 
designed to unbalance the enemy by taking a half-step backwards.474 This technique 
is deemed to have been impossible because there would have been too much 
physical pressure from the rear ranks to allow a half-step back to occur. None of 
these points stand up to scrutiny, and it will be shown that hoplite equipment was as 
suited to single combat as any other equipment, while there was space in the front 
ranks for, amongst other things, stepping backwards and carrying individuals from 
the fighting.475 I begin with a brief discussion of the scholarship regarding loose 
ranks, and move onto an analysis of the relevant ancient evidence in the hope of 
demonstrating that it was possible for generals to influence hoplite battle as ranks 
were not so tightly packed as to render it impossible.
In 1985 Krentz pointed out that “...fighting requires room to fake, to dodge, 
to sidestep, to wrong-foot the opponent by stepping backwards as he delivers his
473 See, e.g. Hanson (2000a) 116-7.
474 Discussed below.
475 See, e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.33; 6.4.13.
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blow or thrust.”476 Fighting is not a static affair, movement requires room, therefore 
room must exist in which to move. Krentz proposed that a sensible upper limit for 
this room could be determined by examining how close individual hoplites would 
need to be to render assistance to each other if necessary. This space could be 
determined by the length of a spear, possibly with a single step added to it, thus the 
space between individual files would ideally not be greater than around seven feet, 
with Krentz settling on a “...comfortable limit...” of about six feet per man.477 If we 
take into account the need for the spear to be held and wielded in a balanced manner, 
only around half of the spear would actually project in front of the wielder, thus an 
appropriate distance for “...within a spear’s thrust...” would amount to around four 
to five feet.478
Goldsworthy believes that a stronger case can be made for a space of around 
three feet; such a formation would ensure that the phalanx would remain intact 
during the advance to battle as individuals would be unable to flinch at the last 
minute or seek to avoid combat.479 Van Wees based his approach to the problem on 
the practical implications of carrying weapons, interpreting Thucydides 5.71 thus: 
“...clearly what he meant by ‘as near as possible’ depends on how much room 
hoplites needed to wield their weapons effectively.”480 Van Wees’ approach 
accounts for the equipment carried by hoplites, the effective use of that equipment, 
and the human desire not to be isolated in times of stress, while also remaining 
flexible enough to be acceptable given the ever-changing nature of hoplite battle.
476 Krentz (1985) 51-2.
477 Krentz (1985) 54.
478 Krentz (1985) 54; Schwartz (2009) 159.
479 Goldsworthy (1997) 17.
480 van Wees (2004) 185.
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Indeed, the exact distance between hoplites in all formations and battles is an 
impossible figure to discover and to attempt to do so is to assume not only that all
481hoplites were the same but that the nature of hoplite battle was constant. However, 
by examining a number of incidents which demonstrate the relative density of the 
phalanx we can arrive at a range for the distance between hoplites in combat, and if 
this range indicates a loose order then the possibility for generals and subordinate 
commanders to influence battle was strong.
The tacticians Asclepiodotus, Arrian and Aelian offer some information 
regarding this range, but their evidence is late and probably refers to the Macedonian 
phalanx of the third to the second centuries B.C., a different formation from both the
489Classical Greek phalanx and the Macedonian phalanx of Philip and Alexander. 
However, some of their information is of use, especially the suggestion that six feet 
between files was the natural (marching?) order, while a tightening of files to three 
feet was necessary for offensive action, and a further tightening to one and a half feet 
was used for stationary defensive action.483 These figures serve as useful indicators 
as to what were regarded as the upper and lower limits for file distances in the late 
Hellenistic and Roman tacticians’ time. However, they cannot be reliably applied to 
hoplite battle; the tacticians are simply too removed from the time of the Classical 
hoplite phalanx for their evidence to be relied upon. Two incidents regarding unique 
and professional forces survive which give some indication regarding the loose 
nature of phalanxes: at the battle of Cunaxa the 10,000 were able to open gaps in
481A point recognised by Wheeler (2007a) 190; 202.
482 Asclepiodotus 4.1-3; Arrian Tactica 11.1-6; Aelian Tactica 11.1-5; Cawkwell (1989) 381; van Wees 
(2004) 185-6 (N.7); Wheeler (2007a) 208; Schwartz (2009) 157-8
483 Polybius 12.1.7. Goldsworthy (1997) 14-16.
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their ranks to allow Persian chariots to pass harmlessly through.484 If there was 
enough room in a phalanx to allow charging chariots to be avoided then there was 
surely enough room to engage with weapons, display conspicuous bravery, and Use 
techniques such as the Thessalian trick. Similarly at the battle of Gaugamela the 
Macedonian phalanx was able to open gaps when faced with scythed chariots; the 
example is even stronger than that of the 10,000 as scythed chariots would 
presumably need a wider gap to be created. Equally the Macedonian phalanx was 
well known for its densely packed ranks, and if there was room enough for 
Macedonian phalangites to step aside, then we can assume there was enough room in 
a Classical Greek phalanx for hoplites to perform a similar manoeuver. If this was 
the case then, in these formations, there was room for men to move sideways, indeed 
there would have to have been more than a man’s width if room for a chariot to pass 
was to be made. The incidents also indicate these formations had a level of command 
and control that allowed specific sections of the phalanx to recognise incoming 
chariots and respond accordingly; while the reaction of the troops have have been 
spontaneous, we can reasonably expect that the movements would have been 
facilitated by subordinate offices, especially given the number of such officers in a 
Spartan system of command 486
Xenophon’s account of the battle of Leuctra contains two valuable pieces of 
information regarding the ability of individuals to influence combat, the amount of 
space available to individuals in the front ranks, and the flexibility of the phalanx
484 Xenophon Anabasis 1.8.10,20. Note that we do not see purely amateur forces undertake such a 
manoeuvre, mainly because chariots were not found on the battlefields o f Greece. However the 
evidence suggests that well-trained hoplite forces would be able to undertake such a manoeuvre if 
necessary, especially as the same evidence also points to a loose formation.
485 Arrian Anabasis 3.13.5; Quintus Curtius Rufus 4.15.4; Bosworth, 2001, 82.
486 While the 10,000 was made up of Greeks from many states, the majority were Peloponnesians.
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formation: (i) the Spartan Cleonymus fell and recovered his footing three times 
before finally being killed, and (ii) the Spartan King Cleombrotus was fatally
Aonwounded in the initial fighting before being carried from the phalanx. Hanson is of 
the opinion that recoveries such as Cleonymus’ “...were probably rare and largely 
confined to the battle line at the front of the phalanx in the very few seconds 
following the collision...”488 Hanson prefers to believe that after the collision the 
opposing phalanxes were in such close proximity, and their ranks were so dense, that 
it was not possible to fall, let alone stand up. However Cleonymus fell three times, 
presumably not in a matter of seconds, and was able to not only regain his footing 
but do so without being trampled or immediately killed.489 The only way this 
anecdote makes sense is if there was enough room for Cleonymus to fall, or be 
physically knocked over, and, more importantly, be observed by other hoplites who 
could recognise him and subsequently tell friends, or Xenophon himself, what had 
happened to Cleonymus during the battle. Indeed, whether the incident actually 
occurred or not is not that important: Xenophon, an experienced general and hoplite, 
considered it plausible enough to include in the Hellenica, and this should be enough 
indication that it was possible for a hoplite to fall and recover his footing three times 
in a single battle.
The second piece of information is the ability of the Spartans to recover the 
wounded Cleombrotus during the course of the battle. Xenophon uses this to prove 
that the Spartans were initially winning the battle:
487 Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.33, 6.4.13.
488 Hanson (2000a) 175.
489 The incident is slightly suspicious: the ‘rule of three’ regarding exaggeration or comic effect may 
be in play, however Xenophon seems to have expected his audience to regard the incident as 
plausible, so I include it here.
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6 pwg 6 e 6)<; oi pev uepi to v  KAeopppoiov to  TTpunov EKpcuouv tq  pc*xn aacpET TOUTtp 
TEKpnpkp Yvoin ti^  av: ou ya p  av  e5 u vo vto  o u to v  aveAeoGai Kai ^cjvto  qtteveykeTv, ei 
pii oi TTpo auToO payopEvoi ETTEKpcrrouv ev ekeivu) tu i xpbvip.
Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in 
the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been 
able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were 
fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time.490
The recovery of Cleombrotus attests to the amount of space available to 
those in the front ranks: in a Spartan phalanx that was initially having the better of a 
fight there was enough integrity of command and room for ‘dead weight’ to be 
carried out and taken back through the rear ranks to safety.491 Clearly the Spartan 
hoplites had the space to step aside or assist in removing the King to safety, while 
also possessing the ability to secure the position around the fallen King against 
further attack. This is indicative of battlefield command and control by subordinates 
in a moment of crisis, indeed teamwork, discipline, and a rapid assumption of 
leadership would have been vital in order for this action to have been effective, with 
the Spartan system of subordinate command being largely responsible for this 492
Generals were capable of exercising influence over their commands during 
fighting. This influence was not always decisive, but the fact that it was occasionally 
responsible for victory, and was also as recognised as problematic if there were too 
many individuals capable of doing so, strongly suggests that command did not ‘break 
down’ during fighting by default. Further evidence for the possibility of command
490 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13.
491 Contra Hanson (2000a) 175: “Fully armed hoplites found it difficult to scoop up a fallen warrior, 
to much more than awkwardly sidestep his body.”
492 Discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
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can be found by analysing the evidence for the amount of space available to generals 
and hoplites in the front ranks of phalanxes.
The manoeuvre known as the ‘Thessalian trick’ is a strong indication that 
there was room enough to move in the phalanx, implying that the ranks were not so 
densely packed to prohibit generals, and other individuals, from exerting their 
influence. Thessaly as a region was not known for its hoplites in Classical Greece, 
and the lines from Euripides, where the trick is described, could indicate that it was a 
‘fancy’ or unusual technique, and by examining it here I do not mean to suggest it 
was a technique commonly found on the battlefield. Rather I examine the passage 
and its implications as it is frequently discussed by modem scholars who argue for 
tightly packed ranks and, usually, the inability of generals to influence battle; in this 
thesis I suggest both of these points are incorrect and so must engage with this 
passage.
KdpaKog bpcpoTv xElp’ dTTecnepriMevoiv. evGev 5e Kwuag apTTaaavre cpaayavwv 6g 
TauTOv f)KOv, auppaAovTE 5 ’ dom 'dag ttoAuv Tapay|j6v dptpipdvT’ e?xov paXHS- Kai 
m ug voriaag ’EteokAhc; to GEaaaAov EariyayEv adcpiap’ opiAig x 9 °v°S- E^aAAayEig 
y ap  toO TTap£<xru)Toq ttovou, Aaiov psv Eg toutticjGev apcpEpEi n o d a , TTpoaco to KoTAa 
yaoTpog EuAapoupEvog, Trpopdg 5 e kwAov Qe^iov Oi’ opcpaAoO koGhkev syxog 
a<pov5uAoig t’ dvrippooEV.
Then clutching their sword-hilts they closed, and round and round, with 
shields clashing, they fought a wild battle. And Eteocles introduced the crafty 
Thessalian trick, having some knowledge of it from his association with that 
country. Disengaging himself from the immediate contest, he drew back his 
left foot but kept his eye closely on the pit of the other's stomach from a 
distance; then advancing his right foot he plunged the weapon through his 
navel and fixed it in his spine.493
493 Euripides Phoenicians 1404-13.
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By taking a quick step back with his left foot a canny hoplite was able to 
draw his opponent’s balance rapidly forward. Simultaneously the hoplite using the 
trick found his body turning between 90° and 180°, with his weapon hand moving 
towards his opponent but with his shield arm continuing to provide adequate cover 
for his body.494 If the opponent was unprepared for this then he would stumble 
forward, potentially sinking to one knee or even having to drop one of his arms to 
steady himself. If the attacking hoplite was quick enough he would be able to launch 
a powerful strike against an unprotected part of his opponent’s body.
Techniques similar to the Thessalian trick are commonplace in martial arts of 
all styles, although they are especially common in judo and wrestling, as the 
disruption of balance and stability are the core goals of these sports 495 The 
application of force in one direction naturally leads the opponent to resist with an 
equal amount of force in order to prevent being moved into a disadvantageous 
position. The instigator can then instantly withdraw this force, resulting in the 
opponent either stumbling forwards or over-compensating and compromising their 
balance backwards. The result is usually a scoring throw or an entry into an 
advantageous position from which a more direct attack can be made. It is to be 
admitted that these scenarios do not involve weapons, however the principles behind 
the technique are easily transferred to combat with spear, sword, and shield, as are
494 Borthwick (1972) 15-21 observes that this could refer to a specific wrestling move. I agree, 
however the techniques and principe behind the trick would still be of use to hoplites. Craik (1988) 
253-4. Armstrong (1950) 73-9 for a brief discussion of single combat in the, mainly, epic and 
dramatic sources.
495 Ju-do(^iM): literally ‘gentle way’. Although it may appear to be a contest of brute strength and 
endurance Judo is actually highly technical, with many of its techniques requiring the misdirection 
and shift of balance embodied by the Thessalian trick.
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many o f  the basic principles o f  most martial arts.496 The example here is Ippon Seio 
Nage, full point shoulder throw.
Fig 1
/
In this drawing the first image is similar to the Thessalian trick: the man with 
the black belt has taken a ha lf  step back, which has brought his opponent forwards 
and compromised his balance, allowing the black belt to throw him.
Fig2
|C b d |Y u k o
jsHdjKQka
4% By which I mean the taking o f balance, coordination of movement, and awareness of body space.
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In this picture the trick can be seen in the third image, where the person with 
his back to us takes a big step back.
Fig 3:
The distance travelled by both parties in the modern images given above is 
exaggerated for effect, and it is quite possible to perform this throw effectively with 
only the half-step mentioned by Euripides in his description o f  the trick, indeed the 
shorter and quicker the step, the more surprising and powerful the throw.498 It is to 
be admitted that the vase image is two individuals wrestling rather than fighting as 
hoplites in a phalanx, however the principles behind the application o f  any 
unbalancing technique are unchanged by this, and I believe that the principles behind 
the skills on show, i.e. an understanding o f  the importance o f  balance, speed, and 
flexibility, could have had practical application on the battlefield.499
4 ,7 Bronze figurine from Dodona, c.510 B.C. Staaliche Museen zu Berlin, misc. 7470. 
4>8 Euripides Phoenicians 1404-13.
499 See, e.g. Plutarch Moralia 639F; Krentz (1994) 48-9.
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Lazenby dismissed the use of the Thessalian trick in a phalanx because 
“...taking a pace back...would have been almost impossible for a man in the front 
rank of a phalanx.”500 His objection to this is based on his understanding of othismos 
as meaning a mass physical push. This is discussed in detail in the next section, 
suffice to say here that I do not agree -  this interpretation is not supported by the 
ancient evidence regarding the ability of generals to actively influence battle, and by 
the concentration by the ancient authors on the flexible nature of the phalanx, neither 
of which are conducive to a mass push. We have already seen that there was room 
for individuals to fall in the front ranks, room for individuals to be carried away from 
the front ranks, and room for spears to be used in active combat, points recognised 
by Lazenby himself.501 If there was room to “...swap thrusts with enemy spearmen 
only a few feet away...” then there was room to take a brief half-step back; this does 
not imply a completely loose formation, simply one in which ranks were not packed 
so tightly that they prevented even small movements.502 Hanson also doubted the 
possibility of the trick, wondering how such a manoeuvre was possible given the 
constant pressure on the backs of the front-rank fighters from the shields and bodies 
of the second rank, as well as posing the question:
“...how could you teach the martial arts to men in armor forced forward 
constantly by the ranks to the rear...one wonders how (the Thessalian trick) was
f A - J
accomplished when there was pressure at his back as well.”
The answer is that there was no literal pressure from the second ranks - they were 
not physically pushing the front rank from behind; indeed, short of actually stabbing
500 Lazenby (1991) 94. In the same volume Anderson concluded that “In hoplite battle the front-rank 
fighters of the ‘cutting edge,’ carried forward by the mass behind them, would have had little 
opportunity for feints and withdrawals...” 34.
5(31 Lazenby (1991) 94-6.
502 Lazenby (1991) 95.
503 Hanson (2000a) 166-7.
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his comrades it is difficult to imagine a less helpful course of action for a second 
ranker to undertake.504 Equally, if they were pressured like that from behind, the 
second rankers would be focussed on avoiding impalement on the butt-spikes of the 
front rank. The notion of a multi-rank physical push is a very difficult scenario to 
accept in normal battlefield fighting.505
The asvis and its impact upon formation.
The evidence for the use of weapons and offensive techniques within the 
phalanx has been reviewed, but this chapter would not be complete without a 
discussion of the implications that the shield had on the phalanx, and thus also on the 
ability of generals to influence battle. In a famous passage that has played a huge 
part in the modem re-creation of phalanx battle Thucydides wrote that all armies 
push out their right flank while advancing into combat.506 This remark, seemingly 
casually made, has led to a number of interpretations as to how the shield was used 
in hoplite battle, most notably the idea that the hoplite shield offered some physical 
protection to the left hand side of its bearer and the right hand side of the hoplite to 
his left, although it is conceded that a physical shield-wall was not possible with 
round shields.507 In this way the shield is transformed from a personal piece of 
equipment to a communal item; the motivation for men in the front ranks to stand 
their ground was no longer one of personal pride or a demonstration of individual 
qualities, but was a physical display of public duty. Although this image works well
504 Discussed in full in Section B.
505 Krentz (1985) 59.
506 Thucydides 5.71: text quoted in full above.
507 An idea central to Hanson’s reconstruction of hoplite battle.
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with the conception of hoplite battle as a deliberate and clinical system designed to 
share the risk of combat between the citizen classes, it does not gel well with the 
ability, recorded by the ancient authors, of generals to use tactics, local terrain, and 
trickery, amongst other things, to their advantage, or with the equipment carried by 
hoplites, the methods by which this equipment was used, and the chaotic reality of 
battle between phalanxes.
The ability of individual hoplites to protect themselves with their shields 
allowed the phalanx as a formation to function; however, this does not make the 
shield a ‘communal’ piece of equipment, offering protection to anyone other than its 
wielder, apart from the natural advantage to be found in all members of the phalanx 
being so protected. In order to provide this physical communal protection the shield 
would have to be held relatively flat against the chest by a hoplite who had adopted a 
neutral and front-facing, or square-on, stance; this is the only way in which part of 
the shield would naturally cover the individual to the bearer’s left. However standing 
in such a way is inherently unstable due to the lack of a ‘back foot’ to act as a base of 
balance and strength.508 This stance presents serious difficulties for the avoidance of 
blows as any attempt to dodge or step back would begin from an unstable position, 
and would involve withdrawing the shield arm in such a way that it no longer 
protected the hoplite to the left. In the packed ranks of a phalanx, as imagined by 
orthodox commentators, a hoplite would be unable to move sideways, while a step 
backwards may also have been impossible due to the rear ranks who were apparently 
applying physical pressure to ensure forward momentum. In this unlikely scenario 
the front rank fighters could do little more than attempt to parry or absorb blows with
508 van Wees (2000) 126-30.
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their shield from a static and square-on position. This is not a situation that accords 
with the conclusions of this study so far: that generals were able to act in a dynamic 
and proactive manner, and that the phalanx was a relatively flexible formation.
I find a ‘square-on’ stance very difficult to accept: the shape of the aspis 
meant that in the event of a successful block the attackers’ spear would naturally be 
directed sideways by the curved nature of the shield and the force of the blow; in this 
manner the communal and packed nature of the phalanx formation would have 
served to protect the individual while endangering those around him!509 Equally 
there is very little potential for strong offensive strikes in this stance, unless the 
attack were accompanied by a step forwards, which would change the stance into 
something approaching the front-foot forward stance presented by van Wees, 
amongst others, and affirmed above.510 A powerful spear thrust from a square-on 
position is a very difficult action to achieve without either taking a step forwards or 
twisting the body in order to allow the more powerful shoulder muscles to provide 
the force for the attack. In this scenario the hoplite would be exposed to attack either 
as a result of the slowness of his attack or because the twisting of his body resulted 
in his losing the protection of his shield during the attack.511 The movement of a 
hoplite’s body during a spear thrust would inevitably also cause his shield arm to 
move; if the ranks were tightly packed then this could have resulted in the shield 
bashing or pressing against one’s neighbour every time you tried to attack with the 
spear, hardly an effective or efficient formation.
509 Schwartz (2009) 34.
510 Van Wees (2000) 126-131; Cawkwell (1989) 386.
511 Any attempt to attack would naturally reduce the defensive strength of any stance: see below.
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We should not take Thucydides 5.70-1 to mean that each hoplite sought 
physical protection from the shield of the man to his right. Such a scenario is not 
supported by the sources and also fails on a practical level: to ‘fight’ while seeking 
this protection would be virtually impossible as the weapon hand of each hoplite 
would be greatly impaired by the shield of the hoplite to his right and footwork 
would be compromised to such an extent that the avoidance and delivery of blows 
would be very difficult. Thucydides also makes clear that during the advance to 
battle most large armies lost their cohesion, primarily because of the reported fear of 
the hoplites on the extreme right of the phalanx, who found themselves with no 
cover for their ‘naked’ spear arm and so marched slightly to the right in an attempt to 
avoid direct contact with the enemy.512 Schwartz connects the danger of this 
situation with the honour that the Greeks attached to holding the right wing of a 
phalanx, an honour that was usually granted to the best troops in the army, with these 
troops also being joined by the general.513 Indeed Schwartz remarks that the right 
wing was the most dangerous posting in a phalanx, a point I find difficult to accept 
since Thucydides explained that the right wings of opposing phalanxes usually 
outflanked the enemy left, and that this was a result of the fear of those on the 
extreme right of the phalanx.514 Thus when two phalanxes actually engaged those on 
the respective right wings were least likely to engage the enemy head on, and most 
likely to strike enemy hoplites from the side or the rear, consequently they were 
probably in the safest position of the entire phalanx, while those on the left wing 
were in the most danger.515 The placing of the general along with the best troops on
512 Thucydides 5.71.
513 Schwartz (2009) 172.
514 Thucydides 5.71.
515 As they would be outflanked by the enemy right wing. The right wing was probably the most 
dangerous place to be in an unengaged phalanx as an enemy could launch a surprise attack upon it, as 
occurred at Amphipolis: Thucydides 5.10-12. Being able to strike the ‘naked’ side of a phalanx was
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the right wing was a practical measure - it ensured that the best troops were able to 
take direction from the general himself throughout the course of the engagement, 
with the accounts of battles where the victorious right wing halted and ‘ground up’ 
the enemy centre indicating that an important role for the general remained during 
the fighting.516
Hoplite battle was an affair of fighting, of the trading of blows between men 
in the front, and frequently the second, rank; the contemporary sources indicate that 
generals and subordinate commanders were able to influence this fighting and that 
there was enough room for a relatively fluid form of fighting to occur, while the 
various incidents discussed indicate that the phalanx was a much more flexible 
formation than is currently accepted. The mechanics of fighting with both shield and 
spear, defensive and offensive equipment, in a phalanx formation suggest that a 
number of practical considerations would limit the methods of combat. Chief 
amongst these considerations would be the desire of individual hoplites to maximise 
the protection they could gain from their shields, and the striking power they could 
gain from their spears: this could be achieved by adopting a simple left-foot forwards
51Vstance, with the body turned to almost 90 degrees from the angle of the shield. 
This would place the body of the hoplite directly behind the shield and allow for 
effective footwork while also ensuring that the main offensive weapon, the spear, 
could be powerfully thrust without the risk of losing balance. This thrust would have 
to be accompanied by a step forward with the right leg, allowing the hoplite to strike
usually a sign that it had been outmanoeuvered, as occurred at Nemea (Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18- 
21) and Laechum (Xenophon Hellenica 4.5.14-16.)
516 See section d and chapter 3.
517 Cawkwell (1989) 382, 384-5; van Wees (2000) 126-8; (2004) 168-9; Schwartz (2009) 39.
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with the maximum strength possible; a simple step back with the same leg would 
return the hoplite to his original defensive position. This action is not without risk: a 
twisting of the torso is necessary to deliver such a blow, and this would result in a 
brief moment of vulnerability during which the shield offered little protection. This 
is a necessary risk in all fighting systems: an aggressive move naturally reduces the 
defensive strength of any position, and the front rank fighters of a phalanx would be
CIO
constantly moving from defence to attack.
Two factors, footwork and balance, are vitally important to any method of 
fighting, and would be doubly important to the soldiers of ancient Greece, 
considering the very real possibility that a hoplite would find himself being targeted 
by a number of enemies simultaneously. I do not suggest that this stance was the 
only one in which hoplites ever stood, indeed the chaotic and frantic nature of 
fighting in the front ranks would dictate that a hoplite would have to adjust his 
position and stance constantly, according to circumstances. However when its 
offensive and defensive strengths are considered, the side-on stance is far more 
natural than the square-on stance that would have to be adopted if the shield was to 
physically protect a neighbouring hoplite. Finally, let us consider exactly what a 
hoplite would have been expected to do: march in line, make effective strikes with 
his spear, engage in the othismos, protect his left side with the right half of his shield, 
seek protection for his right side in the left half of shield held by the hoplite to his 
right, and also provide protection for the hoplite to his left with the left side of his 
own shield. This is a very complicated scenario, and one which is highly unlikely to 
be accurate when it is remembered that the vast majority of hoplites were not
518 Schwartz (2009) 40.
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professionally trained. Equally the evidence for professional hoplite forces indicates 
that the advantage these forces held over amateur hoplites were increased flexibility 
and manoeuvrability, not a superior ability to utilise the ‘communal’ protection 
offered by the shield.
The shield is vital to any discussion of the hoplite way of war; 
misunderstandings as to its use and a wholly impractical and unnecessarily strict 
model of battle has resulted in its importance being recognised, but for misleading 
and incorrect reasons. It can be seen that the shield’s design was that of a personal 
piece of equipment; it physically protected the individual using it, ensured that he 
was not exhausted from carrying it when he came to the front ranks and allowed him 
to endure the blows of the enemy when he was actually engaged in combat. The 
shield was a communal piece of equipment in that it was absolutely and 
unquestioningly essential for all in the phalanx to be equipped with one; a hoplite 
without a shield was largely defenceless, thus instead of contributing to the success 
of the phalanx by protecting himself and striking at the enemy he was little more 
than a target for enemy strikes, a weak link to be exploited and a drain on the overall 
effectiveness of the phalanx itself.519
The flexibility of hoplites and the phalanx formation
Some scholars have assumed that the term ‘loose ranks’ is synonymous with 
the lack of any recognisable formation, and as such have rejected any notion of loose
5,9 PlutarchMoralia 24IF.
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ranks through the belief that a hoplite’s equipment was ineffective or inappropriate 
for single combat. However loose ranks means that generals would have been able 
to direct and manoeuvre their phalanxes as hoplites would have room to move and 
fight, as individuals or as small groups, while being close enough to render 
assistance to their neighbours if required: it does not mean a series of individual 
combats, although this undoubtedly took place at times. Schwartz has recently 
repeated the assertion that the hoplite panoply, and the shield in particular, made 
single combat an impossibility for hoplites. Thus the shield was “...hopelessly heavy 
and clumsy and spectacularly out of place outside the highly specialised fighting
CA I
environment of the phalanx.” He compares a single-grip and double-grip shield, 
and concludes that the single-grip shield is far more suited to single combat because 
it could be more easily used to parry and block attacks at a greater distance from the 
body than a double-grip shield.522 Based on these points he states that “... the hoplite 
shield was extremely unfit for single combat of any kind: designwise, every single 
feature is the opposite of what one would want for this kind of fighting.” However
these points can only count as actual disadvantages in ‘this kind of fighting’ against 
other forms of infantry; in the event of a hoplite fighting another hoplite in single 
combat there was no disadvantage present as they would both be fighting under the 
same circumstances. Indeed there is absolutely no need to label single combat with 
relatively heavy equipment as being any less possible than single combat with any 
other form of equipment. It is to be noted that hoplites served as marines aboard 
triremes in order to repel attackers, to board enemy craft if the opportunity arrived,
520 E.g. Cartledge (1977) 13; Holladay (1982) 95-7; Hanson (1991) 6-7; Anderson (1991) 34-5; 
Hanson (2000a) 166-8; Schwartz (2009) 38-41, 146,154.
521 Schwartz (2009) 154. Also 146: “...the defensive weapons -  particularly the helmet and shield -  
were ill-suited to single-combat and hand-to-hand combat in duel situations.”
522 Schwartz (2009) 35-8.
523 Schwartz (2009) 38.
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and to form the backbone of raiding parties or invasion forces; indeed Thucydides’ 
description of the final sea battle of the Sicilian Expedition as like a land battle 
fought on ships suggests that marines were engaging each other in actual close 
combat.524 We cannot be sure that all marines were equipped as hoplites all the time; 
indeed it is clear that on some occasions they were sitting down and throwing 
javelins, not fighting as a hoplite. However, the limited space aboard a trireme, the 
need for marines also to fight as hoplites on land, and Plato’s scornful image of a 
marine equipped with a fanciful new weapon, would seem to indicate that the aspis
526was a standard piece of equipment for marines.
This demonstrates not only that fighting in single combat with hoplite 
equipment was possible, but that it took place on the decks of moving ships! 
These epibatai could only function in the very loosest of formations while fighting 
on deck, and their focus was most likely on teamwork and concentration of force as 
opposed to strict cohesion and discipline; the constantly moving deck ensured that 
ship-to-ship boarding actions placed a great deal of emphasis on balance, speed,
MO
strength, and agility, all skills required for effective single combat. It is to be 
admitted that the decks of triremes were cramped and would certainly not have given 
the epibatai much freedom to move, however this would also have prevented an 
effective phalanx from being formed. Most engagements between marines would 
have been up-close and deadly, with life or death being based on the key skills of
524 Thucydides 7.70-1.
525 Thucydides 7.67. Van Wees (2004) 227.
526 Krentz (2007) 153. IG (II) 1631.404-9 with Casson (1995.) Plato Laches 183D-4A. Thucydides 
4.12 describes Brasidas as dropping his shield when he was injured while attempting to force a 
landing on Sphacteria in 425.
527 Morrison & Williams (1968) 263-5; Krentz (1985) 53.
528 Rawlings (2000) 236-7; van Wees (2004) 227-8. .
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balance and spatial awareness.529 Van Wees suggests that these marines would 
probably have been professionals, a reasonable point considering the difficult 
battlefield environment they found themselves in. The epibatai were also expected 
to take part in raids; these raids involved tactics similar to those employed by light 
infantry, and as such they required stamina and precise timing in order to, as it were, 
‘smash and grab.’ Although effective, such tactics earned the marines Plato’s 
displeasure; running forwards and backwards from the ship was regarded by Plato as
M l
beneath citizen-hoplites.
So we know hoplites could fight as individuals, while on the decks of 
triremes. What about single combat while fighting on land? In Euripides’ 
Phoenicians, produced around 415, the brothers Eteocles and Polyneices fight in 
single combat; both are equipped as hoplites and engage in a protracted and 
energetic duel.532 The sequence has strong epic overtones but the action is described 
in some detail and must have had a basis in reality if it was to have some resonance 
with the audience.533 The brothers’ duel serves as a fine literary example of the 
ability of hoplites to engage in single combat -  the two clash their shields together, 
stab with their spears and finally kill each other with swords. The duel gives some 
clue as to what could be considered possible by an educated audience, many of 
whom would likely have fought as, or were even currently liable for service as, 
hoplites. Indeed, given that the scene is described in some detail it would have been 
incumbent upon the audience to follow the action in their imagination, indicating
529 Rawlings (2000) 236-7.
530 van Wees (2004) 222.
531 Plato LawslM C
532 Euripides Phoenicians 1404-15.
533 Schwartz (2009) 42.
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that an audience of Athenian citizens could not have been totally unfamiliar with the 
movements, or the principles behind them.
The most famous example of a hoplite engaging in single combat is probably 
that of Sophanes of Decelea, the Athenian whose behaviour at the battle of Plataea 
so interested Herodotus. Two different and incompatible stories were told about 
Sophanes. According to one, Sophanes apparently arrived at the battle with an 
anchor attached to his breastplate which he would use to fasten himself to the ground 
when the fighting started; he would thus be literally anchored to the spot. Herodotus 
relates that if the Greeks were victorious, Sophanes would pick up his anchor and 
join in the pursuit.534 The story is unbelievable, although it does help to demonstrate 
an important quality of hoplite fighting; a single involuntary step backward by a 
number of individuals, under sustained attack or pressure, could be all that was 
needed to break a phalanx.535 Herodotus relates a second interpretation of the anchor 
imagery, namely that Sophanes had an anchor painted on his shield, which he 
continually moved from side to side.536 Being able to move one’s shield effectively 
and rapidly would have been an important part of fighting as a hoplite as he 
changing nature of battle meant individuals would have to respond rapidly to their 
immediate circumstances.537 If Sophanes had room to move his shield as described, 
and others were able to witness him doing this, then the Athenian hoplite phalanx of 
the early Fifth century was not so densely packed as to limit the movement of
534 Herodotus 9.74
535 See also section C.
536 Herodotus 9.74.
537 Rawlings (2000) 249 for the suggestion that this indicates Sophanes’ was trained in hoplomachia. 
The point is well-made but there is no reason to limit such skill to being taught for profit or through 
traditional dance: these were clearly useful skills for hoplites to possess, and may have simply been 
general knowledge.
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individuals in the front ranks; it implies that the phalanx was relatively flexible, and 
leaves open the possibility for control and command during battles.
Hoplites fighting in the front ranks of a clash between phalanxes were almost 
identically equipped; all other things being equal, tactical organisation, local scale 
leadership, individual skills and the ability to fight would prove useful. Plato has 
Nicias make it clear that hoplomachia, private training in the art of hoplite fighting, 
could serve a youth well, by fostering an interest in the art o f generalship, improving 
his general health and fitness, and by giving him skills that would be of use during 
battle.538 The first point is vital: Nicias regards instruction in hoplomachia as a 
‘gateway’ to further instruction in, and mastery of, the art of generalship:
ETi 6 e  Kdi eiq oA A ou koAoG p o 0 n |JO T o s  £TTi0upiov t to p o k o A e i t o  to io O to v :  ttc k ; y a p  a v  
p o G w v  tv 6 ttA o i£  (joxecfG oi £TTi0U|jiiaEiE Kai to O  E^rfe M aQnM cnoS T° 0  Trcpl t o s  tu ^ e i^ , 
Kai TdOTd A d p w v  Kdi <piAoTi|jr|9e iS au T o ig  6™ t t o v  d v  t o  n x p i  t o s  crrpdT riY ia^ 
o p p q aE iE
“Moreover, it is a thing which impels one to desire another noble 
accomplishment; for everyone who has learnt how to fight in armor will 
desire to learn the accomplishment which comes next, the management of 
troops; and when he has got that and once taken a pride in his work he will 
push on to attain the whole art of generalship.”
The progression from fighting, to managing troops, to generalship, is 
fascinating: here we see Plato, through the character of a well-known Athenian 
general, pointing out, firstly, that there existed what we might call ‘levels’ of 
command. Thus ‘management of troops’, a tactical or administrative concern, must
538 Plato Laches 181e-182a.
539 Plato Laches 182b-c (trans Lamb.) See Wheeler (1982) and (1983) for comments regarding the 
possible origins of hoplomachia and its effectiveness as a training method. Wheeler does not discuss 
the importance of the art as a ‘gateway’ to the study of generalship.
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be mastered before one can fully appreciate the wider strategic art of generalship.540 
Secondly, and most importantly, the ability to function as a general is connected to 
an understanding of how to fight in armour: thus generals must understand the micro 
level of battle, as well as the macro level, and be able to appreciate the implications 
of any orders or plan for men equipped as hoplites. Nicias also emphasises the 
advantage that such training would give during flight or pursuit, stating that an 
individual would be able to fight off one, perhaps even several, men without coming 
to harm; doubtless this would involve a constantly moving shield and many shifts of 
position or balance -  Sophanes’ fighting style would not look so out of place on a 
fourth-century battlefield, and was perhaps not so unique!541 However Hanson takes 
the discussion to indicate that:
“...specialized weapons training was of little value except during retreat and 
pursuit, where for the first and only moment men had room to manoeuver and 
to use their prowess in arms in duels or individual skirmishing.”542
This is clearly not the sentiment that Nicias is advancing, indeed Nicias suggests 
quite the opposite: such training would be of value in the general fighting, but it 
would be even more valuable once the ranks had broken and there was an element of 
‘every man for himself.’543 Nicias’ foil in this argument is Laches, who does not 
dispute Nicias’ position regarding the usefulness of hoplomachia as a specific and 
general training aid; instead Laches concentrates on the fact that the teachers of 
hoplomachia do not seek students in, or even dare to set foot into Sparta.
540 Hence Xenophon’s attack, at Memorabilia 3, on those who claim to teach generalship. The 
students of such men are like doctors who are qualified but have never practiced: they may understand 
theory, but have no practical understanding of the reality of medicine.
541 Plato Laches 182b.
542 Hanson (2000a) 91.
543 Krentz (1985) 57-8; Cawkwell (1989) 378-9;
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Professional teachers of fighting in armour could not match up to the Spartan system 
of education and training, but this does not render their instruction useless, simply 
not as good as Spartan practice; this much is surely to be expected, and the point 
being made is that this if one wishes to find instruction in fighting outside o f Sparta, 
the hoplomachoi would be able to give it, although Plato does not comment on 
whether it was possible to find further instruction in the art of generalship. However 
Laches’ point is well made; a reputable playwright could not avoid Athens and 
expect to be taken seriously, just as a teacher of fighting could not avoid 
Lacedaemon; the fact that the hoplomachoi would not even attempt to teach their art 
to the Spartans was an indication of its inferior quality.544 Plato has Laches point out 
that not one instructor of hoplomachia had ever distinguished himself in battle, quite 
the opposite in fact, with Laches telling an amusing story of a hoplomachos called 
Stesilaus who tried to use a spear-scythe combination weapon while on board a ship. 
The story centres on Stesilaus’ over-specialisation for ship-to-ship combat; his 
weapon, possibly designed to sever ropes and lines, became stuck in the rigging, and 
he was dragged along the deck of his trireme before being forced to release it, to 
much laughter.545 The story serves as a metaphor for the teaching of hoplomachia in 
general; Stesilaus had clearly done much thinking about how to operate effectively 
while fighting as a marine, however when it came to the actual physical event, rather 
than theory or practice, he was shown to be a fraud.546
544 Plato Laches 182E-183C.
545 Plato Laches 183D-184A
546 Van Wees (2004) 90-1.
195
The fact that Plato regarded the teachers of hoplomachia as little more than 
sophists547 who refused to engage the recognised experts in the art of hoplite fighting 
(the Spartans) is not evidence that there was no demand or need for such training, or 
that it had no practical application on the battlefield. Indeed the discussion 
emphasises the availability of such instruction, and while Plato frequently hints at 
the sophistic qualities of the hoplomachoi, the dialogue is balanced in its evaluation. 
It is undeniable that there would be a great deal more room for fighting and single 
combat once the ranks had broken, hence Nicias’ point that instruction would be of 
most use at this point; however this cannot be taken to mean that there was no room 
to move before this breaking occurred. That Plato, through the mouths of two 
experienced generals, suggests that such instruction was a starting point for one 
interested in the broader aspects of command, and was of practical use for battle, 
indicates an acknowledgement that effective generalship began with understanding 
physical limitations, that generals were aware of the benefit that instruction in 
fighting could bring, and thus that there was room for such techniques to be used in 
the front ranks.
Conclusions
Various examples discussed above attest to the looseness of the phalanx 
formation: hoplites in phalanx formation were able to move and fight, and were also 
able to engage in single combat should the occasion demand it. This, combined with 
the discussion of communication in chapter 2, suggests that there was no physical 
block which prevented generals from influencing battle, and the formation as a
547 Anderson (1991) 29.
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whole was one which allowed, indeed demanded, the influence of individuals to be 
felt. As spears snapped, individuals fell, and groups of hoplites exploited momentary 
advantages, sections of two engaged phalanxes would advance and retreat, reacting 
to the immediate battlefield environment. The surviving contemporary evidence 
suggests that hoplites could do this in many different ways, with the overall picture 
being one of flexibility. The Classical phalanx cannot have been ‘closed’ or ‘tight’ -  
this cannot be reconciled with the majority of battle descriptions, which indicate that 
generals were able to influence fighting, and hoplites were able to move, fight, and 
fall back as the situation demanded; it is also based on a misunderstanding of the use 
of the shield, itself taken from a single passage of Thucydides. As pointed out above, 
this does not mean that I believe hoplite combat to have been an affair of 
monomachia, indeed single combat was most likely the last thing that amateur 
soldiers wished to engage in, although it was the lack of weapons training that was 
responsible for this, not the nature of their equipment. I will not attempt to place a 
definite figure on the distance between individuals in phalanxes -  changing tactical 
circumstances would have ensured that this distance changed frequently, and there is 
no hint of a ‘standard’ or ‘official’ distance in the source material, indeed, there is 
simply not enough surviving evidence to allow a conclusion about an accurate 
distance to be reached.
In Classical phalanxes there was normally enough room for hoplites to keep
their shields moving, enough room for fully armed injured men to be carried through
the ranks to safety, and enough room for especially brave or skilled individuals to be
recognised and singled out for praise. Equally, well-trained or professional fourth
century phalanxes were able to create small gaps in the ranks to allow chariots to
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pass through, were able to reverse the direction of their march without having to 
rearrange their ranks, and could be penetrated by enemy formations. It is difficult to 
see how such actions would have been possible if the ranks had been tightly packed; 
the counter-march at Coronea in particular suggests that the space between 
individuals was at least the width of a fully armed hoplite, probably slightly more. 
This is strong evidence for a looser and more flexible formation than is currently 
recognised, allows for the active use of weapons, and also demonstrates that the 
shield was not a communal piece of equipment, all points that reinforce the point, 
presented throughout this thesis, that generals could influence battle. The front ranks 
of an engaged phalanx were loose enough to allow weapons play, loose enough to 
allow experienced, skilful, or especially brave fighters to be recognised, and loose 
enough for individuals to be carried away when injured. This phalanx was not a 
restrictive formation, and the evidence suggests that the fighting phase of a hoplite 
engagement did not result in the breakdown of command.
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Section C: Othismos and dthismoi
The previous two sections have examined the ability of generals to exert their 
influence upon battle, an ability closely tied to the flexible nature of hoplites and the 
phalanx as a whole. However the picture remains incomplete without an analysis of 
one vital element: othismos, generally translated as ‘the push’. The broader 
discussion of this concept has a significant impact upon how we view the exercise of 
generalship in battle, and it forms the most controversial aspect of hoplite battle. Its 
various interpretations have resulted in some strikingly different accounts of the 
battlefield environment generals found themselves in, the combat techniques used by 
hoplites, and the phases of hoplite battles. An analysis of what othismos could have 
been, in light of the previous two chapters, is therefore needed, indeed it is essential 
if a full picture of the battlefield role of the general is to emerge. If battles were 
decided by a pushing contest of mass versus mass, as the most influential theory 
states, then generals can have exerted little influence once ‘the’ othismos had begun. 
However if a different meaning is implied, then our image of hoplite warfare has 
room for, indeed demands, a role for the general, as a significant obstacle to the 
continued exercise of command will have been removed. As such the following 
discussion will analyse the evidence for, and modem discussion of, othismos and 
will attempt to show what implications it has for the battlefield role of the general.
I refer in this introduction to ‘othismos', a noun, but modem scholarship of 
this concept also includes the much more common verbs otheo and exotheo, and 
treats instances of their use as indicative of the same ‘technique’ or ‘phase.’ The 
ancient literature review which follows will address all three words at the same time.
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Reference to this ‘technique’ or ‘phase’ with othismos rather than the verbs is so 
entrenched that I do not attempt to give a different name to the overall concept here. 
It is important to point out that reference to ‘the’ othismos as a ‘phase’ of combat is 
most likely an entirely modem invention -  the word only occurs five times in 
battlefield contexts, and the verbs appear much more frequently, hence the title of 
this section ‘othismos and dthismoi\ rather than just ‘othismos.’
Every scholar of Classical Greek warfare has his or her own image of what 
othismos was, and any attempt at reconstructing or analysing any aspect of hoplite 
battle must present an explanation the term or concept. As a result of the increased 
interest and attention paid to Classical Greek warfare since the 1970s the quantity of 
scholarship devoted to interpreting othismos has increased, with new ideas emerging 
and new methodologies being proposed, however the fundamental nature of the 
argument remains the same: what was othismos, and, especially relevant for my 
purposes, how did it affect the way the phalanx operated? Two identifiable positions 
have emerged since Cawkwell’s three page discussion of the problem in 1978, with 
the argument largely switching between a physical mass-push and a metaphorical 
interpretation of the concept; the two interpretations have very different implications 
for the battlefield role of the general, and neither side has given significant 
ground.548
Those who favour a mass push present a highly physical event; othismos was 
an intentional and organised pushing contest involving the entire phalanx, a contest
548 Cawkwell (1978).
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that would be entered into as soon as possible due to the implications it had for the 
phalanx's cohesion and order.549 For this push to be effective it would require a 
highly compact order, and it would be in the best interests of each phalanx to enter 
into battle with this order already drawn up.550 This need for close order and physical 
pushing is connected with three other factors which combine to form the core of the 
most influential understanding of Greek warfare as a whole. These factors are (1) 
The shape of the hoplite shield lends itself to an organised push, (2) Thucydides 5.71 
indicates an overriding concern for close order before battle had even been joined, 
and (3) references to othismos generally occur immediately before the end of a battle 
and can be interpreted in such a way as to indicate a literal shoving match.551 
Advocates of this interpretation propose that once the distance between the opposing 
front ranks had been closed those directly engaged in the fighting could attempt to 
strike with their swords, continue to fight with their shorter, probably broken spears,
c <9or could ’go in’ for an othismos.
In this scenario the front rank fighters would place their shoulders behind 
their shields and push against the enemy line in an attempt to break through and 
disrupt the enemy ranks, creating panic amongst the rear ranks and others unable to 
see what was happening.553 To ensure maximum power and effectiveness the rear 
ranks of the phalanx attempting the othismos would place their shields in the lower 
backs or side of the hoplites directly in front of them and push. Thus the second rank 
would push the first, the third rank would push the second all the way through to the
549 Hanson (1991) 7; (2000) 171-177.
550 Luginbill (1994) 56-7
551 Hanson (1991) 16, 68-71; Wheeler (1991) 129; Schwartz (2009) 162-4.
552 Lazenby (1991) 87-96; Hanson (2000a) 83-88, 136-170, 171-180. On the length of battles see, 
most recently, Schwartz (2009) 201-225.
553 Lazenby (1991) 97; Hanson (2000a).
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eighth rank pushing the seventh. In this manner the entire phalanx would function as 
a battering ram of sorts, with the objective being to either smash the enemy phalanx 
from the field or to break through the front ranks and allow chaos and panic to 
spread. Orthodox theory has no counter to such an othismos other than to reply in 
kind. A pushing match would ensue, with the phalanx possessing the most staying 
power, numbers, force, or ranks emerging victorious.
This mass push interpretation has been the dominant theory for over a 
century: Grundy, Woodhouse, Gomme, Adcock, Anderson, Holladay, Pritchett, 
Luginbill, Lazenby, Hanson, and Schwartz have all proposed, or assumed, that a 
concerted shove ended battles.554 However while this interpretation has proven 
popular, it is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Most importantly it reduces the 
general to little more than a hoplite, pushing with his shield and unable to otherwise 
affect the engagement. This image has, so far, been shown to be false: generals 
played an important role in the advance and there was nothing to prevent them 
continuing to do so during the fighting, so some explicit evidence would be required 
to definitively claim that it was at this point that command ‘broke down.’ The 
explanation also fails because it relies upon a densely packed phalanx, something 
shown to be false in the previous section.
Reaction against this mass push has been evident since 1942 with Fraser’s 
brief article attacking the 'Myth of the Phalanx Scrimmage' and a theme that was
554 Woodhouse (1933) 78-9; Gomme (1937) 135 Grundy (1948) 267; Adcock (1957) 4. Anderson 
(1970) 175-6; Cartledge (1977) 16; Holladay (1978) 95-7; Pritchett (1985) 65; Hanson (1991) 7, 
(2000) 28-9, 246; Schwartz (2002) 44-9, (2009) 183-200.
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picked up by Krentz in a series of articles spanning three decades. This 
‘metaphorical’ position, so called because the push does not have to be a literal, 
physical push,555 concentrates on three different factors, namely (1) the difficulties 
involved with a mass push given the amateur nature of most Greek armies, (2) the 
offensive equipment carried by hoplites, and (3) the other uses of the word 
othismos.556 The commentators who propose a metaphorical interpretation have 
presented the following scenario: the front ranks would break down into a series of 
localised combats, with advantage being gained and lost across the line; individuals 
would fall and be replaced by the rear ranks as each side attempted to make inroads 
into the opposing line of hoplites. As the battle progressed the accumulated physical 
and mental strain would begin to show and one phalanx would lose its nerve. 
Initially unnoticed but rapidly developing into a catastrophic loss of confidence, this 
would result in the phalanx collapsing and splitting, with the majority of casualties 
being taken at this point.557 In this construction othismos is a psychological factor; 
although it is conceded that pushing, shoving, and even wrestling moves were part of 
hoplite combat, a phalanx-wide shove is emphatically denied: “If classical hoplite 
battle was a concerted physical shoving match, front-rank fighters could have done 
no more than lunge blindly at the enemy while being almost crushed to death by 
their comrades.”558 However this approach does not explain various battle 
descriptions where othismos, otheo, and exotheo have a definite physical meaning of 
some sort, and as such it is also limited, although I do find it to be a more accurate 
interpretation of the source material than the mass push.
555 This position has also been referred to as the ‘unorthodox’ or ‘heretical’ position, two terms I also 
find misleading and so will not be using.
556 See Fraser (1942); Cawkwell (1978) 152-3, (1989) 375, 389; Krentz (1985) 55-7; (1994) 45;
(2010) 53-59; Goldsworthy (1997) 5-6, 24; van Wees (2004) 184-191.
557 A point recognized by Hanson (2000a) 160.
558 van Wees (2004) 189.
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Some of the most recent work has been undertaken with a more nuanced 
tone, and does not allow easy categorisation. Wheeler stated that it is not possible to 
conclusively prove either of the positions outlined above, and Matthew observed that 
othismos could be both a physical and a metaphorical push depending on the 
immediate battlefield circumstances.559 However both scholars approach the 
problem, and the source material, with the same understanding of generalship and 
the battlefield environment of hoplite engagements, i.e. generals could do little to 
influence the course of battles, and the phalanx relied on a densely packed order to 
be effective.
I favour a slightly modified interpretation of Krentz and van Wees’ view of 
othismos, an interpretion that accords with the image of generalship and hoplite 
fighting that has been built up over the previous two chapters: othismos need not be 
either a physical push or a metaphorical push, but can be both of these things and 
more. Indeed the sources use othismos, otheo and exotheo in many and varied ways, 
from describing an individual shove with the shield to a movement involving an 
entire army, and while on some occasions a mass push cannot be ruled out, in the 
majority of cases a different form of push can be identified.
These pushes can be defined as 1) physical, where a bodily push of some sort 
is described, usually in addition to other elements of fighting such as use of weapons 
and shield, for example the othismos over the body of Leonidas as Thermopylae;560 
2) non-physical, where a manoeuvre or tactic such as ‘pushing out’ a wing or is
559 Wheeler (2007a) 211; Matthew (2009) 395-405.
560 Herodotus 7.225. The passage is discussed in more detail below.
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being described, as at the battle of Mantinea in 418, or when a psychological or 
‘push of effort’ is being described, as at the battle of Delium in 424;561 3) other, 
where the words are used in a non-military context, such as Herodotus’ reporting of 
the way Egyptian men push their needles through cloth. In the following sections I 
analyse the evidence for each of these definitions, and attempt to demonstrate that 
‘the’ othismos was not a ‘phase’ of hoplite battle which reduced the role and 
influence of generals to that of pushing with their shields. The three definitions also 
highlight the flexibility of the terms and the importance of trying to understand the 
‘everyday’ form of hoplite warfare, a form beyond the large pitched battles.
Potential instances of othismos indicating a physical push
A number of battles appear to have involved a physical push, or physical 
pushing of some sorts; if this was a mass push of the sort advocated by Hanson and 
others then individuals in the front ranks, forced from behind directly against the 
enemy front ranks, would have been largely unable to move, instead being carried on 
a wave of pressure generated by the rear ranks. This is a very difficult scenario to 
accept: the previous sections have emphasised the ability of generals and subordinate 
officers to influence battle and the flexibility of hoplite forces, so the extraordinary 
claim that fighting developed into a mass push must be supported by some 
extraordinary evidence if it is to be proven correct.
561 Thucydides 4.96. Discussed in more detail below.
562 Herodotus 2.35.
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The first recorded battlefield othismos took place during the final day of the 
battle of Thermopylae, where there was an othismos over the body of King Leonidas. 
Herodotus wrote:
Kai UTT£p toO vEKpoO toO Aewvi'Sew n e p a e w v  te Kai AaKESaipovkuv tbQioiJog eyi'veto 
noAAog, Eg o  toOtov te apETfj oi "EAAqvEg CnTE^Ei'puaav Kai ETpEipavTO Toug Evavn'oug 
TETpaKig.
“The Persians and Lacedaemonians pushed at length with one and other over 
the corpse of Leonidas, but the Greeks fought so well and so bravely that 
they eventually succeeded in dragging his body away. Four times they forced 
the Persians back... ”563
This cannot be cited as evidence for a mass push interpretation of othismos. 
Indeed it simply shows the intensity of the fighting over the body of Leonidas, 
fighting that would naturally have included individual pushing and shoving as 
Herodotus reports that most of the Greek spears had snapped, and the Spartans were 
forced to use their swords instead. Thus the fighting was at very close range, and we 
should imagine Spartans stabbing, pushing, shoving, and perhaps wrestling with 
Persians as they attempted to create a safe area around Leonidas’ body.564 There was 
no “...confusing contest of pressure...”565 at Thermopylae, indeed Leonidas’ tactics 
had been fluid, relied on the ability of Spartans to respond to commands of Leonidas, 
and the flexibility of the Spartan phalanx, attributes polar opposite to those required 
for a mass push. The ability of the Spartan phalanx to continue to operate in a fluid 
and flexible manner appears to have been disrupted by Leonidas’ death, and the
563 Herodotus 7.225 (trans Waterfield.)
564 Herodotus does not suggest that the snapping of the spears forced the Spartans to attempt a mass 
push with their shields, as Hanson claims happened in most hoplite battles. Instead the Spartans 
continued to fight with what weapons they had remaining. Hanson (2000a) 88. Lazenby (1993) 146-7.
565 Hanson (2000a) 88-9; (1991) 67-71.
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battle that raged over possession of his corpse is in stark contrast to the ‘baiting’ 
tactics used earlier during the previous days. It is possible that this indicates the 
Spartan phalanx was rendered less effective following the death of Leonidas, and 
was unable to continue operating in such a manner. Attached to this is the possibility 
that the death, or mortal wounding, of Leonidas was spotted and exploited by the 
Persians, who attempted to take advantage of the confusion and disarray they 
thought this would cause.566 Unfortunately for the Persians the Spartans at 
Thermopylae were veteran troops, and were able to maintain cohesion and discipline 
despite the loss of Leonidas and several other important men, and the increased 
pressure of the Persian attack.567 The othismos over Leonidas’ body was not a mass 
push, rather it was brutal hand to hand combat between Greek and Persian, with the 
Spartans demonstrating to the rest of Greece, and to history itself, that the ideal 
hoplite “...never gave ground but fought to the death, lunging with his spear until it 
broke, slashing with his sword until it snapped, then punching and biting until the 
end...”568
A comparison of the struggle over Leonidas’ body to an incident at the battle 
of Plataea is of use here. After the Persian cavalry commander Masistius’ horse was 
shot by an arrow he was rapidly set upon and killed by Athenian hoplites.569 His 
death was not spotted by the retreating cavalry until they had regrouped, with 
Herodotus stating that they missed Masistius’ presence as there was no one there to 
give orders. This sudden lack of leadership resulted in the cavalry attacking in a
566 Herodotus 9.22-3.
567 Lazenby (1993) 147 for the observation that the death of Leonidas may have shamed or enraged 
the surviving Spartans into fighting to the death, an interesting juxtaposition of the current view that 
the death of a general caused panic to set in! See chapter 3.
568 van Wees (2004) 183.
569 Herodotus 9.22; Plutarch Aristides 14. Lazenby (1993) 221-2.
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fashion notably different to their previous mode of engagement, which had caused a 
great deal of trouble to the Megarians who had been the target of their first attack. 
Now, instead of attacking by regiment, they attacked en masse, and a fierce struggle 
over Masistius’ body resulted, with the Greeks emerging victorious.570 The loss of 
their commanders caused both Spartans and Persians to operate differently until they 
had the chance to withdraw, regroup, and assess the situation: the Spartans withdrew 
to a narrow part of the pass and prepared for their last stand, while the Persian 
cavalry abandoned their attack and went in search of Mardonius for new orders and,
C'TI
presumably, a new commander. The ability of generals to exert influence in both 
of these battles is indicated by both the change in tactics that occurred once they 
were killed, indicating the impact this had upon command and control, and the 
behaviour of the respective units once a brief, and intense, struggle had occurred.
The second use of the word othismos in a battlefield context in Herodotus 
occurs during his description of the fighting that occurred once Pausanias received 
favourable omens at the battle of Plataea. Herodotus records that:
tyiveTO 6e TTpurrov TTEpi TCi Y£ppa pdxn- 6e TaOia ettetttwkee, n5r| 6y|V£T0 n paxn 
iaxupn Trap’ au io  to Arnjrppiov Kai xpovov Eui ttoAAov, £$ o am'KovTO (bOicriJOv
“The first phase of the battle took place at the wickerwork barricade, until 
that was pushed down, and then a fierce battle raged for a long time around 
the temple of Demeter until it came to the push.”
570 Herodotus 9.22-3
571 Herodotus 9.23.
572 Herodotus 9.62 (trans Waterfield, modified.)
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None of this supports an interpretation of the othismos as a mass push; indeed 
the presence of the barricade would have prevented the Spartans from charging 
directly into combat, a factor given a great deal of weight by those who prefer this
C'7'i
interpretation. The remainder of Herodotus’ account of Plataea describes a chaotic 
and frantic hand to hand struggle, with the Persians being able to break many Greek 
spears and advance to grappling range. The Greeks were victorious because they 
were heavily armoured and disciplined as opposed to the lightly armoured and ill- 
disciplined Persians, not because they were able to literally push the Persians from 
the battlefield.574 Indeed many Persians were killed because they advanced on the 
Greek phalanx individually or in small groups, while only those troops in close 
proximity to Mardonius himself were inflicting damage to the Spartan phalanx. The 
Greeks may have pushed down or pushed through the barricade, but they certainly
e n e
did not engage with the enemy infantry in a massed pushing match. The Greek 
contingents communicated with each other, sent aid to each other, and, after some 
eleven days of manoeuvre and harassment, launched a single large attack which 
proved decisive. Pausanias’ tactics did not rely on a mass push, nor did one occur as
5 7  fsa separate phase in any of the battles of the Persian wars.
Thucydides’ account of the battle of Delium in 424 contains a physical push 
that has serious implications for the role and influence of the general in battle, and 
the nature of hoplite battle itself. It is the only use of the term othismos by
573 See Section A.
574 Herodotus 62-3; Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.4.15.
575 Matthew (2010) 399.
576 Herodotus makes no mention of an othismos at the battle of Marathon, and although Aristophanes 
has an Athenian veteran use the word in his recounting of the action during the battle, this does not 
imply a mass push. Wasps 1081-85. Discussed below.
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Thucydides, and is qualified by the word aspis -  a ‘pushing of shields.’ According to 
Thucydides:
to 5 £ aAAo KapTEpq payn Kai wGiapq) aornfdwv ^uvEicrriiKEi.
“But the rest clashed in a gruelling fight, with shields shoving against 
shields.”577
cno
Matthew takes this to mean a mass physical push, however such an 
interpretation is very difficult to believe, indeed Thucydides’ account indicates that 
Delium was a battle decided by generalship, hard fighting, and psychology, not by a 
mass push, as I now explain. The Athenian phalanx was initially victorious on the 
left wing, where only the Thespian section of the Boeotian phalanx stood its ground;
57 0the Thespians were surrounded and annihilated by the Athenians. The fact that the 
Boeotian sections adjacent to the Thespians were able to withdraw from the battle 
without being pursued by the Athenians suggests that they did so in some order, 
presumably under the direction of their generals, otherwise we would expect the 
Athenians to have attempted to pursue them. This could also suggest the Athenian 
generals and subordinate commanders were able to ensure their sections of the 
phalanx continued to engage those parts of the enemy line that were still offering 
resistance. Equally the Athenian surrounding of the Thespians suggests an 
understanding on the Athenians’ part of the need to defeat intact contingents over the 
pursuing of fleeing contingents, or the continued pressing of withdrawing 
contingents. This may have been a result of battlefield orders from Hippocrates, 
indeed if the Theban general Pagondas was able to direct cavalry to attack the
577 Thucydides 4.96 (trans Hammond.)
578 Matthew (2009)
579 Thucydides 4.96. Pritchett (1985) 74-5; Hanson (1999) 203-219.
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Athenian left wing while the 00ia|i0 0am6a)v was taking place, then there is no 
reason to assume that Hippocrates could not send orders informing this wing to 
continue surrounding the Thespians.
This engagement was not a mass push: it is difficult to imagine how one 
small section of an allied phalanx would have been able to resist a mass push while 
others around it voluntarily withdrew, for it is clear that the Thespians were not 
pushed back and they did not flee.580 There was no mass push by the Athenians on 
the right flank, just a brave stand by the citizens of Thespiae, whose grandfathers had 
died fighting at Thermopylae, and whose sons would stand while others were fleeing 
at the battle of Nemea.581 The 00io|il2l 0ani6u)v that Thucydides described was a 
natural consequence of fighting with spear and shield: the shield was a large and 
heavy piece of equipment and it is logical to assume that some offensive use could 
have been made of it, in combination with spears and shields, or as a desperate 
attempt to knock an enemy off his feet. It was an individual push or shove, not a 
mass push582, and thus did not prevent the continued exercise of command and 
control during fighting.
The noun othismos does not appear in the Hellenica of Xenophon, although 
there are eight instances of otheo, all of them in a military context. The first has
580 Thucydides 4.96.
581 Herodotus 7.202; Thucydides 4.96; Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.16-23; Hanson (1989).
582 As argued by Krentz (1985); Goldsworthy (1997); and van Wees (2004).
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recently been called “ ...one of the literalists’ favourite passages...”, namely 
Xenophon’s description of the battle of Coronea.583
evTaO0a 5f) AyncriAaov avSpeiov pev e^ecjtiv eiueiv dvap(piaPnTnTU)<;: ou pevToi eiAeto 
ye to  aatpaAeaTcrra. e^ov \ a p  auTU) uapEVTi tou$  5iaTTiTTT0VTag cikoAouGoOvti 
XEipoOaGai tou^  ottioGev, ouk 6TToir|CT£ toOto, aAA’ avnpETWTTog auvEppa^E toi^ 
GriPaioi^: Kai aupPaAovisg tcn; aam ’5a^ sujQoQvto, Epaxovro, ottekteivov, 
aTT£0vnaKov.
“At this point one may unquestionably call Agesilaus courageous; at least he 
certainly did not choose the safest course. For while he might have let the 
men pass by who were trying to break through and then have followed them 
and overcome those in the rear, he did not do this, but crashed against the 
Thebans front to front; and setting shields against shields they pushed, 
fought, killed, and were killed.”584
This passage is cited by Hanson in direct support of a literal push, Luginbill 
claims that although it might be possible to see a metaphorical push a natural reading 
suggests otherwise, while Schwartz believes it indicates a violent shoving in order to
c Of
force a path into the enemy phalanx. This passage, along with its concomitant 
passage in the Agesilaus, is the only unambiguous reference in Xenophon’s works to 
a literal and physical push between hoplites; here it is presented along with other 
elements that we would expect of hoplite battle, and which Thucydides described in
C O Z
his account of Delium, namely shields, fighting, and death. The presence of these 
elements in Xenophon’s description strongly suggests that the second clash at 
Coronea was a close and fierce encounter, settled by the thrusting of spears and 
swords, the bashing and shoving of shields, and the discipline and courage of the
583 Krentz (2010) 57.
584 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.19 (trans Brownson, modified); Xenophon Agesilaus 2.12, where he also 
uses olheo.
585 Hanson (2000a) 172; Luginbill (1994) 53; Schwartz (2009) 199.
586 Thucydides 4.96.
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opposing phalanxes. Indeed the ability of the Theban phalanx to break through the 
Spartan phalanx and reach Mount Helicon, although at the cost of ‘many’ lives, 
suggests that they were able to cut a bloody path through the Spartans, not literally 
push them back, a similar situation to that of the battle of Tegyra. There are two 
possible, but admittedly weak, indications of command during this stage of the battle 
of Coronea; the ability of the Thebans to force their way through the Spartan phalanx 
could suggest a co-ordinated attack, while the apparent ability of the Spartans to 
maintain discipline while losing formation suggests the presence of effective 
command and communications during battle. However both of these points could 
simply reflect doctrine and cannot be pushed too far; the second clash at Coronea
fOO
really does seem to have been a desperate head-on brawl.
‘Pushing back’ in hoplite battles.
On a number of occasions the ancient authors describe a battle as ending with 
an army being ‘pushed’ from the battlefield, or a particular contingent of a phalanx 
being ‘pushed’ or ‘pushing’ the enemy back. A survey of the ancient evidence is 
needed in order to determine if othismos, otheo, and exotheo are used in a way which 
supports a literal massed push. If this is indeed the case then the role of the hoplite 
general must have been severely limited during this stage of the fighting: pushed 
from behind straight into the enemy front rank he can have done little more than add
587 Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.16 (trans Brownson.) Plutarch Pelopidas 17.
588 An individual push is also suggested in Xenophon’s account of the battle of Nemea, where pushing 
and fighting are described as occurring at the same time: Xenophon Hellenica 4.4.11-12.
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c o n
his physical effort to a largely uncontrollable sea of men. However if a 
psychological push, or a non-physical push of effort, can be detected in the source 
material then the role of the general, and the possibility for control and command 
during the fighting, can be further clarified. The following discussion focuses on 
those occasions where armies are said to have ‘pushed’ back the enemy, or been 
‘pushed’ back themselves.
In Herodotus’ description of the battle of Plataea the allied Greek army 
refused to move from its elevated position on the spurs of Mount Cithaeron and 
engage the Persians in the plain, so Mardonius ordered his cavalry to attack. 
Although the attack inflicted heavy damage to some parts of the Greek line, the 
Persian cavalry commander, Masistius, was killed and the attack was driven off:
oi ijev vuv pappapoi Tpomp np atpeTepip frrToGavovia ^Ti'pwv Maaicmov: oi 5e 
"EAAnveg wq Tr)v ittttov £5e5avro TTpoapaAAoucrav Kai Se^apEvoi (haavTQ,
“Greek morale was considerably raised by the fact that they had not only 
withstood the assaults of the Persian cavalry, but had actually managed to 
push them back.”590
It is highly unlikely that the Greeks engaged the Persian cavalry in a massed 
pushing contest; rather they were able to resist the attack until such point as an 
advantage could be gained, in this case the killing of Masistius and his horse by the
589 1 use ‘uncontrollable’ here in the sense that a directed ‘opening’ could not be engineered or 
communicated. If ranks were packed tightly and individuals were straining against their shields, while 
being pushed from behind, then it is very difficult to see how amateur soldiers would have been able 
to control, or accept direction, while taking part in an othismos.
590 Herodotus 9.25 (trans Waterfield, modified.)
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Athenians.591 The Greeks had not only withstood the Persian cavalry attack but had 
actually defeated it, resulting in the attack being repulsed, or pushed back, not 
through a literal mass push, but through a push of physical effort and psychological 
strength. The presence of battlefield command during this time is evident by an 
urgent request from the small Athenian contingent under attack for aid; while this aid 
was incoming the Athenians were engaged in a fierce struggle with the Persian 
cavalry over the body of Masistius, but were able to hold the position until the 
reinforcements arrived.592 The contrast between the two armies at this point is 
strong: the Persian cavalry, now leaderless, attacked en masse and became bogged 
down with the Athenians, who were able to hold them off, inflict further losses, and 
send for aid -  all indications that command and control was being exercised during
CQ'J
this ‘pushing back’ of the Persian attack.
Thucydides wrote that during the Spartan attack on the Athenian 
fortifications at Pylos in 425 the Spartan advantage of numbers was nullified by the 
difficulty of the position they were assaulting; however this did not prevent the 
Spartans from trying to push (ibadjjevoi) through the Athenian defences and take the
fort.594 The Spartans were unsuccessful and became trapped on the island of 
Sphacteria, where they were eventually forced to surrender by Demosthenes’ skilful 
use of light infantry. This passage is cited by Hanson in support of a literal 
interpretation of othismos, which he explains as being a crucial phase of hoplite
591 Krentz (2010) 56.
592 Herodotus 9.2-23.
593 Herodotus 9.22-5.
594 Thucydides 4.11.
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battle which involved the creation of momentum through superior weight.595 During 
this extended skirmish the Athenian force attempted to ‘push back’ (ojaaoGai) the
Spartans in a frontal assault.596 The Athenians’ first attempt to engage the Spartans 
failed as they held a high and easily defensible position, but it is clear that no truly 
physical push was involved as the Athenians were using light infantry; their tactics 
involved advancing to launch missiles before retreating to avoid being caught in 
close combat, as such they lacked both shields and the formation necessary to 
undertake a physical push.597 A push of effort is what is meant here; the light 
infantry applied continuous pressure to the Spartan formation in an attempt to force 
it to either give ground or break up.
Schwartz also refers to the passage during a discussion where he states “The 
examples of othismos meaning bodily push are too many and too unambiguous to be
fQO
safely ignored or explained away...” However the engagement on Sphacteria was 
not a hoplite battle, and the action that Thucydides describes cannot have involved a 
physical push; the passage is unambiguous, but it is unambiguous in its support of a 
push of effort, not for a literal push, and certainly not a pushing of shields.599 A more 
ambiguous example is to be found later in book four, where Thucydides describes a 
battle between Corinthian and Athenian hoplites at Solygeia; after a period of hard 
hand to hand fighting the Athenians were able to push the Corinthians back.
595 Hanson (2000a) 172.
596 Thucydides 4.35.
597 Thucydides 4.33-34.
598 Schwartz (2009) 185.
599 Matthew (2010) 399.
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Kai TTpwTa pcv Tip Sc^np K£p<? twv A Sqvaiw v £u0ug aTTo(3£0qK6Ti TTpo Tffc 
X cp aovqaou  oi KopivBioi ettekeivto, etteito Be Kai Tip aAAip cnpaTEupaTi. Kai rjv q 
paxq KapTEpa Kai ev x ePa ' n a a a . Kai to jjev Be^iov KEpag twv AGqvaiwv Kai 
Kapuan’w v ( outoi yap  TTapaTETaypEvoi q a a v  eoxotoi ) eSe^ovto te tou  ^ KopivGioug 
Kai EajaavTO poAi^
The Corinthians first fell on the Athenians’ right wing as soon as it had 
disembarked in front of Chersonesus, and then on the rest of the Athenian 
army. There was hard fighting, all of it hand-to-hand. The right wing of 
Athenians and Carystians (these were next to the Athenians on the extreme 
right) withstood the Corinthian attack and with some difficulty pushed them 
back.”600
The Corinthians were not broken by this push, but were able to retreat 
behind a nearby drystone wall, behind which they launched stones at the Athenian 
phalanx before raising the paean and advancing to combat once again.601 This does 
not fit a mass push interpretation of othismos, not least because the Athenians would 
have had to physically push the Corinthian phalanx uphill. Indeed the whole 
engagement centred on intense hand to hand fighting, with the second clash being a 
long and hard fought stalemate that was only broken when the Athenian cavalry 
made its presence felt.602
Thucydides also used exotheo when describing hoplite battle, with two of 
these instances occurring in his description of the battle of Mantinea in 418. First 
Thucydides describes how all armies are forced to push out (0£wGenial) their right
600 Thucydides 4.43 (trans Hammond, modified.)
601 Thucydides 4.43.
602 Thucydides 4.44. See also 4.96 for the battle of Delium, where: to 5e 5e£iov, n oi ©nPaToi naav, Skpotei 
tu)v AGnvaiwv, Kai ibaapsvoi Kcrra 0paxu to ttputov t^thkoAouSouv.“Their right wing, where the Thebans 
were stationed, was getting the better of the Athenians, pushing them back gradually at first then ever 
more insistently.” Trans Hammond.
217
wing in the advance to battle as the fear of the hoplite on the extreme right hand side
Z’A'l
results in him advancing at an angle. While this can be considered a ‘mass push’ 
in the sense that it refers to an entire phalanx, it does not refer to a mass push 
between opposing phalanxes, and therefore was not a ‘mass push’ in the sense being 
examined here. However the passage is still of some use in determining the 
battlefield role of the general: the tendency to push out the right wing was exploited 
on a number of occasions by hoplite forces, usually in order to outflank the enemy 
left wing, and, when combined with the placing of the best troops on the right wing, 
formed an important tactical consideration.604
In the next chapter Thucydides describes how the Mantineans and picked 
Argive troops rushed through a gap in the Peloponnesian line before pushing back 
the Peloponnesian left wing.
£TT£i5ii y a p  ev xepcriv tyiYvovTO T0^  evavrio is, to p£v tljv Movtiveljv S e^iov tpettei
auTwv Toug iK ip fras Kai tou<; B paaibE ioug, Kai £aTTSg6vTS<; oi MavTivrfc Kai oi
^uppaxoi auTU)v Kai tljv A pyei'ljv oi x 1^ 101 Aoyo5 es koto to S icikevov Kai ou  
^uykAqoBev tous AaKE5aipoviou<; 5iE(p0Eipov Kai kukAljooijevoi ETpsqjav Kai E^ECjaav 
e<; Taq a p a ^ a g  Kai twv TTpEapuTEpwv tljv ettitetoymevwv dTTEKTEivav Tivag.
“As the engagement began, the Mantineans on the right wing routed the 
Sciritae and the Brasidean veterans, then together with their allies and the 
thousand select Argives burst through the still open gap in the opposing line
and caused havoc in that section of the Spartans, surrounding them
completely then pushing them back in defeat all the way to their wagons, 
where they killed some of the older men posted to guard them.”605
603 Thucydides 5.72.
604 See Chapter 2.
605 Thucydides 5.72 (trans Hammond, modified.)
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This description implies the presence of command and control throughout the 
battle: the decision to push through the gap in the Spartan line must have been taken 
on the spur of the moment as the Mantineans cannot have known in advance that 
Agis would order a tactical shift, or that it would be ignored, leaving a gap.606 If the 
decision was calculated and deliberate then it was well executed, indicating the 
ability of generals to influence battle mid-push, although if so then one has to 
question the amount of information, and level of communication, available to the 
generals of the Mantinean and Argive phalanxes.607 However this appears unlikely,
indeed the Mantinean phalanx seems to have lost its cohesion somewhat during the
608advance. Their pursuit of the defeated left wing right back to the baggage train 
suggests a phalanx which had succumbed to the ‘tunnel vision’ that occasionally 
affected victorious phalanxes, leading them to ignore, or leaving their generals 
unable to implement, the better tactical decision in favour of more bloodshed.609 This 
is what we might expect if the ‘push’ had not been ordered and occurred naturally, 
with the Mantinean and Argive hoplites rushing forward to exploit the gap; this 
resulted in their generals momentarily losing control and their phalanxes pursing 
defeated troops, rather than ‘rolling’ up the Spartan line. Regardless of the reasons 
for the Mantineans and Argives pushing back the Spartan left rather than returning to 
aid their centre, it is very difficult to see a mass push here. A push of effort makes 
more sense, and also allows for the presence, and potential loss, of command and 
control.
606 Kagan (1981) 130.
607 If it was a decision made mid-battle then it was certainly the wrong decision.
608 Thucydides 5.72-4. See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
609 As occurred, most notoriously, at the battle of Nemea; Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18-23.
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A final example from Thucydides is the battle of Miletus, where the Athenian 
phalanx pushed back the barbarian troops opposing it.
A G n v c u o i  5 e  t o u ^  t e  l l E A o T T O v v n a i o u ^  T T p ih T O u g  v i K q a a v T E ^  K a i  t o u $  p a p ( 3 a p o u g  K a i  
t o v  a A A o v  o / A o v  w a a i j s v o i , t o T$ M i A r i a i o i g  o u  ^ u p p E i ^ a v T E ^ ,  a A A ’ U T T O x w p n a a v T i o v  
a u T w v  o t t o  T r jg  t l j v  A p y e i w v  T p O T T fjg  e ^  T r )v  t t o A iv  u x ;  E w p w v  t o  a A A o  a c p w v  
n a a w p E v o v ,  u p o ^  a u T i i v  T f iv  t t o A iv  t w v  M i A n a i w v  k p o t o O v t e ^  n 6 r i  T a  o t t A o  ti'G e v t o i .
“The Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, then pushed back the 
barbarians and the rest of the miscellaneous opposition, but did not engage 
with the Milesians, as after the rout of the Argives they had retreated inside 
their city when they saw the other forces losing.”610
The passage indicates the presence of mid-battle direction in the movement 
of the Athenians from one section of the line to another (although we are not told 
where in the line the various contingents were) and in the decision of the Milesians 
to retreat to their city -  presumably they could see, or were otherwise informed, of 
the plight of the rest of the line, and were able to undertake an organised and safe 
march back to Miletus. A mass push is difficult to see here, indeed the engagement is 
more complicated than a single ‘shunt’ of mass against mass: the Athenians broke 
the Peloponnesian contingent, and then engaged the other opposition, who put up 
more resistance but were ‘ground’ down through a combination of physical and 
psychological pressure.611
Three examples of a psychological ‘push’ can be found in the Hellenica, with 
the first occurring during the second engagement of the battle of Piraeus in
610 Thucydides 8.25 (trans Hammond, modified.)
611 Thucydides 8.25.
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f\ 1 9403BC. A Spartan force had been forced to retreat to high ground after Athenian 
light infantry had killed a number of important men; while the Spartans retreated, 
Thrasybulus, the Athenian commander, marched to the aid of the light infantry and 
organised his hoplites into a phalanx eight men deep. According to Xenophon 
Pausanias did the following:
eke? 5e ouvTa^aiJevog ttovteAux;  pa0£?av Tr)v 9aAaYYa rjyev Eui Toug A Gnvaiou^. oi 6 ’ 
£ig x£'Pa S M£V eSe^avTO, ETTEua 6 e oi |jev E fetbaQ noav  tov ev Taiq AAaT<; tti"|A6v , oi 
5 e evekAivov: Kai anoG vnaK O uaiv a u n n v  TTEVTf|K0VTa Kai ekotov.
“There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and led the charge against the 
Athenians. The Athenians did indeed accept battle at close quarters; but in 
the end some of them were pushed into the mire of the marsh of Halae and
» fi 1 'Xothers gave way; and about one hundred and fifty of them were slain.”
Hanson includes this passage in his list of occasions where battle was 
decided by weight or mass, but such a conclusion is difficult to accept: the eight deep 
Athenian phalanx initially offered resistance to the ‘extremely deep’ Spartan 
phalanx, if the Spartan ranks were only advantageous in the weight they added to a 
literal push then the Athenians should have been shunted aside almost 
immediately.614 This leaves open the possibility for battlefield command, although 
there is not enough detail in the description to ascribe a definite role to either 
Pausanias or Thrasybulus during this phase of the battle. However, the two generals 
seem to have been highly competent, and the whole engagement strongly implies 
they were both in direct command of their forces: Pausanias had earlier withdrawn to
612 A similar push occurs at Xenophon Hellenica 7.2.8, but in the context of a siege, rather than a 
battle.
613 Xenophon Hellenica 2.4.34 (trans Brownson.)
614 Hanson (2000a) 172. Van Wees (2004) 190.
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a hill and ordered reinforcements, while Thrasybulus had used light infantry and 
cavalry to ambush the Spartans at the beginning of the battle. Would both generals 
have displayed such talent for tactics and psychology only to throw it away in a blind 
push once the two phalanxes met? This seems unlikely: the battle of Halae was as 
much a clash between two generals and two styles of engagement than it was 
between two phalanxes, and the evidence suggests the final clash was not a mass 
push. Instead Xenophon’s account hints at varying fortunes for different parts of the 
Athenian line: some were killed, some gave way, and others were pushed back to 
Halae -  perhaps Thrasybulus’ phalanx ‘unravelled’ from the back to the front, with 
the rear ranks fleeing and the front ranks being cut down as they either tried to resist 
or turned to run.615 Indeed, the passage suggests a rearguard action that was forced to 
give ground, either because it took casualties or was in danger of being flanked, 
rather than a head on collision and sustained contest of mass against mass.
A psychological push is also implied by Xenophon’s account of a battle near 
Olympia between the Eleans and various enemies in 364BC. The Eleans first 
defeated an Aracdian contingent and then repulsed an attack by an Argive 
contingent:
e n e i ijevtoi KaTESiw^av £i^ to jjeto^u toO pouAEUTrjpiou Kai toO Trfc 'E c rria s  iEpoO Kai 
TOO TTpOg TaOTa TTpOariKOVTOS 0EaTpOU, EpaXOVTO |jev  o u 5 ev r ju o v  Kai sujQquv TTpO^ 
TOV p w p o v  OTTO IJEVTOI T(I)V CTTOUJV TE Kai TOO P0UAEUTT|pi0U Kai TOO pEyaAOU VOOG 
paA AopEvoi Kai ev tu) iaoTTeSto p a x o p s v o i , a n o G v n a K o u a iv  aAAoi te tw v  ’HAei'w v  Kai 
auTO<; o  tw v  T p iaK oaiw v a p x w v  iT paT oA ag.
615 See Thucydides 3.98
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“When, however, they had pursued the enemy to the space between the 
senate house and the temple of Hestia and the theatre which adjoins these 
buildings, although they fought no less stoutly and kept pushing the enemy 
towards the altar, still, since they were pelted from the roofs of the porticoes, 
the senate house, and the great temple, and were themselves fighting on the 
ground-level, some of the Eleans were killed, among them Stratolas himself, 
the leader of the Three Hundred.”616
Xenophon informs us that the Argives and Arcadians, as well as the 
Athenians and Achaeans who were also present, despised the Eleans in matters of 
war and had not expected them to march on Olympia during the games.617 However 
the Eleans’ success did not come about through surprise or deception any more than 
it came about through a mass push; Xenophon’s account suggests this was an 
engagement of hard and determined fighting, with the Eleans eventually being forced 
to retire in the face of a heavy missile attack. The push that Xenophon describes was 
psychological, as the Eleans were pursuing an already defeated enemy, possibly one 
offering sporadic bouts of resistance in a similar vein to the Athenian withdrawal 
after the battle of Delium.618
The next example of a ‘push’ in the Hellenica is that of the battle of Leuctra. 
After the very deep Theban phalanx made contact with the Spartan contingent that 
made up the Peloponnesian right wing, there was a fierce fight.
ETTei ijevtoi aTT£0av£ Aeivwv te o TToAEjjapyog Kai IcpoSpiag twv TTEpi Sapoaiav Kai 
KAEwvupog o uios auToO, Kai oi pev ittttoi Kai oi aupcpopEig toO TroAEpapxou 
KaAoupEvoi oi te aAAoi utto toO oxAou wQouijevoi avExwpouv, oi 5e toO Euwvupou 
OVTES twv AaKEbaipoviwv wg swpwv to Se^iov wQoupevov
616 Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.31 (trans Brownson.)
617 Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.29-30 (trans Brownson.)
618 Thucydides 4.96. Discussed above.
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“But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent- 
companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the 
royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell 
back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left 
wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being 
pushed back, gave way.”619
Before the deaths of these important and powerful individuals the Spartans 
were having the better of the fight, this strongly suggests that what Xenophon is 
describing is not a literal mass push, but the withdrawal of the Spartan phalanx in the 
face of greatly superior numbers, and with shaken morale due to the deaths of 
several prominent men. The fact that the Theban advantage in numbers was only on 
a narrow front has no bearing on the effectiveness or suitability of the tactic, with 
Xenophon pointing out that the Thebans were relying on defeating only a small part
£ 9 0of the Peloponnesian army: those hoplites immediately around the Spartan king. A 
final detail demonstrates the mixed nature of this push: if this was an encounter of 
push versus push, mass versus mass, then the Theban phalanx, with its 4:1
£91advantage, should have pushed back the Spartan phalanx with ease. Initial Spartan 
success can only be attributed to their superior system of subordinate command, 
training, and discipline, advantages that were slowly but surely nullified by a
£9 9continuous stream of fresh Theban fighters.
In the three major historical sources for the Classical period there is not a 
single unambiguous example of othismos, otheo, or exotheo referring to a massed
6,9 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.14 (trans Brownson.)
620 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.12.
621 van Wees (2004) 190.
622 See Humble (2006) 219-233.
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physical push, with the majority of examples indicating the movement of troops as a 
result of changing battlefield conditions, or the movement of triremes in naval 
engagements. However two more sources remain to be investigated: Aristophanes 
refers to a push at the battle of Marathon, and Polyaenus records that three famous 
commanders all placed great weight on pushing the enemy back a single step.
In Aristophanes’ Wasps a veteran of Marathon is made to state that the 
Athenian army, with the help of the gods, pushed the Persians back until evening 
came:
euGews ydp £K5pa|j6vT£<; ^uv 5opi ^uv acrm'Si epaxopeaG ’ auToTcri, Gupov o£i'vr|v 
ttettiokotes, crrag avrip w ap ’ a v 5 p \  utt opYHS Tr)v xeAuvr|v £a0iu)v: utto 5e tujv 
TO^Eupaiwv ouk rjv I5eTv tov oupavov. aAA’ opux; Su)gap£a6a £uv GeoT  ^ n p o g
EOTTEpaV.
“At once we ran up, armed with lance and shield, and, drunk with the bitter 
wine of anger, we gave them battle, man standing to man and rage distorting 
our lips. A hail of arrows hid the sky. However, by the help of the gods, we 
drove off the foe towards evening.”623
This is no more evidence of the Athenians physically pushing the Persians 
than it is of the gods actually descending from Olympus and aiding the Athenians in 
their fight, for a fight it certainly was; Herodotus reports some 6,400 Persian dead.624 
Indeed, Herodotus’ account of the battle itself is brief, descriptive, and, barring the 
blinding of Epizelos by a phantom hoplite, devoid of supernatural inference or 
influence; he makes it quite clear that victory was down to the Athenian tactics and 
their superior equipment, and also emphasises the sheer, although probably
623 Aristophanes Wasps 1081-85 (trans Barrett, modified.)
624 Herodotus 6.117. Hanson cites the passage from the Wasps in support of a physical and mass push: 
Hanson (2000a) 172.
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exaggerated, scale of the victory. Aristophanes picks up on this; he has the veteran 
describe spearing Persians like tuna fish and stinging them in the face and jaw as 
they scrambled to escape; the image of the grizzled veteran whose stories become 
grander with each telling is brilliantly constructed, but, exaggerated or not, the 
retelling of the battle does not imply a mass physical push, and serves as a 
reinforcement of the gritty physical reality of the event; Marathon was a fierce fight, 
but the Persians could not face the stings of the Athenian wasps, and were 
slaughtered as a result. The push that Aristophanes has his veteran describe is a 
psychological push, one that superior numbers, equipment, or position could create. 
It is the same sort of technical terminology that Thucydides and Xenophon use in 
their accounts of battles, as described above.
A meaning similar to that given by Aristophanes can be seen in a phrase 
recorded by Polyaenus and quoted above; although Polyaenus does not use othismos, 
otheo, or exotheo, the passage is occasionally deployed by literalists in support of a 
massed shove.626
rv pfj[ja Xa PkJaa0£ poi, Kai Tr)v viknv e^opev
fsyn
“Favour me one more stap and the victory is ours.”
In each entry the phrase is uttered by the general and victory follows, 
however this should not conjure up images of the entire phalanx taking a unified step
625 Krentz (2010) 156-7.
626 Lazenby (1991) 97; Hanson (2000a) 173-5; Schwartz (2009) 190.
627 Polyaenus Stratagems 2.3.2; 3.9.27; 4.3.8.
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towards the enemy, shunting them backwards one fatal step; rather it should be seen 
as an appeal for a few brief moments of intense effort, an effort which gave the 
phalanx a momentary advantage and ultimately secured victory. The phrase does 
not allow a solid interpretation for any of the labels used to identify pushes thus far, 
and using the Polyaenus as the sole source for anything is fraught with danger; 
however the passage, whether historical or not, remains of some use. Schwartz 
believes the passage at least shows “...that such a situation -  one last step being all 
that separated the phalanx from victory -  was not unthinkable in Greek tradition.”
I agree: a battle could be won or lost on the timing and force of a single concerted 
effort, and forcing the enemy to take, or even attempt to take, a single involuntary 
step back could have been enough to break their morale. The passage shows an 
awareness and appreciation, at least by Polyaenus, of the ability of a general, or 
subordinate commander, to influence the course of events while in the middle of a 
battle. Whether this push was called in order to exploit a momentary gap in the 
enemy line, to pressure an area that looked vulnerable, or simply to initiate a 
particularly strenuous attack does not matter, the principle remains the same: the 
order could be given, and whoever gave it could expect it to be both heard, and 
followed, while Polyaenus could expect his readership, admittedly not Classical 
Greeks but second century AD Romans, to believe this to have been possible.
628 So recognized by Hanson (2000a) 173.
629 Fraser (1942) 16.
630 Schwartz (2009) 190.
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Uses other than in infantry battle
One of the most important points against interpreting othismos as a mass 
push is that the word does not necessarily indicate a physical event, and was used by 
Herodotus to indicate a fierce argument; a situation where a mass push is out of the 
question. He uses the phrase u)0icj|j6s Aoywv in his reporting of a dispute between the
Tegeans and Athenians as to who was most worthy of claiming a position of honour
zo 1
on the wing of the allied phalanx at Plataea.
evGaOia ev t r  Siaia^i e y e v e to  Aoywv ttoA A w v th0iapo$ T e y e h te w v  t e  Kai A0r|vaiu)v
“Much pushing of words arose between the Tegeans and the Athenians 
during the disposition of the troops.”
The Athenians argued strongly for the honour of constituting the left wing of 
the phalanx, and backed up this position by reminding all present that they had 
defeated the Persians at the battle of Marathon only ten years ago. The left wing was 
second in honour and danger only to the right wing, and the state that was posted 
there could legitimately claim to be second in honour and valour only to the 
Spartans; the decision was tactically important as well, especially considering the 
size of the allied Greek army. This ‘pushing of words’ cannot refer to a mass push of 
any sort, which weakens the argument for othismos referring to such an event during 
battle, and strengthens the possibility of generals exerting their influence throughout 
the fighting. Indeed, both the Tegeans and the Athenians emphasised the strength of 
their character and their recent military victories, the Tegeans even recounting the
631 Herodotus 8.78; 9.26.
632 Herodotus 9.26 (trans Waterfield.)
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ability of one Echemus to fight in single combat, not their ability to engage in mass 
pushes. The othismos at the battle of Plataea was one of words, not actions, but even 
that has the effect of emphasising the importance of generals and generalship to 
Greek warfare: the Spartans decided in favour of the Athenians because of their 
victory at Marathon, a victory that I have argued was due to the use of generalship, 
as well as courage and sheer bravery. Indeed such was the Spartan recognition of 
Athenian superiority in engaging Persian forces that Herodotus reports Pausanias 
later ordered the Athenians to move to the right wing in order to allow them to 
directly oppose the Persian forces. The incident may not be true; Lazenby believes 
it to be designed to glorify Athens, remarking that Spartans would never admit to 
being less able to engage an enemy force than other Greeks.634 However the 
Athenians were the most experienced of the Greeks at fighting Persians, and to 
expect the Spartans to have rejected this expertise in the largest battle of the Persian 
Wars, and only a year after Leonidas and his command were destroyed at 
Thermopylae, is to play too much to the Spartan mirage of martial valour. 
Herodotus considered a swapping of positions to have been possible, given the 
information he had at his disposal and his knowledge of the Athenian and Spartan 
characters, and while there was, in the end, no time for the swap to occur, we cannot 
just dismiss it as an impossibility.
Before the battle of Salamis the Greek commanders were engaged in a heated 
debate about the best course of action, with some preferring to fall back to the
633 Herodotus 9.46.
634 Lazenby (1993) 236-7.
635 How & Wells (1912) 308.
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Peloponnese and others counselling to stand and fight. Herodotus describes the 
debate thus:
t w v  5e ev ZaA cpvi aTparriYwv ey'veto u)9igp6^ Aoywv ttoAAo^
“So the commanders at Salamis were furiously pushing their own points of
view.”636
This is clearly a metaphorical use of the word, indicative of the seriousness of 
the situation and the intensity of the argument; the survival of the allied Greek states 
hung in the balance, and a decisive and unified response to the Persian threat was 
essential. This carries the same meaning and implications as the first example, 
namely that an argument could be so fierce, and its consequences so important, that 
it could be described as othismos. Given the importance of the battles of Salamis and 
Plataea to the independence of the Greek states, and the existence of a clear and 
fundamental disagreement in how to resist the Persian invasion, it is not surprising 
that Herodotus emphasised the intensity of debate. That othismos could be used to 
describe a heated argument is solid evidence that the word could carry metaphorical 
or non-physical connotations; indeed it is simply not possible for the word to imply a 
mass-shove in the two situations mentioned above.
Herodotus makes more use of the verb otheo, which occurs fifteen times in 
his work. The versatility of the word and its potential for metaphorical meaning are
636 Herodotus 8.78 (trans Waterfield, modified.)
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demonstrated by its numerous applications, with Herodotus first using it to describe 
the strange way Egyptian men weave:
AiYUTmoi a p a  tuj oupavw  tu) koto  acpeaq eovti ETEpoiq) Kai Tq) TTOTapto cpuaiv aAAoir|v 
TTapEXopevu) n oi aAAoi TTOTapoi, to  woAAa n a v ia  epwaAiv toToi aAAoiai avSpum oiai 
EOTriaavTO nGsa te  Kai vopoug: ev toicti ai psv yuvaikES dyopa^ouai Kai Kauri Asuouai, 
oi 5e av5p£^ k o t’ oikous eovte^ ucpaivouai: utpaivouai 5e oi p£v aAAoi avu) Triv KpoKnv 
ujGeovte^, AiyuTnioi 5e kotw .
“In keeping with the idiosyncratic climate which prevails there and the fact 
that their river behaves differently from any other river, almost all Egyptian 
customs and practices are the opposite of those of everywhere else. For 
instance, women go out to the town square and retail goods, while men stay
at home and do the weaving; and whereas everyone else weaves by pushing
(\\nthe weft upwards, the Egyptians push it downwards.”
Herodotus also uses otheo to describe pushing past guards, stabbing with 
daggers, pushing dead bodies off cliffs, and throwing oneself into a fire. Clearly 
otheo could carry a wide range of meanings, none of which imply a mass push, a 
point backed up by two other important examples of Herodotus’ use of otheo: the 
walling off of Chersonese by Miltiades, and the Athenian rejection of Spartan 
leadership in the build up to the battles of Plataea and Salamis. These both 
represent ‘pushes’ on a strategic scale, with the Aspinthians and the Persians being 
pushed away from a certain location, the Chersonese in the first case and Greece as a 
whole in the second. They do not support a massed physical push, indeed they 
reinforce the image of Greek warfare as being more complicated than is generally
637 Herodotus 2.35 (trans Waterfield.)
638 Herodotus 3.75, 3.78,4.103, 7.167.
639 Herodotus 6.37, 8.3.
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accepted: strategic concerns are evident in these two examples, and both demonstrate 
the ability of generals to influence events on a scale outside the phalanx itself. 
Clearly, otheo had as many different meanings to the Greeks of Herodotus’ day as its 
equivalent, ‘push’, has in modem day English.
Thucydides also uses otheo and exotheo to describe scenarios in which a 
mass push was simply impossible. The strongest example is that of a speech given in 
the Syracusan assembly by the Syracusan general Hermocrates. Hermocrates was 
advising the assembly that an invasion from Athens was a threat to be taken 
seriously, and that immediate action was needed if Syracuse was to offer serious 
resistance; to that end he proposed sending the Syracusan fleet to Taras in order to 
contest any unfriendly crossing of the Ionian Gulf.640 His hopes were that the 
Athenian fleet could be engaged early and at some distance from the city, that this 
engagement would see the Athenians at a disadvantage of either stamina or 
formation due to the distance they would have travelled, or that this unexpected 
resistance would force a rethink of strategy.641
w o t  eyw Y£ toutu) Tq) Aoyiapq) r’lYoOpai auoKAno|j£voug airroug o u 5 ’ av  a u a p a i  d n o  
KEpKupas, aAA’ n SiapouAEuaapEvoug Kai KaTaaKonaTg XPWM£V0US» ottoooi f  Eapsv 
Kai ev q> xw Pko, 65u>a9nvai av  ip  u>p<? iq x£|MWva, n KaianAaYEVTa^ Tq) ddoKqiq) 
KaTaAOaai av  tov ttAo Ov
“So I believe that these considerations will inhibit them from leaving Corcyra 
at all. Either the time they spend in discussing strategy and sending out 
spying missions to establish our numbers and position will push them into the
640 Thucydides 6.33-4.
641 Thucydides 6.34. See Aeneas Tacitus Preface 1 for the advantages of engaging an invading enemy 
at the earliest opportunity -  discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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winter season, or frustration at this unexpected obstacle will cause them to 
disband the expedition...”642
This is a metaphorical use of exotheo, completely lacking any physical 
element: if the Syracusan fleet could cause enough disruption in the Ionian Gulf then 
the date of the final crossing to Syracuse could be pushed so far back that it became 
logistically difficult or physically impossible. This is the only example of exotheo 
being used in this manner by Thucydides, however the point remains powerful: 
Thucydides could conceive of a ‘push’ as having a temporal characteristic, just as we 
might ‘push back’ a deadline, with this further damaging the case for othismos, 
otheo, and exotheo referring to a ‘mass push’, strengthening the case for the ability 
of generals to influence battle, and showing conclusively that the word does not have 
to have a physical meaning.
Thucydides and Xenophon both use exotheo in their descriptions of naval 
battles, where a mass push of any kind is impossible to detect. Thucydides’ use of 
exotheo occurs mostly in the various battles fought in the harbour of Syracuse during 
the final stages of the Sicilian Expedition. The naval engagements were of vital 
importance to the Athenian force. The fleet, and consequently the entire army, was 
trapped in the harbour and morale was drastically low -  a victory in the harbour was 
essential if the Expedition was to receive reinforcements or retreat back to Athens. 
Given the desperate situation of the Athenian force Thucydides’ use of the word 
suggests a similar technical meaning to Herodotus’ use of the word during the battles 
of Salamis and Plataea; the Athenian ships were driven from the battle in the harbour
642 Thucydides 6.34 (trans Hammond.)
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because the physical damage they sustained also had a severe impact on their 
collective nerve and morale.
Thucydides first uses exotheo to describe the tactics that would shape the 
conflicts in the harbour, explaining that:
th te TTpoTEpov apaGi'Qi Twv KUpEpvryrwv SoKouan eTvai, to avn'TTpcppov ^uyKpoOaai, 
pdAiaT av auToi xpnaaor9ai: ttAeTcttov yap  ev auTio axnaeiv: Triv yap  avaK pouaiv ouk 
eaeaG ai ToTg A6r|vai'oig e^ooGoumevok; aAAoae n ££ tt)v yqv, Kai TauTr|v 5 f  oAiyou Kai 
eg oAiyov, kot’ outo to aTpaTonedov to eauT(I)v
“Head-on ramming, which had previously been put down to the captains’ 
inexperience of naval warfare, would now be their favoured mode of attack, 
and they expected to gain great advantage from it. Athenian ships forced to 
back water out of the battle could only retire towards land, and that land was 
close by and closely confined to the area of their own base.”643
The Syracusan tactic of head-on ramming was highly successful against the 
waterlogged Athenian triremes, especially when combined with the disruptive tactics 
that the Syracusans used to bring on a sea battle. A second battle quickly followed, 
with Thucydides again using exotheo to refer to the ‘driving ashore’ of Athenian 
triremes.644 The retreating Athenian ships were not literally shunted from the sea by 
the pursuing Syracusans, but were forced into this action by the superior enemy 
numbers and the unfavourable battlefield situation. Thucydides uses exotheo several 
other times in relation to naval warfare, with it meaning ‘driven ashore’ or ‘forced to
643 Thucydides 7.36 (trans Hammond.)
644 Thucydides 7.39-40.
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withdraw’ on each occasion: these pushes were all non-physical pushes of effort; 
none of them was a contest of mass versus mass.645
The use of othismos, otheo, and exotheo by the ancient historians to describe 
events that took place at sea, on a strategic level, or in a domestic setting indicates 
the flexibility of the terms, and suggests that any attempt to ‘pin’ a single meaning to 
their use in battle descriptions is flawed. Rather, each ‘push’ should be analysed with 
the context of the whole engagement in mind, compared to other instances and 
similar scenarios, and only then can we ascribe a particular meaning to that push: 
simply defining ‘the’ othismos as a mass push is to ignore the wealth of evidence 
which suggests that othismos, otheo, and exotheo can, and do, mean many different 
things.
The ‘rugby scrum’ analogy and the implications this has for generalship
Othismos could be an individual push, from the technical prowess of the 
Thebans in wrestling to perhaps a far from technical strike with the shield, but I do 
not deny that othismos could also serve as an event which involved multiple 
individuals and which involved teamwork and leadership rather than purely physical 
effort. Indeed there are occasions where a local ‘push’ of effort involving a small 
number individuals is a better interpretation than a concerted phalanx-wide effort.
645 Thucydides 2.90, 7.63, 8.104-105. Xenophon Hellenica 4.3.12 for a similar use by Xenophon. 
Krentz (1994) 45-7.
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The imagining and description of this situation has presented scholars with 
some difficulty over the years, with many seeking refuge in the form of an analogy 
taken from the game of rugby.646 A discussion of the analogy is needed here as I 
believe, with some modifications, it can be useful in illustrating the importance of 
command and communication to hoplite armies, as well as because to avoid it 
completely would leave an obvious gap in this chapter’s analysis of the four phases 
of battle. The analogy is dangerous for a number of reasons, primarily because it is 
based on a misunderstanding of the importance of leadership and coordination to 
successful scrimmaging, and to hoplite battle, and also because it is based on the 
mass push interpretation from the offset: there are no technical weapons present on 
the rugby field, and as such the scrum appears to be a matter of pushing and little 
else. ‘General’ is also an inappropriate term to use regarding rugby players, however 
in the scrum, and in ‘open’ play, there are recognisable individuals who we could 
reasonably identify as fulfilling a similar role: they are communicating, making 
decisions, and driving play on. A final difficulty is that a scrum is a ‘set-piece’ 
engagement; play is halted and the two opposing packs shuffle into position before 
play is resumed by a recognised signal -  the insertion of the ball into the relatively 
stable and waiting scrum. The phrase ‘set-piece’ is difficult to apply to hoplite 
battle; few engagements took place ‘by agreement’ and the one example of the 
deliberate limiting of combat, the ‘battle of champions’, if it was historical at all, 
ended in a full scale pitched battle anyway.647 A final danger is the incompleteness 
of the analogy; the primary purpose of a scrum is to gain possession of a rugby ball 
within the confines of the rules, whereas the primary purpose of hoplite battle was to 
kill and not be killed; there were no rules and certainly no referee governing the
646 Krentz (2010) 52-6.
647 Herodotus 1.82.
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conduct of combat in the front ranks. However, despite these dangers I believe a 
rugby analogy can be of some use in describing othismos; I will begin by giving a 
more detailed analysis of the scrum as an analogy.
The use of a rugby scrum as an analogy for the othismos is truly successful 
only in that to an outside observer with little experience both the rugby scrum and a 
phalanx battle would be a baffling sight to experience. It is fair to say that many 
commentators on the nature of the phalanx who make comparisons to the scrum do 
not appear to have much experience of the reality of the event; a scrum, while 
undoubtedly an intensely physical event, does not have a mass shove as its sole 
technique or objective and is certainly not as simple as it may seem to an external 
observer. Indeed tactical leadership and constant communication are vital elements 
of successful scrimmaging, and are, ironically, denied a place in the battlefield 
environment that the ‘mass push’ interpretation of othismos presents. For example, 
while the side putting the ball in has an inevitable advantage in that the hooker 
generally receives a silent signal before the ball is rolled in, the opposing side can 
disrupt this by spotting and reporting the put-in and attempting to ‘spoil’ the ball. 
Equally one member of the scrum ‘pack’ is usually designated the ‘pack leader’, and 
this individual will develop and communicate tactics throughout the game, as well as 
ensuring the coordination of the pack as a whole. There are also three other 
command and control figures present during a scrum: a referee to ensure safety and 
fair play, and two ‘scrum-halves’ who are responsible for inserting and retrieving the 
ball, and organising both the scrum and communication with the backs who will 
receive the ball: scrums, like hoplite battles, are not about pushing!
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A successful scrum requires constant communication and direction from a 
designated leader, as well as the development of the techniques, strength, and 
balance appropriate to the activity, all attributes that have been shown as integral to 
Classical Greek warfare. On this understanding of the analogy the scrum actually 
helps the case for generalship, however a more powerful and appropriate analogy 
can be used, also from rugby, namely the ‘ruck’ or ‘maul.’ These two aspects of play 
are more appropriate analogies as they are not ‘set piece’, and while the objective is 
still to retain or retrieve the ball, this is achieved through a combination of both co­
ordinated pushing on a local scale and tactical retreats and advances upon the flanks 
to weaken the integrity of the opponent’s defence. A successful attack will either 
gain the ball, force a scuff of the ball, or force the opposition into an accidental or 
deliberate foul, all scenarios which would likely result in possession of the ball being 
granted to your side.
In these events the co-ordinated pushing of the enemy remains important, but 
is much more difficult to achieve in a steady and methodical manner, given the lack 
of an initial shunt and the co-operative manoeuvring, overseen by the referee, such 
as begins a scrum. A ruck or maul is free-flowing; they are not initiated by a set 
movement or action and generally build up, in the absence of a swift capture or 
retrieval of the ball, until the forward players of each side are engaged, and continue 
until one side is able to secure the ball and release it to those more mobile 
individuals in the backs. Individual players will join, reinforce the structure and 
integrity of the formation, add their physical and psychological strength to the effort, 
and then withdraw when they become out of position, when the ball is retrieved, or 
when they become physically exhausted. Localised leadership, communication, and
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tactical decision making remain vital in order to secure and protect the ball, as well 
as to ensure that the individuals who are not directly involved in the process are 
aware of what is going on, and what to do once the ball comes out. Once the ball is 
won it is sent out another ruck or maul is likely to occur soon afterwards as players 
are tackled or forced out of position. This is referred to as a ‘phase’ of play, with 
teams that are able to string together multiple phases of play being rewarded by 
constant possession of the ball and dominance of the field. Thus victory is achieved 
by multiple local scale pushes; pushes which secure a brief tactical advantage, which 
are coordinated by recognisable individuals, and which can be exploited to advance 
into enemy territory before the cycle begins again. This is exactly how I conceive the 
fighting and pushing of a hoplite battle to have been: the communication and 
decision making of the generals, and subordinate officers, would result in multiple 
small scale pushes of effort, which would exert psychological and physical pressure 
resulting in sections of the enemy front line bending or otherwise beginning to show 
the strain of battle. Leadership and ‘generalship’ are vital aspects of rugby, just like 
they were to the armies of Classical Greece.
Conclusions
The evidence suggests that no single definition can be placed on ‘the’ push or 
pushes our sources sometimes refer to, but that each instance must be evaluated in 
the context of the engagement; some are physical pushes, others are psychological 
pushes of effort, but none of them are a massed push. This is an entirely unbelievable 
form of warfare, which denies the possibility of generals influencing battle, which 
has not been found anywhere else in the world, at any time, and which relies upon an
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advance ‘at the run’ into combat in a closed and restrictive formation in order to 
occur, scenarios which the previous section of this chapter have shown are not 
supported by the sources. There is also no evidence to suggest that othismos was a 
‘phase’ of battle distinct from the fighting, indeed on many occasions pushing occurs 
at the same time as fighting, while the use of otheo, exotheo, and othismos in naval, 
metaphorical, and other non-literal contexts indicates that a strict definition of push 
as a mass physical shove is incorrect. The push of hoplite battle was the desperate 
engineering of advantage, the deliberate attempt to exploit favourable situations to 
the fullest, the desire to inflict as much damage as possible while the balance of the 
engagement was swung your way, and the frantic struggle to stay calm and escape 
while others around you panicked and were struck down. Scale is not an issue for 
this definition; three hoplites pushing back the enemy with their spears in order to 
save a friend works as well as a formation wide-effort to break the enemy resistance, 
with both these scenarios requiring leadership, teamwork, and communication in 
order to be effective.
If “the” othismos was not a mass push then it allows, indeed demands, the 
presence of leadership and the ability of individuals in command to exercise their 
influence. The source material indicates that this was the case, with this conclusion 
supporting the argument developed above that hoplite battle was a chaotic and messy 
affair, but one that could be, and frequently was, influenced by generals, veterans, or 
by individuals who spotted the potential for advantage or disadvantage, and made 
themselves heard.
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Section D: retreat and pursuit
The final breaking of a phalanx could come about in many different ways: 
front rank cohesion could be lost and enemy fighters penetrate the formation; the 
deaths of generals and notable individuals could remove the ability to maintain 
command and control or destroy morale; sheer weight of numbers could inflict 
massive casualties; and a collective loss of nerve could result in defeat before any 
fighting actually took place. Regardless of how this breakdown occurred, it marked 
the final recognisable phase of a hoplite battle, that of the retreat and pursuit.
This phase of battle has received relatively little treatment in modem 
scholarship, but its nature is vital to any discussion of the role of the general in 
hoplite battle. If the sources demonstrate that there were ‘levels’ of pursuit, or that 
phalanxes could remain cohesive and under control despite being on the retreat, then 
this could indicate that generals were capable of issuing orders in what was likely the 
most chaotic phase of battle; orders which may have relied on the training or 
continued discipline or of their troops, but which still indicate generals could 
influence the phase.
The battles of the Persian Wars demonstrate the ability of generals to 
influence the final phase of battle, the strength and survivability of hoplite forces in 
the face of massed light and ranged infantry, as well as the tactical flexibility of the 
phalanx formation. At the battle of Marathon in 490 Herodotus reports that both of
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the Athenian wings were victorious and did not pursue the fleeing Persians, instead
(LAVcombining into one phalanx and marching to the aid of their defeated centre.
paxopEvwv 6e ev up MapaOwvi xpbvo^ eyi’veto  uoAAog, Kai to psv pEaov toO 
OTpaTOTreSou evi’k w v  oi pappapoi, tq  riepaai te auioi Kai Io k o i etetoxoto: koto  to Oto 
p£v 5rj evi'k w v  oi Pappapoi Kai pri^avTE^ eOi'w k o v  e^ Tr)v pEaoyaiav, to 5 e KEpa^ 
EKaTEpov evi'k w v  A0r|vaioi te Kai nAaTaiEEg: vik iu vte^ 6 e to p£v TETpappsvov t w v  
pappapw v (pEuyeiv e w v , toTo i 5 e to psaov f^n^aai o u tw v  auvayaYovTE^ to  KEpsa 
apcpOTEpa spaxovTO, Kai evi'k w v  A0r(vaToi. (pEuyouai 6e toTo i riEpancJi eittovto 
kotttovte*;
The fighting at Marathon was long and drawn out. In the centre, where the 
Greeks were faced with the Persians themselves and the Sacae, they were 
beaten; the invaders got the better of the Greeks at this point, broke their 
lines, and pursued them inland. However, the Athenians and Plataeans on 
their respective wings were victorious. They left the Persians they had routed 
to flee from the battlefield and concentrated on those who had broken 
through the centre. The two wings were combined into a single fighting unit- 
and the Athenians won.649
This restraint of pursuit, whether planned in advance or a ‘natural’ decision 
made by both wings simultaneously, was a sensible decision given the tactical 
environment, indeed the battle may have been lost had the wings not returned to aid 
the centre as rapidly as they did.650 The exact nature of the Athenian tactics at 
Marathon has been disputed, with some preferring a deliberate withdrawal by the 
Athenian centre followed by a double envelopment, and others imagining that both 
wings re-formed into a single phalanx which then charged the Persian centre from
648 Herodotus 6.112-3.
649 Herodotus 6.113 (trans Waterfield.)
650 Herodotus 6.111-3. Describing the restraint as a deliberate tactical double envelopment gives too 
much credit to the amateur, inexperienced Athenian hoplites of 490, as does any thought of a 
deliberate ‘withdrawal’ or sacrifice of the centre, a tactic that would have sharply clashed with the 
ideal of shared risk in battle. Krentz (2010) 158.
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behind.651 Both interpretations give a great deal of credit to the untrained and 
inexperienced Athenian and Plataean hoplites, and gift Miltiades a victory of 
tactics and subtlety while ignoring the presence of nine other strategoi on the 
field. Crediting Miltiades with deliberately thinning the centre in order to gain a 
double envelopment may be expecting too much, and it is true that the ability of 
amateur hoplites to undertake manoeuvres mid-battle, or even to maintain the most 
basic of formations once battle had ended, can be doubted, given later examples, 
however this does not automatically render Herodotus’ account false or useless.
Van Wees emphasises the heroic perfection of Herodotus’ account, however I 
do not agree with his conclusion that hoplite armies did not have the degree of 
control and cohesion required to perform such a manoeuvre;654 examples of 
phalanxes performing actions which would require communication, cohesion, 
discipline, and command abound. Later armies rally,655 return to the battlefield,656 
and ignore fleeing enemies to engage intact phalanxes, and when the nature of the 
Athenian army at Marathon is considered, the case for a deliberate restraint of 
pursuit followed by an organized advance back into combat becomes stronger. The 
Athenian and Plataean phalanx at Marathon had a distinct advantage over larger 
phalanxes made up of contingents from several cities or areas: a lifetime of
651 Lloyd (1881) 338 for the view that the Athenian centre gave way deliberately. Van der Veer (1982) 
319; Bum (1984) 520; Hammond (1988) 512 for the view that the wings joined into a single phalanx. 
Green (1996) 37 suggests both wings reformed and began a pincer-movement.
652 Van Wees (2004) 180.
653 While Herodotus’ account can be quite reasonably be described as “...a story of hoplite behaviour 
pushed to heroic extremes”, there are also reasons to believe the fundamental details, as long as one 
does not go past these and posit a deliberate ‘double envelopment’. Van Wees (2004) 180. Green 
(1996) 37; Santosuosso (1997) 35-6. Krentz (2010).
654 Van Wees (2004) 180.
655 Thucydides 5.10.
656 XenophonHellenica 4.3.18-20.
657 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.20-3.
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• • ^ cofriendship, family, and love. It may be too much to expect Argive and Corinthian 
hoplites to give up pursuit of an enemy to come to the aid of Athenians in battle, but 
the same surely cannot be said of a phalanx comprised of only Athenians and 
Plataeans, such a close ally that its population was offered Athenian citizenship after 
the city was razed by the Peloponnesians in 428.659 Thus the decision to return to the 
aid of the centre may have been natural, rather than one ‘forced’ thanks to the tactical 
insight of the generals present, however the point raised above still stands: the two 
wings still needed to be organized and, to some extent perhaps ‘reformed’, before 
advancing upon the centre, indicating the ability of the generals present to influence 
battle in this final stage. A final point ends the discussion of Marathon: that this was 
a deliberate restraint of pursuit is further indicated by the subsequent lengthy pursuit 
of the Persian centre all the way to the shoreline; once the centre had been defeated 
there was no tactical concern which demanded pursuit be restrained, and the 
Athenians pursued and killed as many of the Persians as they could.660
The ability of generals to influence the pursuit phase of battle can also be 
seen at the battle of Plataea; after the death of the Persian commander Mardonius the 
Persian infantry fell back in disarray to their camp and were pursued with ‘much 
slaughter.’661
658 Lazenby (1993) 248, 258.
659 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.21-3. Thucydides 3.55, 63; Isocrates 12.94; Lysias Against Pancleon; 
Diodorus 14.46.6. However such solidarity does not seem to have come into play at the battle of 
Nemea, perhaps because that engagement involved an allied phalanx of many different states, not a 
‘single nation’ phalanx. Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.16-23.
660 Herodotus 6.113-5; Aristophanes Wasps 1081-85.
661 Herodotus 9.63.
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TH 5e eTuyxave auToq ecov Map5ovio<;, cut’ ittttou te paxopEvog AeukoO exwv te TTEpi 
eojutov AoyaSa^ riEpaEwv Toug api'aToug X'^ioug, to u tr  5e Kai paAicrra tou^ 
Evavriouq ETTiEaav. oaov psv vuv xpbvov Mapdoviog TTEpifjv, oi 6e ovteTxov Kai 
apuvopEvoi KaTEpaAAov TToAAoug twv AaKEdaipoviwv: wg 5e Mapdovio^ aiTEGavE Kai 
TO TTEpi EKETVOV T£TOY|J£VOV EOV iaXUpOTOTOV ETTEOE, OUTOJ 5r| Kai Oi aAAoi ETpaTTOVTO 
Kai Ei^av toToi AaKEdaipovioiai.
Mardonius rode into battle on his white horse, surrounded by his elite 
battalion of a thousand first-rate soldiers, and wherever he put in a personal 
appearance the Persians made things particularly difficult for their opponents. 
As long as Mardonius was alive, the Persians held their ground and fought 
back, inflicting heavy casualties on the Lacedaemonians. But after he had 
been killed and the men of his battalion, the most effective troops on the 
Persian side, had been cut down, all the others turned and fled before the 
Lacedaemonians..662
This slaughter continued when the camp barricade came down, and does not 
seem to have ended until the Persians were utterly destroyed as a fighting force. 
Specific roles for any Greek generals during this pursuit are difficult to determine, 
however there is no indication that any of those phalanxes directly involved in the 
initial fighting lost their coherence or began an unwise pursuit, thus it can fairly be 
stated that they remained under the control of their generals. This is strengthened by 
the degree of co-operation implied by the breach of the Persian palisade wall; 
Herodotus reports the Spartans had been unable to break through the wall and were 
being hard pressed by the Persian defenders until the Athenian contingent arrived 
and created a breach, with the Tegean contingent being the first enter the camp.664 
The episode is suspicious as there is no indication that Athenian forces were
662 Herodotus 9.63 (trans Waterfield.)
663 Herodotus 9.64-5.
664 Herodotus 9.70.
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experienced in siege techniques at this time,665 although such an implication would 
undoubtedly have gone down well with Herodotus’ contemporary audience, while 
the fact that the Tegeans were the first through the breach (and also the first to begin 
the advance against the Persian infantry) would seem to indicate that they created it 
in the first place.666 However, the story is believable, indeed Herodotus must have 
expected his audience to believe that such a degree of co-operation was possible, co­
operation that could only have been effective with a degree of communication 
between the Athenian, Tegean, and Spartan contingents, who also, therefore, 
remained under effective command.667 The breach of the palisade led to the massacre 
and final defeat of the Persian force, with Herodotus emphasising the Persian lack of 
order and other soldiery virtues, a situation presumably matched by the Greek 
forces’ retention of such qualities; while Herodotus’ figure of 257,000 killed is 
fantastically large, a great slaughter surely followed.
The successful, and extended, pursuit by the Greek forces at Plataea 
demonstrates the ability of generals to maintain control over their forces during this 
final phase of battle, and is all the more impressive considering the eleven day build 
up to the final engagement and the ‘desertion’ of so many contingents at the last 
minute. However Herodotus also records an incident where the opposite seems to 
have happened, i.e. generals being unable to control their troops, this being the 
massacre by Theban cavalry of 600 Megarian, Phleiasian, and other Greeks who
665 How & Wells (1912) 316.
666 Herodotus 9.62. Lazenby (1985) 244.
667 Herodotus 9.70.
668 Lazenby (1985) 244-5.
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rushed forward in a mob after spotting the retreat of the Persian infantry.669 
Herodotus points out that they had not played a part in the earlier fighting670 and so 
were presumably at ‘full strength’ before embarking on their precipitate pursuit, 
which leaves three explanations as to why they did so: 1) the generals were unaware 
of the danger posed by the Theban cavalry and so ordered the pursuit to be 
undertaken, 2) the generals were aware of the danger and did not order the pursuit, 
but were unable to prevent the hoplites from beginning it, 3) the generals were aware 
of the danger but became caught up in the moment and began the pursuit anyway. 
The second and third possibilities are more likely as Herodotus emphasises the lack 
of cohesion and discipline these hoplites demonstrated in their haste to join the 
pursuit, two attributes in direct opposition to those displayed by the Spartan, 
Athenian, and Tegean contingents. The generals of the various contingents present at 
Plataea played direct and important roles in the pursuit of the retreating Persian 
forces, and their ability, or inability, to make appropriate tactical decisions, as well 
as to control their men, was the difference between life and death for their 
contingents.
The ability, and desire, of generals to restrain pursuit in unfavourable tactical 
circumstances was not isolated to the large battles of the Persian Wars, indeed it can 
be detected in several battles of the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars, most 
notably in the various battles involving the Athenian generals Demosthenes and 
Thrasybulus. In 426 Demosthenes, in command of a small allied hoplite force,
669 Herodotus 9.69.
670 Bum (1962) 537 for the suggestion that these Greeks were marching to aid the Athenians, 
Woodhouse (1898) 50-1 for the conjecture that the Greeks set off upon receipt of a message from 
Pausanias.
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defeated a larger Peloponnesian army at the battle of Olpae by anticipating the 
flanking manoeuvre of their right wing, and placing 400 hoplites and light infantry in
f\ 71ambush for it. This ambush resulted in the defeat of the Peloponnesian right, and 
the spread of a contagious panic which resulted in all but the Ambraciot contingent 
of the Peloponnesian force turning to flight. The Ambraciots had met with initial 
success, and pursued those immediately opposite them right the way back to Argos. 
The Ambraciot contingent would have been more effective had it restrained its 
pursuit and covered the retreat of the rest of the army, or moved to engage another 
section of Demosthenes’ army, however the extent of the Ambraciot pursuit suggests 
that their general may have been unable to control his troops, or preferred to chase 
down fleeing enemies rather than engage an intact phalanx. Either way, when the 
Ambraciots did return to the battlefield they found it held by Demosthenes, were 
engaged and defeated by his Acamanian troops, and turned from pursuer into 
pursued. Thucydides stresses the lack of discipline shown by the Ambraciots during 
their retreat: many were killed in headlong flight. The desperate flight of the 
Ambraciots is immediately contrasted with the seemingly calm and disciplined 
retreat of the Mantinean contingent, who maintained their formation and,
• 673presumably, were able to withdraw in safety.
Demosthenes’ army does not appear to have attempted to pursue the main 
body of Peloponnesian troops, choosing to occupy the battlefield instead, a wise 
decision given the initial success of the Ambraciot contingent. This success may
671 Thucydides 3.106-7.
672 Thucydides 3.108. Homblower (1991) 532 refers to this as an ‘over-pursuit’ -  a useful phrase. 
However he also refers to this section of Thucydides as containing many events “...contrary to the 
spirit of hoplite warfare.” This ‘spirit’ is an entirely modem invention, See Chapters 1 and 6.
™ Thucydides 3.108.
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have been communicated to Demosthenes, or those commanding the Acamanian 
hoplites, resulting in the centre and left wing restraining their pursuit and awaiting 
the return of the Ambraciots; given the level of intelligence and local geographical 
knowledge that Demosthenes seems to demonstrate here, it is reasonable to posit that 
an effective messaging system was in place. However this restraint of pursuit was 
achieved, it resulted in Demosthenes’ army occupying the battlefield and inflicting 
heavy casualties on the Ambraciots as they fled to Olpae.
So generals were able to plan ahead for the retreat/pursuit phase of battle, 
however such forward planning was not always necessary, and generals were also 
able to influence this phase by reacting to changing tactical circumstances. The battle 
of Cyzicus, discussed in Chapter 2, is a good example of this, as is the battle of 
Munychia, where Thrasybulus, one of the three Athenians generals present at 
Cyzicus, commanded the ‘rebel’ forces.674 Xenophon’s description of the fighting is 
brief, although we are told the rebel forces pursued the forces of the Thirty as far as 
level ground and that the enemy general Critias was killed. In this case it was 
Thrasybulus’ concern for the maintenance of geographical advantage in the face of a 
numerically superior enemy rather than the threat of an intact enemy force that 
placed a limitation on the extent of pursuit: Diodorus was explicit in explaining that 
the rebel survivors of the battle would not pursue further due to their relative lack of
fin e
numbers, and in this he is probably correct. The forces of the Thirty were unable 
to maximise their numerical advantage due to the difficulty of the terrain and the
674 Xenophon Hellenica 1.1.12.
675 Diodorus 14.33.2-3.
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presence of a road, as such they had arrayed some fifty ranks deep.676 This compared 
to the ten ranks of the rebels, a disparity that could have had dangerous 
consequences if the rebels’ force-multiplier of favourable terrain had been 
abandoned. If the rebels had continued their pursuit then they would have risked the 
possibility of being re-engaged on level terrain by a force whose frontage could have 
been extended to overlap on both flanks -  the pursuit by Thrasybulus’ men up to, but 
not beyond, level ground was a sound tactical decision based upon the immediate 
terrain and the composition of the opposing armies.
The most striking example of the ability of the general to influence the final 
phase of battle, and the advantages of the restraint of pursuit, as opposed to a 
headlong pursuit, is the battle of Nemea. Here the Spartan contingent was able to 
defeat the six Athenian tribal contingents opposite them, and wheel round to come to 
the aid of their beleaguered allies.677 By contrast the four other Athenian tribal 
contingents had pursued their enemies so far that the Spartans did not even come into 
contact with them, gifting the Spartans free rein to attack and kill large numbers of
(LHQ
Argive and Corinthian hoplites. This restraint of pursuit was a response to the 
immediate tactical environment: by leaving defeated enemies to flee they were able 
to concentrate on those enemy elements that were still intact. Indeed, the initial 
Spartan restraint of pursuit enabled them to ‘roll’ up the allied line, striking enemy 
hoplites on their shield-less side and probably causing more casualties than if they 
had pursued the hoplites they had initially defeated. By doing this the Spartan 
phalanx was also able to maintain a high level of discipline and cohesion, as
676 Xenophon Hellenica 2.4.11-12.
677 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.18-23.
678 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.20-3.
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demonstrated by their defeat of those enemy formations which were initially 
successful, began a pursuit, and returned to the battlefield later. Thus returning 
Argive, Corinthian, and Theban formations were systematically attacked and
rrnQ
defeated, resulting in a comprehensive Spartan victory. It is difficult to ascribe the 
ability of the Spartans to go to the aid of their allies, and then engage three more 
enemy formations, to anything other than effective battlefield command and control 
combined with developed tactical awareness, two qualities that the Argive, 
Corinthian, and Theban phalanxes appear to have lacked.
Spartan tactical concerns in pursuit
Thucydides’ account of the battle of Mantinea in 418 is of great use for 
determining the ability of generals to influence the final phase of battle and of the 
apparent Spartan preference for restraint in pursuit. In his description of the battle 
Thucydides remarks that there was little in the way of pursuit once the Argives and 
their allies turned to flight, and notes that:
oi yap AaK£5aijj6vioi fjeypi M^v T°0  Tpeqjai xpovioug Tag ndxa,> Kai pepaioug Tq> 
[j£V£iv TTOioOvTai, Tp£qjavT£g 6£ ppaxei'ag Kai ouk m i ttoAu Tag 5ico^£ig.
“The Spartans fight their battles long and resolute to the turning point, but 
once they have turned the enemy they do not pursue for any great time or 
distance.”680
679 Xenophon Hellenica 4.2.22-3.
680 Thucydides 5.73 (trans Hammond).
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Plutarch recorded a similar sentiment: apparently Lycurgus stated that Spartans 
should only pursue until victory was assured as any further pursuit gave the 
impression that nothing was to be gained from flight.681 Xenophon also had an 
opinion: he reported that Agesilaus was greatly upset at the scale of the carnage at 
Nemea, and in an idealised demonstration of his subject’s concern for Greek lives 
and pan-Hellenic unity he has Agesilaus proclaim that the number of Greeks who 
fell in one day were enough to defeat all the Barbarians had they lived.682 However 
Spartan practice does not match the image presented by these sources: the victorious 
Spartans in the battle for the walls of Corinth in 392B.C. felt the sight of a crowd of 
panicking, scared, and utterly defeated hoplites to be a gift sent from heaven, and set 
about slaughtering them. A similar sentiment can be found in the account of the 
‘Tearless battle’ in 368B.C.: such was the ferocity of the Spartan advance that the 
majority of the opposing Argive phalanx fled before contact was made, while those 
who stood their ground were quickly killed and a pursuit of the fleeing army 
undertaken. Xenophon reports that vast numbers of the Argives were killed, a
fL QAsituation viewed with great pleasure at Sparta.
The response of a Spartan general to a fleeing enemy was based on the 
immediate tactical circumstances: if there were intact enemy contingents still 
fighting then the standard response seems to have been to restrain pursuit and engage
681 Plutarch Moralia 228F; Polyaenus 1.16.3. A similar sentiment is expressed by Diodotus in the 
Mytilene debate: if  Athens punishes cities who have surrendered by slaughtering their citizens, then 
what incentive would cities have to surrender in the first place? Thucydides 3.46.
682 Xenophon Agesilaus 7.5. Schwartz accepts the evidence for lengthy pursuit but also suggests that 
Spartan practice was indeed to offer only limited pursuit, even stating that it may have been official 
policy. Schwartz (2009) 214-5.
83 Xenophon Hellenica 4.4.12. Also Thucydides 5.10 for the lengthy pursuit of the Athenians after 
the battle of Amphipolis.
684 Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.31-2; Diodorus 15.72.
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these threats, however if there was no need for restraint then Spartan generals were 
able to order a sustained pursuit of the enemy. Spartan forces were also able to 
retreat in good order when defeated in hoplite engagements, chase off attacking light 
infantry, and form ‘flying companies’ to help cover a withdrawal, all indications of 
the ability of their generals to influence the retreat, as well as the pursuit.685
Extended pursuit
Those occasions when phalanxes engaged in extended pursuit of a defeated 
enemy are as useful in determining the battlefield role of the general as times when 
this pursuit was restrained or abandoned; they will help to indicate whether pursuit 
was a ‘natural’ response to victory, a deliberate and desirable action given the 
specific tactical circumstances, or that pursuit was undesirable but the phalanx could 
not be prevented from undertaking it. An analysis of these occasions will further 
highlight the battlefield role of the general by showing the limits of what was 
possible: if many battles ended in a tactically unwise pursuit then either many 
generals could not exercise sufficient influence to prevent this, or lacked the tactical 
nuance to realise that such pursuit should not be undertaken.
One of the most striking examples of battlefield command during a pursuit is 
that of the stoning to death of a number of Corinthian hoplites after the battle of
685 Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.13-14, 7.5.18-25,4.4.16; Thucydides 4.126-7.
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Megara in 457. Thucydides’ description of the engagement is detailed, interesting, 
and surprisingly moving; it tells us a great deal the role of the general and the nature 
of Greek warfare, and has not been given nearly enough attention by modem
s o n  t
authors. The passage is also of interest as a result of its position in Thucydides’ 
work, and the amount of space he devoted to it: Kitto comments that “. . .this section 
of the History is written with such concentration that the events of nearly fifty years 
are packed into what becomes only sixteen pages of the Teubner text...yet 
Thucydides could spare half a page for this one afternoon’s horrible work.”688 As 
such we must treat the passage with the respect it deserves, and see what it tells us 
about the battlefield role of the general:
oi 5e viKwpevoi uuExwpouv, Kai ti aunhv pepog ouk  6Aiyov TTpoapiaa0ev Kai 
SiapapTOv Tffc 65o0 e o e tte o e v  iq to u  xwPiov iSiurrou, $  e tu x ev  opuypa |j£ya 
■nepieTpyov Kai ouk  rjv £^o5og. oi 5 e  A0r|vaToi yvovTE^ k o to  TTpoaumov te  E?pyov toT^ 
OTrAiTai  ^Kai TTEpiainaavTES kukAip tou ^  tpiAoug KaTEAEuaav TravTag Toug 6a£A0ovTas.
As the Corinthians were retreating after this defeat, quite a large section of 
them, hard pressed and missing the way back, found themselves in a private 
estate which was surrounded by a deep ditch with no other exit. Seeing this, 
the Athenians blocked the entrance with their hoplites, positioned light
• £ O Qinfantry round the perimeter, and stoned to death all those inside.”
The incident is an important example of command and control being 
exercised during the retreat/pursuit phase of hoplite battle, and highlights the level of 
sophistication that amateur forces could operate with. The effective deployment of 
light infantry was difficult for Classical Greek generals to achieve, yet here we see it
686 Thucydides 1.106.
687 Schwartz (2009) 264-5 includes some detail o f it in his battle appendix but offers no comment.
688 Kitto (1966) 271; Homblower (1991) 166.
689 Thucydides 1.106 (trans Hammond, modified.)
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used in combination with a pursuing hoplite force to exploit advantageous terrain 
while in unfamiliar territory, the very model of an effective engagement as 
recommended by Aeneas Tacticus!690 This level of sophistication is all the more 
surprising when it is remembered that a large percentage of Athenian manpower 
was, at this time, serving abroad in Aegina and Egypt, and the force that was sent to 
Megara was made up of the remaining men of serviceable age, i.e. the youngest and 
oldest.691 That an Athenian army made up of ‘second-choice’ hoplites, and an 
unreported number of light infantry of unknown quality, was able to undertake a 
coordinated action in which the hoplites performed a ‘checking’ role and the light 
infantry did the damage, suggests generals and subordinate commanders could 
influence the final phase of battle. Indeed the engagement indicates that Myronides, 
the Athenian general, was able to direct his forces during their pursuit of the 
Corinthians, while the haste of the Corinthians suggests that their general was no 
longer able to control his force, or had been killed.692 A degree of caution may be 
needed when looking at the incident generally as the Corinthian forces were so 
clealy beaten they may no longer have posed a threat to the Athenians, thus allowing 
the Athenians to make decisions or engage in operations which were normally not 
options when faced with more coherent opposition. However when we remember 
Myronides’ force was not made up of the best hoplites the Athenians had, quite the 
opposite in fact, we can see that Thucydides’ description remains of use.
690 Aeneas Tacticus 16-18. Discussed in Chapter 4.
691 Thucydides 1.105.
692 The engagement began with the Athenians sallying out of Megara and destroying a Corinthian 
force which was erecting a trophy -  it is reasonable to assume that the Corinthian general would have 
been involved in this. Thucydides 1.104.
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The ability of the general to influence the retreat/pursuit phase of battle, as 
well as the importance of maintaining cohesion and discipline during the retreat, was 
dramatically demonstrated in two battles involving the Athenian general 
Demosthenes in 426. In an engagement in Aetolia Demosthenes’ phalanx was 
broken by Aetolian light infantry and, with its Messenian guide having been killed, 
fled in disorder; the situation was similar to that of the battle of Megara discussed 
above, with some Athenians running into inescapable ravines, and others into a 
forest which was blocked off and set alight. Thucydides’ comment regarding the 
death of the Messenian guide is interesting, perhaps serving as an attempt to save 
Demosthenes from taking the full blame for the defeat. Indeed Thucydides’ 
readership would surely have appreciated the importance of knowledge of local 
terrain and the ability of generals to use this intelligence in battle: had the guide 
survived, then maybe the defeat would not have been so serious.694 In the end some 
120 Athenian hoplites were killed, and the ability of light infantry to engage hoplites 
effectively was ably demonstrated, a lesson which Demosthenes learnt and later put 
into practice himself.695
Thucydides records another engagement involving Demosthenes in 426, one 
which shows what a good general could achieve in the final phase of hoplite battle, 
although mostly by the use of scouting and advance planning.696 At the battle of 
Idomene Demosthenes planned in advance how to maximise the casualties that could 
be inflicted on his retreating enemy. He placed Amphilochian troops, familiar with
693 Thucydides 3.97-8. Homblower (1991) 512-4; Lazenby (2004) 61-2.
694 Thucydides 3.97.
695 Some 40% of the hoplites present. See below for Demosthenes’ use of skirmishing tactics.
696 Thucydides 3.97-99; Roisman (1993) 12-13.
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the immediate territory, in ambush along the natural lines of retreat from the 
battlefield before attacking the Ambraciot army at day break.697 His achievement of 
surprise was total: some Ambraciots were killed on the field while others who fled to 
the mountains were cut down by the Amphilochians, who had the additional 
advantage of being lightly armed:
TrpOKaTEiAr|MM£vw v 5e tw v  65wv, Kai ap a  tw v  |jev Ap(piA6xwv EjjTTEipwv ovtw v  Tffc 
eou tw v YHS KCtl ipiAwv n p oq  OTTAiTas, tw v  5e aTTEipwv Kai dvETnaTnMOvwv o ttr  
TpairwvTai, EaTTinrovTEg iq te  x a p d5pag Kai Ta^ TrpoAEAoxiapEvag EVESpag 
5lECp0EipOVTO.
But the paths had been ambushed in advance, and moreover the 
Amphilocians were familiar with their own territory, in which they had the 
advantage of light-armed troops against hoplites, while the Ambraciots did 
not know which was to turn in unfamiliar country: so they blundered into
1TQO
ravines or the ambushes already laid for them, and were killed.
The engagement is similar to Demosthenes’ earlier defeat at the hands of 
Aetolian light infantry, and indicates that he had learnt from that experience and had 
taken advice from the Amphilochian light infantry regarding the immediate terrain 
and the advantages they held over hoplites. Either possibility points to an important 
role for the general during the retreat/pursuit phase of battle, although on this 
occasion it was more planning before battle rather than direct command during the
1 - 699retreat that was important.
697 Thucydides 3.112.
698 Thucydides 3.112 (trans Hammond.)
699 Thucydides 3.113. Roisman (1993) 14-15.
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The year 395 saw an allied Ainianian and Athamanian army defeat and 
pursue a Phocian army.700 Few details survive, but Diodorus makes it clear that 
pursuit was undertaken until nightfall, i.e. it ended because the coming of night made 
it difficult to see and kill the fleeing enemy, as well as making the accurate
701transmission of orders using messengers or visual signals difficult. While one 
cannot make too much of such a brief battle description, the fact that nightfall was 
the only reason the pursuit ended indicates that this pursuit was initially appropriate 
given the circumstances, and was deliberately restrained when it became too 
dangerous.702 Whether this restraint was ordered by the general or occurred naturally 
cannot be determined, but it is reasonable to suggest that both could occur 
simultaneously; indeed a single salpinx note indicating ‘recall’ or ‘gather’, perhaps 
that used for reveille, could have been used. The incident also strongly suggests that 
there was no moral concern regarding the cutting down of defeated enemies; if the 
coming of night was the only reason the pursuit was ended, then this reinforces the 
notion that the only limiting factor regarding the killing of other Greeks was that of a 
desire to, sometimes, ‘play it safe.’703
The nature of the final phase of battle is difficult to define and the only 
certain position is that there was no ‘standard’ response to defeat or victory: the
V
unique circumstances of each battle dictated if, how, and for how long an enemy 
would be pursued. Not all accounts of battles record details of the retreat and pursuit, 
and there is no direct discussion by the contemporary sources of the role of generals
700 Diodorus 14.82.7-10; also Thucydides 4.44 for nightfall ending the pursuit after the battle of 
Abydos and Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 1, 6.
701 Diodorus Siculus 14.82.9.
702 The coming of night was also the only reason the Boeotians did not pursue the Athenians after the 
battle of Delium: Thucydides 4.96.
703 See Appendix 1.
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or hoplites during this phase, beyond Laches’ belief that the study of hoplomachia 
would be of some use.704 This is unfortunate, but expected: as discussed in chapter 1, 
the only way to effectively and reliably analyse or reconstruct Greek warfare is 
through interpreting a collage of anecdotes, vignettes, and the occasional brief 
description; we cannot avoid the relative dearth of evidence for the retreat/pursuit 
phase of battle, and so must work with what we have.
The overall image of this final phase is one of a highly dangerous and fluid 
situation for both phalanxes; the defeated phalanx risked annihilation if it fled in 
total disorder, while the victorious phalanx risked over-extension and counter-attack 
if a careless or overly enthusiastic pursuit was begun. While none of the surviving 
sources directly discusses the role, or potential, role of the general in this phase, the 
evidence suggests that command and control could be, and was, exercised up to a 
point. Those examples where phalanxes pursued recklessly or fled in disorder can be 
attributed not just to a collective loss of nerve, but a collective loss of command as 
well; we cannot say which came first, but the two are closely connected. A loss of 
nerve could render individuals and groups unable to respond to commands, while the 
loss of command, or even the perceived loss of command, could cause a loss of 
nerve -  phalanx combat was confusing, and if there was no source of orders or 
authority, or no individual willing to ‘step up’ and fulfill that role, it could result in a 
final, and devastating, blow to cohesion and morale.
704 Plato Laches 181e-182a. See above.
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Conclusions
The evidence discussed above indicates that some hoplite generals were able 
significantly to influence the course of the final phase of battles, a finding which 
accords with the previous argument emphasising the flexible nature of the phalanx 
and the importance of leadership, communication, and command and control. There 
was no ‘standard’ response to victory or defeat in battle: the immediate tactical 
circumstances and the ability of the general, or other individuals, to communicate his 
orders determined how, or if, the retreat/pursuit was undertaken. Sometimes armies 
pursued long and hard, chasing down their defeated enemies until nightfall, or intact 
enemy forces, or difficult terrain forced them to stop; other times armies pursued 
headlong and without regard to nearby danger or allies in distress; while still other 
times armies restrained their pursuit due to tactical concerns. Some phalanxes were 
able to maintain their cohesion and formation in defeat; others were able to maintain 
this cohesion in certain parts of their line; and still others simply disintegrated when 
it became clear that they had been defeated. This variety of responses indicates the 
varying abilities of different generals and subordinate commanders to react to, and 
exploit, the immediate tactical situation, in attack or defence, and the difficulty some 
phalanxes found themselves in if effective command and control could not be 
maintained. This is to be expected given the differences in skill and discipline that 
were to be found between opposing armies in the field, and the unique geographical 
and military circumstances which surrounded each battle recorded by our sources. If 
pursuit was limited then sometimes it was for a practical military reason, and 
sometimes because Greek commanders were unable to control their troops, but there 
is no evidence to suggest that it happened because commanders routinely could not
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influence this phase of combat, or that the Greeks were concerned with limiting the 
human cost of hoplite battle.
Chapter Conclusions
There is a great deal of evidence regarding the battlefield role of the general, 
his ability to communicate with his phalax, and his ability to influence combat; this 
evidence suggests his role was not limited to offering an inspirational example by 
fighting in the front ranks, and that in principle he was able to influence all phases of 
battle. However it is likely that his influence changed as the battle progressed, 
becoming weaker during the fighting itself and only returning to its full strength 
once the retreat/pursuit phase of battle began, because most generals would have 
been directly involved in the fighting at some point. The ability of generals to 
influence battle can be split into three main sections: before battle, during battle, and 
after battle.
Before battle we sometimes see generals being able to set up ambushes in 
order to counter enemy manoeuvres, place troops behind enemy positions in order to 
cause more casualties during the pursuit, give long and inspiring speeches before 
battle, give short speeches before battle in order to catch the enemy off guard, 
emphasise the importance of terrain to their troops, and make use of intelligence in 
order to attack the enemy when they are unprepared or defenceless. The focus is on 
the exploitation of natural advantages and the engineering of other advantages, and
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the source material suggests that the last thing he should do is to accept a challenge 
to battle where his forces would be on equal terms with the enemy.
The battle proper began with the advance to combat, where we see the 
influence of the general begin to wane slightly. Examples of large phalanxes 
manoeuvring during this phase of battle are rare, although it appears that Spartan 
phalanxes could make significant tactical manoeuvres during the advance, and other 
Greeks were capable of exploiting changing tactical circumstances during the 
advance.
During the actual fighting the influence of the general could be exercised on 
a local level, i.e. within the immediate visual and aural range of other hoplites, and 
on a tactical level should circumstances demand or allow it; messengers could be 
sent, orders passed down the line, or pushes called for. His contribution to the 
fighting, and his ability to command others, was not reduced to that of an 
inspirational example, although the ability to lead by example where necessary and 
to offer continued exhortation during the fighting would have been a significant 
advantage. The main influence that the general was able to exert here was that of 
calling for pushes or retreats in the face of changing local circumstances. However 
there are examples which indicate the ability of generals to exercise influence and 
control on a larger scale: Pagondas was able to order a cavalry attack in the middle 
of the battle of Delium, Pelopidas directed the Sacred Band against specific parts of 
a Spartan army, and Spartan armies regularly wheeled to attack other parts of an 
enemy line that were still engaged, rather than pursue fleeing hoplites. A significant
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piece of evidence regarding the ability, and expectation, of a general to influence 
battle can be found in the death of Epaminondas at the second battle of Mantinea. 
This resulted in such confusion that the Theban-led army ground to a halt, and any 
chance of securing a significant victory was lost. The use of the word ‘confusion’ 
rather than a more emotive word is deliberate: Epaminondas’ army may have lost its 
momentum not because it was so shocked at the death of its leader that it was unable 
to continue, but because the ultimate source of command and control had suddenly 
been wiped out, hence confusion reigned. It is, of course, possible that a combination 
of the two was responsible for the inability of the Boeotian army to secure victory, 
indeed this is likely -  what is no longer acceptable is only looking to the impact on 
morale that the death of Epaminondas caused.
During the final phase of hoplite battle, the retreat/pursuit, the role and 
influence of the general comes back into focus, reduced to the question “should we 
pursue or not?” The ‘default’ position of hoplite armies was one of significant and 
fierce pursuit, and several examples attest to the desire, and ability, of victorious 
hoplites to pursue defeated and broken enemies some distance if the tactical 
circumstances allowed it. Those examples where pursuit did not occur are at least as 
important, indicating that a deliberate and calculated decision had been taken by the 
general, and communicated to the rest of the phalanx; this deliberate restraint could 
occur because of the presence of other enemy forces, a nearby enemy city, or 
because other friendly elements were still fighting and required assistance. Spartan 
forces appear to have been well trained in this regard, and regularly returned to the 
main fighting instead of pursuing fleeing enemies, although they were also capable 
of engaging in the slaughter of a defeated army if there was no tactical reason to
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return to the battlefield. The overall concern appears to have been one of tactical 
expediency: the general restrained his troops from pursuing if to do so could invite 
further attack, and crafted a pursuit to cause maximum casualties.
While a progression from advance to retreat can be detected in the structure 
of most battles, the nature of this progression depended on changing tactical 
circumstances. Some battles involved a large amount of manoeuvring before and 
during the advance, others involved a simple advance which was followed by a 
lengthy and intense period of fighting with no pursuit, while others saw little fighting 
at all, with one phalanx losing its nerve and running before the two sides made 
contact. The lack of similarity from one battle to the next is accounted for by a 
number of factors, including geographical factors, phalanx composition, the presence 
of supporting forces such as light infantry or cavalry, and the motivation of those 
forces present. However the most important factor was the ability of generals to 
influence the course of battle.
Generals were capable of exercising command and control throughout these
battles, sometimes with a view in mind to maximising enemy casualties, other times
to exert control over territory or save beleaguered allied units. Not all battles
required complex tactics, and not all generals were capable of advanced tactical
thinking, but this does not reduce the art of generalship in the Classical Greek world
to setting an example as a warrior. Indeed remarks comparing the development of
generalship from the brutal and simple onslaught of an Achilles to the intelligent and
innovative plans of an Odysseus miss the point. This contrast was as possible in the
world of Homer as it was in the Classical world; it did not represent an ‘advance’ in
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generalship, and from Homer’s time to modem times, the emphasis has been on a 
balance between the two, not a progression from one to the other. This balance can 
be seen throughout Greek history, when warfare was a balancing act between 
brutality and intelligence, between rage and restraint, and between selfishness and 
communal good; it was not simple, it was not undirected, and it was certainly not 
limited to a single, honourable clash between equal phalanxes on a level plain.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This thesis has attempted to present a new approach to the study of hoplite 
battle, one that is centred on the role and influence of the general and subordinate 
commanders. The vision of battle thus created is brutal, at times utterly chaotic, and 
seemingly unrestricted in nature, and at other times clinical, malicious, and chilling 
to a modem civilian mind-set quite divorced from the physical violence and blood of 
battle. The experiences of the Athenian army that was defeated at the battle of 
Delium in 424 epitomises this vision: first interrupted by an unexpected enemy 
advance, the Athenian phalanx found success on its left flank, routing most of its 
opposition and massacring those who stood, met with resistance on its right flank, 
and was finally broken by the appearance of enemy cavalry. The ‘fog of war’ present 
at Delium was such that this cavalry was mistaken as an advance scouting force of 
another Boeotian army, while the victorious Athenian left flank became so 
disorientated that it began to engage itself. No quarter was expected, none was given, 
and hundreds were killed in the fighting and pursuit, which only ended with the 
coming of night.
I began this research with the intention of examining the evidence for 
generals and generalship in the battles of the Classical Greeks. I was unconvinced by 
assertions that generals were little more than foci for the morale of hoplite armies, 
and that the only way they could really influence battle was by providing a brave and 
conspicuous example. Attached to this was a deep degree of scepticism regarding the 
notion that Classical Greeks operated under a ‘system’ of warfare that somehow 
deliberately limited tactics and, consequently, casualties. The two positions must be
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taken together if they are to make sense, thus some of the most influential scholars of 
the past fifty years have created and developed an interpretation of warfare which 
placed limits on the ability of generals to influence battle and emphasised the simple 
nature of warfare, which itself resulted in a minimum of casualties occurring. The 
above chapters have collected and analysed the evidence for this image of Classical 
Greek warfare, and have concluded that it must be rejected.
Initially I analysed and discussed the source material in a chronological way, 
looking for changing trends in the battlefield role of the general from Herodotus to 
Aeneas Tacticus, a search which has revealed that there was very little development 
of generalship as a formal topic of study and investigation during this time. Indeed, 
while gifted, driven, and occasionally eccentric generals appear in the pages of the 
historians using ‘radical’ tactics or methods of engagement, as do radical 
technologies such as flame throwers and siege mounds, they briefly make their mark 
and then disappear. Sometimes, years later, the theories, practices, and successes of 
these generals were replicated by another individual, but there was no linear 
progression or development of generalship in the Classical period: the underlying 
theories of battle and warfare that governed the Athenian response to the first Persian 
invasion and Pausanias’ command of the allied army that resisted the second were 
functionally identical to those which Epaminondas followed in his defeat of Sparta at 
the second battle of Mantinea. Individually gifted generals either took their style of 
command to the grave, or the secrets of their success were too complicated and 
different for their contemporaries to grasp: generals developed, but generalship as a 
genre and technical skill did not.
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A degree of command and control was detected throughout most of the 
engagements described by Herodotus: hoplite forces frequently attacked at such a 
time, and in such a manner, as to gain the maximum advantage from the tactical 
circumstances. The battles described by Thucydides echo these qualities, although he 
gives greater detail and approaches the engagements with a more technical eye, 
something we would expect given his experience and his reasons for writing. 
Thucydides offers stark examples of the dangers associated with underestimating 
light infantry, comments on the chaotic reality of fighting in the front ranks of a 
phalanx, and also gives a great deal of information regarding the ability of generals, 
and subordinate commanders, to influence engagements. There is no indication that a 
theory of warfare and command had developed, or was developing, and there is 
certainly no indication that warfare had become ‘more brutal’ since the events 
described by Herodotus. There is no noticeable difference in the level of battlefield 
command present in Xenophon’s battle descriptions than in Thucydides or 
Herodotus, though he describes some of the largest hoplite battles the Greek world 
ever saw, as well as a number of small and intense skirmishes. Aeneas Tacticus’ 
conception of warfare conforms to that of his historical predecessors and 
contemporaries: he does not present any of his advice as being new or revolutionary, 
indeed much of it has direct parallels with earlier events.
The use of intelligent generalship, subordinate commanders, light infantry, 
and flexible heavy infantry, as well as a desire for victory regardless of the method, 
are all attributes that are present in Greek warfare throughout the Classical period;
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indeed, they define it.705 These attributes account for the fact that no two battles from 
Classical Greece were truly alike; while a progression from advance to retreat can be 
detected in the structure of most battles, the nature of this progression depended on 
changing tactical circumstances. Some battles involved a large amount of 
manoeuvring before and during the advance, others involved a simple advance which 
was followed by a lengthy and intense period of fighting with no pursuit, while 
others saw little fighting at all, with one phalanx losing its nerve and running before 
the two sides made contact. The differences between battles are accounted for by a 
number of factors, including geographical factors, phalanx composition, the presence 
of supporting forces such as light infantry or cavalry, and the motivation of those 
forces present. However the most important factor was the ability, discussed 
throughout this thesis, of individuals to influence the course of battle. On many 
occasions this individual was the general, who could have used scouting parties to 
gather information, set ambushes to tie up a wing of the enemy during battle, placed 
troops behind the enemy to maximise casualties, led a small strike force himself, 
determined when to attack and whether to pursue, and even stepped back from the 
fighting to allow fresh orders to be sent to other parts of the line. Equally this 
individual may have been a designated subordinate officer or an observant or 
experienced hoplite who shouted out advice, recognised and exploited a weakness in 
the enemy line, or organised the defence of an injured comrade. In a relatively loose 
phalanx formation all of these actions would have been occurring up and down the 
line simultaneously, with the ebb and flow of battle changing constantly according to 
the overall tactical situation. Hoplite battle was not about massive defensive 
formations or shows of social solidarity in the face of danger; it was about
705 Contra Carmen (1999) 40-2; Hanson (2000b) 201-232. Rawlings (2000) 233-250 for discussion of 
the individual flexibility of hoplites.
269
teamwork, communication, leadership, and the ability of individuals from the 
supreme commander down to the youngest hoplite, to ‘step up’ when the situation 
demanded it.
Two levels of command and control have been identified in the surviving 
accounts of hoplite engagements. These are: 1) generals; 2) designated subordinate 
commanders, veterans, and notable individuals. These levels of command are found 
in all the phases of battle, although their importance and prominence change from 
one phase to the next. The presence of subordinate officers in Classical Greek armies 
suggests that the Greeks recognised the importance of command and control, and 
that they took steps to ensure it could be maintained thoughout an engagement. This 
may seem to reduce the overall role of the general but when we remember the 
difficulties of communication during engagements, and how the Greeks attempted to 
overcome them, we can begin to see the complete picture: subordinate commanders 
were present not only to maintain order and morale directly around them, but also to 
pass on orders and ensure those under their command responded to new orders 
issued from the general himself. Subordinate commanders help to complete the 
image of generalship and command in Classical Greek armies that this study has 
attempted to create; one of continued tactical influence (whether extremely local or 
army-wide) combined with the ability to innovate should the individual general have 
the chance or capacity to do so.
Hoplite generals were able to influence each and every stage of a hoplite 
battle: This is specifically demonstrated by a number of battlefield incidents
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recorded by reliable sources, as well as being heavily implied by evidence which 
suggests that the phalanx formation was not a basic and tightly packed battering ram. 
Indeed, the phalanx could be a highly manoeuvrable formation, while individual 
hoplites were flexible and capable of individual action. This potential, indeed this 
desire, for battlefield flexibility is emphasised further when the position of light 
infantry in Greek warfare is considered. Light infantry was highly dangerous when 
handled correctly, but to do so required either a great deal of micro-management, a 
successful ambush, a supporting phalanx of hoplites to ‘check’ the response of the 
targeted phalanx, or a combination of all of these. As such it is perhaps unsurprising 
that there are relatively few examples of the effective use of light infantry by Greek 
generals, although those that survive to us indicate that there was no doctrinal or 
moral bar on their use; the only battlefield restriction on the effective deployment of 
light infantry was the competence of the general in command. The evidence of the 
Fourth century tactician Aeneas Tacticus is important in this regard; his treatise on 
how to survive under siege involves a very broad conception of siege, one that 
extends to the mere presence of enemy forces on the extreme borders of a state’s 
territory, and as such his advice has some application to pitched battles and warfare 
in general. This advice concentrates on the use of combined forces in co-ordinated 
attacks that strike the enemy when they are least prepared; in order to achieve this he 
emphasises the importance of effective, rapid communications, and an experienced 
scouting force. Aeneas assumes a great deal about the military forces and capabilities 
of a state and he does not present his work as being anything other than a practical 
guide for any other state to follow; his advice does not appear to be unrealistic or 
radically innovative, rather it represents an everyday approach to the forms of 
warfare that average states would experience. As such we must engage with his
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surviving work if we are to form a complete understanding of warfare, and Greek 
attitudes to military organisation, command, and violence. For this is what Aeneas’ 
text is: a guide to killing as many of the enemy as possible at the smallest risk to the 
state through the use of intelligent generalship coupled with overwhelming force; in 
this Aeneas echoes, in a greatly refined form, the work of Herodotus, Thucydides, 
and Xenophon.
The conclusions of this study have significant implications for the study of 
Classical Greek warfare, and help to complete a number of recent trends in modem 
scholarship, namely the rejection of idealised notions of Greek warfare as being 
somehow superior to later forms, the vigorous re-examination of ideas and concepts 
promoted by earlier generations of scholars, and the drive to expose the 
sophistication of thought and action which the Greeks brought to the history of 
warfare. The hoplite general now appears as more than just a first amongst equals, 
destined to fall in the front ranks of a phalanx over which he held only tenuous and 
fleeting control, and in order to demonstrate to his fellow citizens that he was worthy 
of his office. Indeed he is now helped by subordinate commanders, who were present 
to ensure the continued existence of command and control in hoplite armies. The 
general is now seen as playing a vital role in the battlefield effectiveness of his 
phalanx, a role which saw a remarkable array of tactics, mse, and manoeuvre being 
used, from Herodotus through to Xenophon’s day, and which was limited only by the 
extent of his own imagination.
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Appendix 1: Casualties in Hoplite Battles
Josiah Ober detected a deliberate attempt to maintain a level of decency in 
the way the states of Greece made war; in his list of the ‘rules of war’ in Classical 
Greece he includes ‘Pursuit of defeated and retreating enemies should be limited in
7 0duration.’ A similar sentiment can be found in the works of Hanson, who is of the 
opinion that the beauty of the Greek way of war was its deliberate focus on the 
limiting of conflict to a single brief encounter which allowed disputes to be settled 
decisively and with the minimum of bloodshed.707 Krentz has calculated that 
casualties in the pitched battles recorded by our surviving sources were generally 
low; an average of 5% of the victorious force was lost, compared to 14% of the 
defeated force.708 This relative lack of bloodshed has been lauded by some modem 
commentators as demonstrating the underlying humanity inherent in the pitched 
battles fought between hoplites in Classical Greece.709 According to this viewpoint, 
the concern for the limitation of bloodshed also resulted in the deliberate exclusion 
of certain tactics and military forces from significant roles in warfare; lightly armed 
troops and cavalry were largely ignored in mainland Greece, while battles were brief
71ftand involved little or no pursuit of the enemy.
This is not to say that battles were not fiercely contested affairs; Hanson has 
imagined the battlefield environment of the hoplite in vivid and disturbing detail,
706 Ober (1996) 56.
707 Hanson (2000a) 36. See also Anderson (1970) 149; Lazenby (1991) 101; Wheeler (2007a) 212.
708 Krentz (1985) 13-20.
709 Most forcefully by Hanson (2000a) 36-7: “For more than three hundred years Greece thrived under 
such a structured system of conflict between amateurs, where the waste of defensive expenditure in 
lives and lost work and agricultural produce was kept within “limits.”
710 A factor closely connected to the exclusion of manoeuvrable and fast striking forces such as lightly 
armed troops: see Chapter 4.7.
273
while Goldsworthy pointed out that although 5% may appear to be a small figure, it 
still represents nearly half of the front rank of a ‘standard’ eight rank phalanx, with
71114% accounting for a rank and a half Hanson views these casualties as 
acceptable: “The outcome of hoplite pitched battle left the property and culture of 
the defeated intact, robbed only of some 15% of their male citizens, many of whom
719were already past the prime of life.” This is a very difficult statement to accept; 
15% of a city’s available male citizens was no small loss, and it is rather 
disingenuous to suggest that this blow had no effect on the culture of a polis. Indeed, 
in the vast majority of cases city’s would have responded to threats or undertaken 
their own offensive operations with the largest levy possible; in the event of defeat 
this would result in, on average, 15% of the total male citizen population being 
wiped out in a single encounter. This would have a drastic effect on culture, however 
it is defined, and would also have serious financial, political, and social implications. 
It is difficult to see how Hanson could conclude that most of these casualties were 
past their prime, indeed the evidence suggests that the exact opposite was the case, 
with most of these casualties being taken by the first two ranks, i.e. by be the 
strongest, fittest, and by extension youngest, members of the phalanx. This much is 
suggested by Arrian’s advice that the first ranks of a phalanx should be comprised of 
the strongest and fittest men, surely also the younger members, while Xenophon 
suggested that the rear ranks should be made up of the most experienced, level­
headed, and elder members.713 These young men could become casualties by being 
struck by enemy spears or swords during the fighting phase of combat, but more 
likely they were killed when the nerve of their phalanx broke and they were faced 
with the choice of fighting on without support, attempting an organised withdrawal,
711 Goldsworthy (1997) 22-3.
712 Hanson (2000a) 224.
713 Arrian Tactica 12.2; Xenophon Cyropaedia 3.3.41-2. Anderson (1970) 174-5; Hanson (2000a) 29.
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or fleeing in panic. Thucydides’ description of 120 hoplites killed in Aetolia in 
426B.C. as “...men in the prime of their youth...” suggests that these men were 
certainly not past their best, and the note of pathos in the historian’s account suggests 
that their loss was keenly felt in Athens.714 Finally the Spartan system of responding 
to skirmishing attack involved certain age classes being instructed to begin a pursuit; 
when Iphicrates attacked a Spartan mora in 390B.C. his peltasts were pursued by the
nt  e
first ten, and then the first fifteen, year classes. The younger age classes were 
preferred for this task because of the need for brief and intense bursts of speed; their 
youth gave them an obvious advantage over the older members of the phalanx. This 
system also suggests that these young hoplites were in a position to make an 
immediate response to skirmishing attack; I suggest that they made up the majority 
of the front ranks, although given the flexibility of the Spartan phalanx it is entirely 
possible that the age groups could be rapidly assembled from various parts of the 
phalanx. Even if this were the case, the battle of Lechaeum still speaks against 
Hanson’s position: the first, and presumably the heaviest, casualties were taken by 
those hoplites who were ordered to chase down the peltasts, i.e. those aged 18-32,
7 1  f \certainly not men past their prime.
When viewed in this way the incredibly violent nature of hoplite battle 
becomes apparent, as does the difficulty of viewing its system as being one designed 
to limit the impact that warfare would have on the state. If the majority of deaths
714 Thucydides 3.98.
715 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.5.14-15. Also Hellenica 2.4.29-31, on which see below. Rawlings (2000) 
239 states: “That this strategy met with mixed results does not invalidate the Spartan recognition of 
physiological reality.”
716 Xenophon, Hellenica, 4.5.16.
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from recorded battles were amongst the young and strong front rank fighters, then 
how is this system any different or more praiseworthy than any other?
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